

Critical Incident Review: Active Shooter at Robb Elementary School—Chapter 2. Tactics and Equipment

Rick Braziel

00:00:01

Hi, my name is Rick Braziel, I'm the former chief from the City of Sacramento, and Mark Lomax will introduce himself in a minute, but we're here to talk about tactics and equipment. A little bit about my background: I did 33 years at the Sacramento Police Department, the last five as chief. During that time I had multiple assignments, including eight years as our SWAT commander and our Metro commander, which is basically all the special operations group. Retired in end of 2012, and since that time I've been doing critical incident reviews and organizational assessments across the country. And today we would like to talk to you about tactics and equipment. Mark, would you like to introduce yourself?

Mark Lomax

00:00:41

Yes, thanks, Rick. My name's Mark Lomax. I retired from the Pennsylvania State Police after 27 years. When I retired, I was the director of training and education for the department. Subsequently, I was the training manager for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP. And then I worked for the United Nations in Liberia, West Africa, overseeing the Liberia National Police SWAT team and crowd control unit. Then I came back, and I was the executive director of the National Tactical Officer Association. And then I've been doing consultant work, and currently I am the director of campus safety at a private school here in Pennsylvania. So welcome, and back to you, Rick.

Rick Braziel

00:01:39

One of the things all of you may have heard is the confusion about whether this was an active shooter or a barricaded subject. And so one of the things we want to talk about is kind of how do you respond to and how do you identify those?

So in this situation in Uvalde, in this tragedy, we had officers responding into the building from both ends of the building. And if you haven't had the opportunity yet, we encourage you to go to the timeline segment of the video series. It'll kind of explain in more detail the circumstances and the sequence of events that occurred. In this situation, officers raced down the hall from both ends of the hallway, and actually when you look at it, had extreme potential for crossfire. And we're just fortunate that we didn't have a blue-on-blue shooting as they moved through the hallway. And throughout the entire event, no one recognized that this was a potential problem all the way through the entire incident.

So one of the things we have to do in our training is to identify those along the way. Stop, practicals, talk about tabletops, about what happens with and who's responsible for identifying how people move through buildings; what formations they have; what if you only have one, two, or three officers? And then someone watching in your formations and you're practicing your tactics, are there potential crossfire situations? And even stopping and freezing those practicals and saying, "Stop, look, look what

happens if the gunman comes out, we're all going to shoot each other." And to be able to identify those so it becomes just it's not necessarily muscle memory, but it's brain muscle memory to constantly assess and look and have a broader perspective from that. Mark, you want to add some more?

Mark Lomax

00:03:24

Yeah, I agree, Rick, and thanks for bringing that up. And I think all this formation and how to address active shooters—the paradigm shift back in Columbine,¹ where—prior to Columbine, it was always first responding officers wait until there's a tactical team or a SWAT team to arrive to address the situation. Ever since then it's changed to five-person formation, four, three, even down to now one-person formation, one person addressing the situation.

So what we reviewed and what we saw in Uvalde, there were sufficient enough people there, but like you said, they were coming in from both sides. The potential for blue-on-blue shooting was significant. They didn't form up the way they should have. Initially they did, but then later on that didn't come into play. And like you stated, it all goes back to training, training, training, having the proper equipment, proper documentation and policies and procedures. So yeah, thanks.

Rick Braziel

00:04:48

One of the things that we found in Uvalde, despite the fact that most of the officers that responded had active shooter training, is that they lost momentum. And part of that losing momentum, they lost sight of the fact it's not just about eliminating a threat, it's also about stopping the dying—it's stop the killing, stop the dying. And they decided to treat it as a barricaded gunman. That was a bad decision. It was the wrong decision. And when they did that, they forgot about their obligation to rescue victims and potential victims, and they had information there were victims inside the classroom.

If you have the opportunity or haven't had the opportunity, we encourage you to also look at the leadership video, they'll talk about the decisions that were made that led up to this and the failures of incident command. But for this one, when we talk about tactics: The tactics failed regardless of leadership, because they lost momentum and didn't continue down following the training, following the tactics. In our assessment, the only thing we can look at is that doing training once doesn't—you check the box, that's all you do. You actually don't develop the skill set, particularly in areas like Uvalde where the agencies are small and you're likely to have multiple people from multiple jurisdictions.

So training is critically important at a regional level with the potential responders to an active shooter so that everyone is on the same page and everyone knows what to do, and that you practice it over and over and over again. And we use the term practice a lot, because think of your favorite sport, doesn't matter what your favorite sport is, whether you're into music, the best of the best only perform a small

¹ On April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School in Columbine, Colorado, shot 34 people, killing 13, before dying by suicide. (Three more individuals were injured escaping from the shooters.)

percent of the time, they practice over and over and over again anticipating that performance. And in this case, we checked the box that we had active shooter training, but never ever practiced it. And so you've got to practice it. And Mark, I know you totally agree with that.

Mark Lomax

00:06:48

Absolutely, well, you're spot on, Rick. And one of the things also we talked about practicing, training—Uvalde, there was the police, the school district of police, there was the City of Uvalde police, there was the county, and tons of other agencies that showed up. But the initial response, there was three different agencies there.

And one of the things that we did discover in our review was that there was a significant lack of training between agencies. And again, when there's a significant event like what happened in Uvalde and multiple agencies arrive, that is not the time to start making relationships or understanding procedures or how to deal with a situation. And so like what you said, Rick, when you're dealing with talking about training and training and training and tabletop exercise and so forth, it's always best to ensure that those possible responding agencies are included.

And so in the situation down in Uvalde the city, the county, local, even federal agencies should have been on the same page, they should have trained together before and understanding whether their equipment was interoperable, whether communications was on the same page, and tactics especially. So when you're talking about training, when you're talking about active shooter situations, it's always best to ensure that other agencies that have the potential to respond to your location are also included in those exercises.

Rick Braziel

00:08:43

One of the things that we saw in the review of Uvalde is you have 11 officers there within a short period of time, and some of them drove right towards the active shooter, they drove towards the stimulus. They actually had the stimulus when they entered the door, and they had that initial momentum to go towards it. And then people paused, and you ended up with just a couple people going down the hall, and the rest of them stopped. And we've got to develop the culture of you don't stop, you've got to keep moving forward, even—no matter what you have with you.

In this case, when we looked at the review, some of the responders were talking about, we didn't have shields, we didn't have rifles, but they had numbers. They had significant numbers. They did have some of the equipment. Was it ideal? No, it wasn't ideal, but they had enough to move down, and they lacked that creativity of how to move together—one, because there are multiple agencies, but two, they hadn't talked about that and practiced it.

In addition to that, Uvalde, when you talk about it is we had classrooms—school was in session, it was, they were wrapping up the school year, they had students and teachers in some of the classrooms, is how do you prioritize moving towards the building and at the same time eliminating the threat and also

protecting other potential victims? Because we actually had an injured teacher in a classroom across the hall from a round that went through the Sheetrock. So how do you move forward, stop the threat, reduce the risk to other students and staff, and then also at the same time think about how do we rescue the victims that are in that class?

It's super dynamic, and that's not the time to think about all those things in the middle of the crisis. The time to think about all those is in your practice and your training and you develop scenarios, and what if this, what are we going to do?

Many of you that are watching this have actually had those déjà vu moments. Like you actually had a dream of something, you actually had it in your brain. And the more we think about it, the more we train on it, the less we have to think through it, but natural instinct kicks in. In this case it didn't, and a lot of that has to do with just the inability to think through the scenario because they hadn't practiced it, they hadn't talked about it. Mark?

Mark Lomax

00:11:05

You're right. And one of the things, like you said, the what ifs. And so when it comes to training, whether it's patrol, tactical, or whatever, the what ifs, just like they had the shooting, the tragedy last year down in Allen, Texas,² and it was outside, it was an outside active shooter situation. How many departments practice for different venues, being outside or whatever?

And like you stated, not all the time—probably pretty much the majority of the time, the first responders in a active shooter situation will not have all the equipment that they may think they need. But the equipment that every officer, every responding officer, has is their training, what's in their mind, what's in their heart. That's probably the best equipment you can have in an ever-evolving dynamic situation. So you have to be prepared to be able to switch up, to think outside the box, to be innovative, and when other responders are coming, to be able to communicate, communicate, communicate, and stop the killing.

So again, in this situation, like you said, Rick, you had 11 responders first there, some of them had significant training, some of them had okay training, some of them were tactically or SWAT-trained, but again, they may not have had every piece of equipment necessary to address that situation, but they did have their training, they did have, they had their hearts, their minds.

So again, you have to be fluid and think outside the box pretty much at any time because you may train, train, train, but when that moment occurs, it may not line up exactly on how you train. But again, you have to think outside the box, you have to be innovative, and the most important step, you have to stop the killing.

² On May 5, 2023, a gunman shot 15 people—killing eight and injuring seven—at a shopping center in Allen, Texas, before he was shot and killed himself by a police officer who was present for other reasons. Jake Bleiberg and Gene Johnson, "What to Know about the Mass Shooting at a Texas Mall," AP, May 10, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/shooting-outlet-mall-allen-texas-200f1ffadf7daefa42cfbe45510b083f>.

Rick Braziel

00:13:33

As we talk about training, we're strongly encouraging agencies to adopt the national standards for active shooter—and adopting it doesn't mean putting it in policy. We can put anything in policy. It's do we adopt the culture of, and does that become part of how we respond?

Mark was mentioning the training and how important that is and how to think outside the box. And we in law enforcement don't do a really good job of stepping back and looking elsewhere at what's happening and try to adapt those here. Every review we've ever done, the chiefs will tell you, the sheriffs will tell you, the state patrols will tell you, "I never thought that would happen here." No one ever thinks it will happen here. Not a single agency thought this will happen here, but it did.

So we have to get out of the mindset that it's never going to happen here, and then have the conversations about what if it were to happen here? Are we meeting national standards? Are we training together? And then get super creative like Mark said, think outside the box.

I know an agency in Northern California that had an officer shot and was out in the open with a sniper. And they didn't have a vehicle, they didn't have a ballistic vehicle. So a bunch of officers took off their vests, put them over the side of the door, put them inside the door, and they drove the car in as a shield to protect and rescue her. But that's thinking outside the box because they had those conversations. What if we don't have the equipment? We don't have time to wait for the tactical teams.

And in Uvalde, they were waiting for the largest agency in that region, which is Customs and Border Protection. They were waiting for them to come, and they were nowhere close at the time for their BORTAC. So we have to come up with scenarios and talk about the training where we get super creative, we regionally adopt standards, we regionally talk about things, what if it were to happen here? Not if but when, and practice for the when. And "hope it never happens" is never a good strategy. Hope is not a good strategy. We just have to plan and prepare. Mark?

Mark Lomax

00:15:35

Absolutely. And I was somewhere recently, and we were talking about statistically, statistically what would it be? I mean, the statistics of it happening here, 80 percent, 90 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent. And my response always is 50 percent. Either it is or it's not. And for the most majority of time you don't train on the fact it is not, you train on the fact that it is.

And one of the things that we observed in the review is, Uvalde had a SWAT team. And as we know ever since Columbine, when there's an active shooter, you do not wait, you do not wait for the SWAT team or the tactical team or whatever.

And the other part of the review that we looked at was the fact of their having a SWAT team, but it was definitely not in compliance with the national standards that are out there. So if you do have a SWAT team or emergency response team or whatever you may call it, you really need to look at it as far as is it part of the national standards as far as personnel and equipment and training and so forth?

So it also provides a false sense of security to the community. If the community believes you have a fully functioning SWAT team, and you have two or three people, that's not a fully functioning SWAT team.

So again, you have to look within a department to look at your capabilities, look at your staffing, look at your equipment to see what you do have, what you're capable of doing, and do you have the resources. And one of the biggest assets into a tactical situation, it's regionalization, is being able to reach out to other local agencies within your area and to regionalize responses to active shooter or significant events whereby you're sharing resources, personnel, equipment, and so forth. But again, going back to what we said earlier, when you do that, you have to ensure that your training and your policies, your MOUs are all in line with that.

So again, when it comes to this active shooter scenarios, again, you must have the mindset that you must first stop the killing. That's number one priority. But then there's subsequent things that need to be done too, and we're going to talk about that in the next couple of slides.

Rick Braziel

00:18:39

Next slide.

Mark Lomax

00:18:44

So again, one of the things, again, that we observed down in Uvalde was the fact that the lack of leadership, the lack of communication contributed to the 77 minutes of waiting. There was that misinformation that subsequently came out that it was a barricaded situation, which it was not. And subsequently information was being communicated to responding officers that it was a barricaded situation.

But this all goes back to the fact that those first arriving on the scene, those 11 officers that are there, should have been in a situation that they should have assessed the situation and provided that information to those that are responding. One of the acronyms is LCANs—location, condition, actions, and needs. That provides valuable information to those that are responding. And that did not occur at Robb Elementary. The information that was being provided was erroneous, which created total confusion. There was no—and like Rick said, if you go to the different sections or different chapters in the review, under Leadership and Communications, you'll find some of the things that we're talking about.

The other part of this is clearing rooms. So as this was ongoing for the 77 minutes and as Rick talked about, some of the officers that were on scene were starting to clear other rooms. And so when we looked and we reviewed the videos of body-worn cameras, one of the things that they were not doing was marking the rooms that they were clearing and everything, which is not only a issue for the safety of the officers there, but also a management issue as far as using valuable resources to have duplicative

things going on where rooms are being checked two and three times. So there needs to be something in place to ensure that when you do clear rooms that you're clearly marking the areas. But again, in this situation, the information that was being provided was not accurate. Rick?

Rick Braziel

00:21:34

One of the frustrations from the officers that responded is that when they responded, they were hearing it was a barricaded subject, but when they got there, they realized this wasn't a barricaded subject. There were kids in the room, something's going on, and there wasn't a system set up for them to speak up because we didn't have true incident command. And again, as Mark referenced, it's another chapter in another segment, but how do we enable responding folks, even leadership from other agencies, to feel comfortable challenging decisions? To say, "Listen, we don't have good intel. We don't have a good sit stats. Nobody's done LCANs." And no matter where you are in that scenario, you need to be able to pivot and go to those and say, "We didn't do it. Now we need to do that."

So you need to reinforce with your agencies and your peers: It's okay to challenge, have we done this, have we done this? And because that might enlighten people, "Wait a second, I hadn't thought about it." We saw a tremendous amount of tunnel vision and a tremendous amount of overload, particularly on leadership that they weren't functioning well because they were just overwhelmed and nobody challenged them on the decisions they made on the process.

And then—for those of you that have never worked with major search and rescue teams, never been in hurricane deployments or tornadoes or earthquakes, the fire service search and rescue has a phenomenal way of marking the areas they've been to. They have a coding system, so other rescue teams coming behind them know that something's been checked so they can move on and use their resources.

So we have to also think out outside of our law enforcement silo and start looking towards our other first responding communities for what would you do in this situation? We've got a huge campus, and we need to have a very efficient way of marking what's been searched, what's been not searched, large office complexes, big warehouses, the ability to manage all that. So if you start thinking outside the box, all your potential response scenarios is how do you manage it so that you aren't duplicating, triplicating? I mean, we had rooms searched over and over and over again, and that's a lot of wasted time, a lot of wasted resources, quite honest, too many officers in the inner perimeter doing things they think are the right thing to do when in fact it was already been done one, two, or three times.

Mark Lomax

00:24:05

And so as we have reviewed in this video and talked about it early on, time is of the essence. One thing that is notable about this tragedy is the 77 minutes that transpired between the time the shooting started to the time the suspect was killed. And so leaders at the scenes—and leadership doesn't always have to be a rank. The first responding person on the scene is the leader until someone else comes. But in this situation, they did have high ranking individuals at the scene. And so again, there's several

chapters in the review that talk about leadership and talk about communication and the failure on both. In this situation, there was definitely a delay and the miscommunications that was transpiring. But again, our review indicated that when you have active shooter situations, time is of the essence. Every second that goes past when there's an active shooter gives the shooter more time to kill more victims.

So you may not have all the equipment like we talked about earlier, but whatever you do have, you have to utilize that. And so some departments, you may want to look at issuing particular equipment to your patrol or to a unit that will respond to special incidents like this. And you have to look at your inventory, your resources, and you may not be able to have everything. But again, what we mentioned earlier is another option is for regionalization. And so if you do not have all the equipment that you think you would need for your department, again, by regionalization, you should be able to reach out to other agencies within your area to be able to, again, share through MOUs or train with each other.

And so again, you could share the equipment, share your resources, share your training especially. But again, it all goes back to proper training, proper documentation, proper policies, understanding the dynamics of active shooter situation where time is of the essence, and it's imperative to stop the killing. Rick?

Rick Braziel

00:27:16

Yep. Most of us in the country don't have the ability to have all of this within our jurisdiction. We're not the New York PDs or the Los Angeles PDs or Chicago's. And so when Mark talks about regionalizing, it's not just the fact that, oh, let's all get together and talk. It's taking a hard look at, is our equipment interoperable? Are we using the same weapon systems? Do we have the same ballistic shields? So when you have a regional response and you look at regionalization, if I am agency X and Mark is agency Y, we know each other's equipment because we have the same equipment, we use the same manufacturers, the same weapon systems, so we have to look hard at ourselves, and do we have certain pieces of equipment because it's different than someone else, or do we realize that we need to start getting together as groups?

And there's examples of this best practices all across the country where chiefs and sheriffs and state entities have gotten together and said, let's have one weapon system, let's have one training scenario, let's all train together, let's piecemeal teams and not have agency X go train, agency Y go train, but we're going to put officers and deputies and troopers from agency X, Y, and Z together and give them the scenario, and they have the same set of equipment so they know what each agency has. So think more as a bigger team. And I know budgets are hard to do that, but how do you leverage each other's resources?

Mark Lomax

00:28:47

So in closing up this chapter, one of the things that you also should look at is having the equipment available at various locations. And for this situation, it doesn't always have to be tactical equipment. It could be as small as keys. And this was very evident in this situation where the access to master keys for

the responding departments was lacking or was not understood correctly. So as a department, when you're looking at schools and you're looking at business buildings or whatever, equipment doesn't always have to be a tactical thing, it could be as small as getting access to the doors, the locations.

So again, in this situation, there was a lot of confusion about keys. It's prudent for departments to be able to get access to schools, buildings, churches, whatever. So in your pre-planning—and that's another chapter in the review—in your pre-planning and your training, visit your local schools and your local synagogues and churches and businesses and talk about being able to have access, whether it's a Knox Box or a access box, or—nowadays, a lot of schools, even churches, synagogues, buildings, you need ID card access or prox card access.

So being able to get access to those prox cards, whether it's per patrol vehicle or per officer or per precinct or whatever would assist significantly in an active shooter situation where you need access through doors or whatever.

So again, when you're looking at these vulnerable, soft targets—schools and churches, synagogues, mosques, being able to get in there can really reduce time. And again, we talked about timing is everything when it comes to stopping the killing and dying. So when we're looking at equipment, sometimes it could just be as small as master keys or a prox card.

The other thing is being able to have radio communication or any type of communications. One of the things that we identified and looked at was one great asset that's in your community that you may not be aware of is your fire EMS services. Most buildings, if not all, schools, churches, synagogues, mosques, business buildings have to come under the fire codes. And so the local fire departments will come into the buildings to ensure you're within code and give you your certificate or whatever for that year. But one of the things that they tend to do is to ensure that their radio system is operable within all the areas of that building, because in case of a fire, they need to be able to communicate to ensure the safety of the firefighters.

So one option is for the law enforcement or police department, sheriff department, state police, whatever you are is to work with the local fire department and see if there are any voids in certain buildings that are in your jurisdiction, what they, the fire department, are doing with that entity, and to be able to know with your department that in the basement of X, Y, and Z building, there's no repeaters and you can't communicate, so be mindful.

So again, a little tip like reach out to your local fire department and work with them to see if there are any voids or dead zones in some of the buildings that are in your jurisdiction. Rick?

Rick Braziel

00:33:57

Yeah, and Mark has a great point because the fire service is not only involved in the inspections, they're also involved in all the building permits and all the development. So that's the time to, if you aren't involved in the building permit process, whether it's an office complex, a school, even just a subdivision, is having input into ingress, egress, the radio systems, where are the Knox Boxes, to have those kind of

inputs in, because at the front end—and the fire service is doing really good at this—at the front end, they’re requiring buildings that haven’t been built yet to have repeater systems inside these big buildings or in the schools, office complexes that allow them to communicate.

Our issue is making sure that on the law enforcement side, those repeaters work for us. And if not, those type of repeaters, those key locations where chemicals are stored, all these things are important to you when you respond. So it’s not just about an active shooter, think beyond that, think about what if we have to go to a building on a burglar alarm call. Do we have radio communications? Are there chemicals stored in a particular room that might be hazardous to us? The fire service has all that, so does your building department, so they can become your best friends when it comes to the planning to response and your assessment of how to respond.

Mark Lomax

00:35:20

So that concludes our video for tactics and equipment, and we thank you so very much for taking time to look at this. Pretty much all the information that’s from our report for this chapter were taken as of May 24th, 2022. We looked at everything up to that point as far as their policies, their procedures, their training, their equipment, and so forth, and then compare that to the industry standards and best practices across the country.

But before we wrap up this video, we want to encourage you to refer to chapter two in the [Critical Incident Review](#). And chapter two talks about tactics and equipment. And for more information on this topic, definitely refer to chapter two. So Rick, any final words?

Rick Braziel

00:36:23

No, just thank you for taking the time to watch this video. We hope it was helpful to you and encourage you to share this link with others and to, again, go to the COPS Office website. They’ve got not only this report, but it’s just a [plethora of information available to you](#). And again from California, thank you very much.

Mark Lomax

00:36:44

And in closing, we thank you so very much for taking time to visit us today. And take care and be safe.

CIR Report Closing

00:36:53

Thank you so much for reviewing these important issues, for taking the time to talk about recommendations and policies. We certainly hope that the observations and recommendations throughout the report will improve the preparation and response by those law enforcement agencies that were addressed during the review, as well as other law enforcement agencies throughout the country, and we would add as well, as schools and school districts and people who are engaged with children in the school workplace to take a look at and address these different issues as well and become

familiar with them. If you do nothing else, it would be very informative to review the recommendations, familiarize yourself with what the issues are talked about today, and look at these specific recommendations and see how you might be able to work them into your active shooter and other disaster response plans.

Also, in the latter chapters, starting on page 513, there are many resources for the different topics that are addressed throughout the report. That whole section is really comprehensive for anyone that's looking for specific agencies and organizations that provide consultation, direct services, crisis services. There are planning templates and other toolkits related to all the topics that are covered by the Critical Incident Review team and the entire report, so we encourage you even to familiarize yourself with the resources.

And certainly before we wrap up the video, we really do want to encourage you to look at all the different chapters. We cover many, many important issues, just as this one is important. There's tactics and equipment, leadership and incident command, post-incident response and investigation, public communications, trauma support services, and finally, pre-incident planning and preparation. If you're looking for more on that, that's chapter 8. Chapter 3 covers leadership and incident command. We know how important—that's the base of where you start all your planning from. Chapter 5, public communications—we know that during and following a crisis are good interventions themselves. And so it's very, very important to familiarize yourself with what the appropriate type of public communications are that can help the community.

Chapter 6 covers trauma and support services, and I will make a plug here, that throughout every phase of the critical incident review, every team member was well-versed and practiced trauma-informed services in how we interviewed, how we talked to the community, how we talked about the incident itself, how we talked to the other youth and the community members, to make sure that we weren't activating people and adding to any of their distress. And as you can imagine, that's not an easy thing to do under these circumstances. So overall trauma-informed practices throughout this kind of a review and in all of your disaster planning in your exercises and drills, we don't want to make the school staff and the children feel more afraid. We want to help them get into a routine and a familiarity so that they know how to go through the process of keeping themselves safe without being more afraid because they're aware of the need to do this. And chapter 7 on school safety and security if you're looking for that specifically.

So there's a lot to learn there and we're so thrilled that you took the time to join us today. We also want to point out that we had an opportunity to talk to family members and learn about these children, who these victims were. And you will see that there is a section of remembrance profiles of the victims who were killed at Robb Elementary in Uvalde on May 24th in 2022. It was a gift and a really sacred place for us to be able to learn about who they were, these dynamic young people who were looking forward to their lives, and to honor their memories as their families continue to suffer through their losses.

But we also want to make sure that you know that you can visit the website where the entire report is listed. It's at cops.usdoj.gov/uvalde. You can download the report, you can refer to it, but know that the website houses the full report and the executive summary, and it's in both English and Spanish. And there are links for the resources that you can access at no cost, getting technical assistance to implement the recommendations in the report. Overall, the report has several hundred recommendations. So again, looking for specific information, you can go to the individual chapters and you can refer directly to the recommendations, and know that you can implement the different recommendations in the report with no-cost technical assistance. So please do visit the website, familiarize yourself with the information that you're looking for, and expand your reach to take a look at all the specific chapters, because there's a lot of lessons learned that we are hoping that throughout the country, others who are working in schools, working in law enforcement, are able to learn and implement some of the lessons that came out of this horrible event.

And we thank you very much for joining us today. We know that it takes a lot of energy out of your day to attend a webinar. We hope it was informative, and we appreciate your being with us. Thank you.