

Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing

A report on the
2013 National Summit
on Preventing Multiple
Casualty Violence



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Why?—the same question many of us asked on December 14th, 2012.

On that day, Adam Lanza fatally shot 20 children and six adult staff members at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. Before the school shooting, Lanza shot and killed his mother, Nancy, in their Newtown home. When first responders showed up at the school shooting, Lanza committed suicide by shooting himself in the head.

This was the second deadliest mass shooting by a single person in American history, after the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre.

Pictured here is one of many residences in the United States that demonstrated its confusion and sorrow following the events on December 14, 2012.



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National Summit on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: Community-Based Approaches to Prevention

Dear colleagues,

We are pleased to share with you the final report from the National Summit on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing, a collaborative initiative of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC); the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office); and the Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership, held at the FLETC's headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, April 9–11, 2013.

This effort began in late July 2012, shortly after the tragic shooting at the Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado. Our first summit occurred in December 2012, bringing together subject matter experts who developed cross-cutting recommendations on preventing multiple casualty violence. They came from a wide array of fields, including law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, education, and academia, demonstrating the utility of taking a multi-disciplinary approach to this complex problem. With the first summit concluding only one day before the startling tragedy in Newtown, Connecticut, we knew our work had only just begun.

The second summit, which occurred in April 2013, once again took a holistic approach to advancing prevention strategies, this time focusing on the criticality of information sharing. Practitioners presented information on successful prevention models, and participants discussed opportunities for various professional disciplines to share information across jurisdictional boundaries. This summit demonstrated the imperative involvement of and coordination among the broad public safety community in averting future tragedies.

On behalf of the FLETC, COPS Office, and Johns Hopkins University, we would like to share our appreciation for the summit participants' engagement in and commitment to this urgent national issue. Their efforts have helped further our national understanding of incidents that often seem to defy reason. While our three organizations have distinct missions, we share a dedication to improving the safety of our nation's communities and look forward to continued partnership in support of this effort.

Sincerely,

Connie L. Patrick
Director
Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center

Joshua A. Ederheimer
Acting Director
Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services

David W. Andrews, Ph.D.
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- The Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership, especially Dean David Andrews

Executive Summary

The 2013 National Summit on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: *Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing* was the second in a series of summits that intends to expand the national dialogue on preventing the types of heartbreaking incidents that have unfolded in places like Virginia Tech; Newtown, Connecticut; and Aurora, Colorado.

The summit was a joint initiative of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Education (JHU-SOE) and took place at the FLETC's headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, April 9–11, 2013.

In an effort to improve the safety and security of the nation's communities, the summit brought together a cross-section of stakeholders from a variety of disciplines, including law enforcement, academia, law, medicine, education, social sciences, private security, emergency management, law enforcement training, and psychology. The 31 attendees participated in breakout discussions and a tabletop exercise, listened to presentations on lessons learned from past incidents and successful prevention models, and engaged in conversation with a panel of leaders from a local community. They expanded the discourse on the recommendations that emerged during the 2012 summit and further developed strategies in key areas, including developing a public awareness campaign, identifying and implementing community-based prevention models, and beginning to identify training needs for members of the public safety community.

“The most salient theme that emerged during the 2013 summit was the necessary involvement of local communities in prevention strategies...”

The most salient theme that emerged during the 2013 summit was the necessary involvement of local communities in prevention strategies; therefore, community oriented policing provides a framework for analyzing summit outcomes on page 13. Specifically, when a police department implements community oriented policing successfully, the organizational changes and resultant approaches that make it effective can shape strategies designed to prevent multiple casualty violence.

The summit revealed the need for additional efforts in identifying successful community intervention models and, more broadly, incorporating the philosophy of community oriented policing into discourse on the prevention of multiple casualty violence. Focusing public safety on community-based approaches and broadening the application of policing within the community emerged as opportunities for institutionalizing a public mindset of collective responsibility for preventing these incidents that continue to shock the public consciousness.

Background on the 2013 National Summit

As Americans followed news accounts in 2012 of the horrors unfolding in Aurora, Colorado, and Newtown, Connecticut, many asked the same questions that emerged in 1999 in Littleton, Colorado, and in 2007 at Virginia Tech—how could this happen, who could do such a thing, and could it happen here? As the Nation grieved with these communities, individuals and institutions continued, revitalized, and initiated efforts to examine how to keep others from experiencing such senseless heartbreak.

To advance the national dialogue on multiple casualty violence, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) began partnering with the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Education (JHU-SOE) in July 2012. While much has been done to increase the delivery of and improve the quality of training in the area of tactical response to active threats, the reality is that law enforcement intervention is often too late to save innocent lives. The FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU-SOE recognized the need to focus on preventing incidents before they reach the point of violence, specifically, identifying potential threats in advance, systematically reporting and analyzing those threats, and taking needed steps to mitigate them. Experts best situated to explore these topics reside in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors in a variety of disciplines, including law enforcement, academia, law, medicine, education, social sciences, private security, emergency management, law enforcement training, and psychology. The FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU-SOE identified a need to bring these groups together to engage in cross-disciplinary discourse focused on prevention.

The first product of this joint effort was the *National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings*, which occurred at the FLETC's headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, December 11–13, 2012. This summit brought together 22 professionals from a variety of fields. Over the three-day period, participants refined and structured the national dialogue on multiple casualty violence and discussed and debated potential strategies for prevention. Concluding only one day prior to the shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School, this summit was the first step in the three partners' steadfast campaign to find actionable solutions to this urgent national problem.

“...the reality is that law enforcement intervention is often too late to save innocent lives.”

The recommendations that emerged from the 2012 summit centered on the need to develop a strategic approach to information sharing in the prevention of multiple casualty violence.¹ Consequently, the FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU-SOE facilitated a second summit, the National Summit on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: Strategic Approaches to Information Sharing, at the FLETC's headquarters April 9–11, 2013. This summit used the same strategic framework as the first summit, a five-part prevention model that illustrates the essential nonlinear elements to preventing multiple casualty violence² (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.
Components of Multiple Casualty Violence Prevention



Source: The FLETC, JHU, and the COPS Office

1. See Appendix A for the 2012 summit recommendations.

2. See Appendix B for a summary of the 2012 summit participants' refinement of the definitional framework provided by the summit planners.

“The exercise demonstrated that rarely does a single entity have all of the information necessary to prevent an act of multiple casualty violence, therefore illuminating the criticality of sharing information across traditional disciplinary boundaries.”

Purpose and scope

The 2013 summit’s goal was to advance the national dialogue on preventing multiple casualty violence by developing strategic approaches to information sharing. In accordance with the FLETC’s curriculum development process, the summit also served as a means to begin assessing training needs to inform future curriculum development efforts in the area of preventing multiple casualty violence.

Continuing the approach of its predecessor, the 2013 summit specifically addressed preplanned events of multiple casualty violence within the United States, excluding terrorist acts, killings in conjunction with the commission of other crime(s), and domestic violence incidents in which only family members are killed.

Although many high-profile incidents of multiple casualty violence involve guns, the recommendations that emerged during the first summit were not dependent upon the kind of weapon involved. Similarly, because the conversations during 2013 summit focused on the events leading up to an act of violence, rather than the act itself, the themes that emerged were nonspecific on weapon of choice.

Objectives

The objectives for the 2013 summit were as follows:

- Promote a “systems” approach to the prevention of multiple casualty violence.
- Identify gaps and impediments in sharing information to prevent multiple casualty violence.
- Catalog effective practices for sharing information within and across disciplines and boundaries.
- Identify training needs in the area of preventing multiple casualty violence.

Anticipated outcomes

Anticipated outcomes of the 2013 summit were as follows:

- A list of recommended organizations and individuals to take the lead on implementing recommendations from the first summit

- A proposal for developing a public awareness campaign, specifically the critical elements to such a campaign
- A process for developing a catalog of effective prevention models
- A document that confirms training needs related to preventing multiple casualty violence, identifies the audience that will be subject to such training, and lists the tasks or competencies that must be addressed

Summit format

The 2013 summit extended over three full days and employed several different formats for eliciting dialogue, including a tabletop exercise, community panel, formal and ad hoc presentations, plenary discussions, and breakout sessions. This variety provided participants with opportunities to hear from colleagues who have experienced incidents of multiple casualty violence, to learn about existing prevention models, and to engage in discourse across professional communities.

The summit began with a tabletop exercise designed to take participants through a series of events leading up to a hypothetical potential act of multiple casualty violence.³ The facilitators divided the attendees into four groups, providing each with injections of information at six-, three-, and one-month simulated periods prior to the hypothetical event. Although fictional, the scenarios were based on actual and thwarted acts of multiple casualty violence.

During the breakout sessions, participants discussed what information they would have had and what they would have shared at various points in time within their particular professional disciplines. The exercise demonstrated that rarely does a single entity have all of the information necessary to prevent an act of multiple casualty violence, therefore illuminating the criticality of sharing information across traditional disciplinary boundaries.

The summit also featured a panel discussion among seven members of a medium-sized community in the southeastern United States. The purpose was to provide summit participants with a common perspective on how

3. See Appendix C for a summary of the tabletop exercise.

“...the summit also incorporated five presentations about prevention models and lessons learned from past tragedies.”

key elements of one particular community interact in terms of sharing information about individuals who may pose threats.⁴ Panel participants included a pastor, school resource officer, youth sports leader/pastor, psychiatric nurse, school counselor, small business owner, and fire department deputy chief. A moderator led the panel through a series of questions related to reporting suspicious or potentially violent behavior.

The four-hour session, which also included a question and answer session between panel members and summit participants, highlighted not only barriers to information sharing that exist in a typical American community but also opportunities for professional disciplines to work together in prevention efforts. One of the participants astutely observed that even though he did not agree with some of the viewpoints the panelists represented, he recognized the significance of listening to them because community voices ultimately inform public policy, such as those related to public safety.

The summit planners used “public safety” as an umbrella term to define all elements of a community, both public and private, that collectively serve to protect the public from harm. Although the term’s traditional definitions apply to entities whose primary purpose is to protect the public, the summit planners broadened the term to apply to organizational entities and individuals who play any kind of role in keeping the public safe, including in a prevention or secondary capacity. For example, in addition to fire, police, and emergency services, the planners conceptualized public safety to also mean emergency room physicians, educators, mental health providers, clergy, community leaders, civic organizations, youth organizations, social service providers, and virtually anyone regardless of organizational affiliation from both the public and private sectors. This helps advance the idea that public safety is everyone’s responsibility and furthers the goal of identifying the community elements that must be involved in successful strategies for preventing multiple casualty violence.

To begin the process of identifying and cataloging effective prevention models and to provide context for interdisciplinary efforts at preventing multiple casualty violence, the summit also incorporated five presentations about prevention models and lessons learned from past tragedies.⁵ Participants heard about the U.S. Secret Service’s threat assessment model, the Kennewick (Washington) School Protection Team Model, and the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Model. In addition, law enforcement leaders involved in responding to and investigating the multiple casualty shootings at the Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, in 2012 and the IHOP in Carson City, Nevada, in 2011 delivered presentations about their agencies’ immediate responses to the tragedies in their communities and opportunities for improved information sharing for future prevention efforts.

During the breakout sessions on the final day of the summit, participants engaged in detailed discussions about the recommendations from the first summit, expanding the previous dialogue on these specific action items and deliberating on the next steps in implementation.⁶

Selecting the delegates

Like its predecessor, the 2013 summit brought together experts from a cross-section of professional communities positioned to facilitate the prevention of multiple casualty violence. Although law enforcement has typically taken the lead on the tactical response to active violent situations, other professionals and practitioners are likely to have contact with those planning incidents at various stages, and others have engaged in substantial academic work in topics relevant to the prevention of multiple casualty violence. By bringing together people from a multitude of disciplines, the summit planners hoped to explore the full range of opportunities, strengths, and limitations of particular disciplines. As anticipated, the summit featured meaningful and action-oriented dialogue.

4. See Appendix D for a summary of the community panel session.

5. See Appendix E for a summary of the presentations.

6. See Appendix F for the breakout group questions.

“All participants came from a diverse array of fields, including local, federal, and K–12 and campus law enforcement; academia; law; medicine; education; private security; emergency management; law enforcement training; and psychology.”

The summit planners purposely invited a combination of 10 individuals who participated in the first summit and 21 newcomers who brought fresh perspectives. All participants came from a diverse array of fields, including local, federal, and K–12 and campus law enforcement; academia; law; medicine; education; private security; emergency management; law enforcement training; and psychology.⁷

The summit planners grouped participants into three overarching categories that allowed them to comprehensively explore information sharing from various perspectives, particularly within the context of the first summit’s recommendations. While the groups were somewhat homogeneous by discipline, the intent was to cluster participants with similar areas of expertise, not necessarily the same job functions. The three areas of focus were as follows:

- **Awareness.**⁸ This focus area addressed educating the public and professionals within the various disciplines represented at the summit about how to identify behavior indicative of potential violence and how to notify appropriate parties when they observe such behavior. Participants in this group consisted of experts from local law enforcement, law enforcement training, psychology, K–12 and campus law enforcement, academia, and private security.
- **Practitioner.**⁹ This focus area addressed the need to identify effective interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention. It also focused on developing technological avenues for obtaining and sharing information pertaining to potential threats across jurisdictional boundaries. Participants in this group consisted of experts from federal, local, and campus law enforcement; academia; and medicine.
- **Legal.** This focus area addressed the various legal issues involved in sharing information, such as alleviating misperceptions about limits imposed by existing laws and developing model statutes that protect those who report and that facilitate reporting by those in pertinent professions. This group consisted of attorneys with expertise in areas including civil rights and civil liberties, higher education, privacy, mental health issues, and criminal law.

Because the groups frequently overlapped in their discussions on particular topics, the majority of this report does not differentiate points of view based on breakout group except in instances where doing so enhances the analysis.

Reporting on the summit

The 2013 summit brought together individuals with widely varying areas of expertise and backgrounds, leading to the emergence of diverse ideas. Because gaining consensus on all points among all participants would have been impossible, the summit planners focused on eliciting dynamic dialogue and multiple viewpoints. This report reflects the major themes and overall perspectives that emerged throughout the three days.

The most salient theme that arose during the summit was the necessary involvement of local communities in prevention strategies. Citizens teaching in schools; treating patients; counseling churchgoers; administering recreational programs; working in stores, restaurants, and theaters; and patrolling the streets interact daily with individuals potentially capable of multiple casualty violence. Thus, subsequent to the summit, the planners reviewed the literature on community oriented policing, which was valuable for framing and analyzing the summit’s dialogue.

7. See Appendix G for a list of the 2013 summit participants.

8. The 2013 summit labeled this breakout group “Education/Awareness” because summit planners used this terminology in coordinating the event. However, to alleviate confusion regarding the multiple meanings of the word “education,” this report has shortened this group’s label to “awareness.”

9. The summit planners used this term to describe individuals whose specific professions might be involved in executing interdisciplinary prevention models.

Applying Community Oriented Policing to Multiple Casualty Violence Prevention

Essential components of community oriented policing

According to the COPS Office, community oriented policing, which provides a framework for analyzing the outcomes of the 2013 summit, is “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”¹⁰ A key component of the philosophy, community partnerships are effective only if they are accompanied by organizational transformation: e.g., alignment of organizational management, structure, personnel, and information systems to support preemptive problem solving. Community policing encourages law enforcement to find proactive solutions to the underlying conditions contributing to public safety problems rather than to behave reactively to crime after it occurs.¹¹

Resident involvement is a central component of most community policing programs, as law enforcement often asks residents to be its “eyes and ears” and to report crimes promptly.¹² The success of community policing requires ongoing joint efforts of the police, local government, public and private agencies, and members of the community.¹³

Although these components are common to most community policing models, there is no single definition or interpretation of community policing and, likewise, no mandatory set of program elements.¹⁴ Consequently, law enforcement agencies interpret and implement community policing in varying ways.¹⁵ In fact, the COPS Office has recognized that implementing a successful community oriented policing program is dependent upon an agency customizing its efforts to meet the unique needs of its community. Thus, its grantees have used their funding in varying ways because the agencies needed different kinds of organizational changes to implement community policing.¹⁶

Similarly, research has found that community context and law enforcement organizational structure factors account for differences in policing styles in different departments; thus, “singular decontextualized models of policing imposed without regard for local conditions and contingencies will be inappropriate and ineffective.”¹⁷ For example, the size of the community and organization are strongly associated with police organizational structures and operating modes.¹⁸

Community policing as a paradigm shift

Implementing community policing has required a paradigm shift for law enforcement agencies in several respects. First, the core of community policing—to build meaningful partnerships for the purpose of improving public safety—is contrary to the traditional autonomous nature of policing.¹⁹ Rather than isolating themselves from “politics,” when implementing community policing, agencies collaborate with “practically everyone,” including community groups and institutions, property owners, city government agencies, other police, and security forces.²⁰ As police agencies build these partnerships, they need to manage sometimes conflicting priorities.²¹ For example, in implementing community policing, law enforcement and different community groups must reconcile the long-standing issue of balancing liberty and maintaining order.²²

Second, community policing counters the hierarchical decision making that often typifies police departments,²³ and, third, it focuses on a proactive and preventive approach to policing in lieu of the reactive and at times para-militaristic nature of traditional policing. As a result, the hierarchal nature of a centralized command can cause departments to resist uniform implementation of community policing.²⁴ Furthermore, this resistance to

10. COPS Office, *Community Policing Defined*, 1.

11. *Ibid.*, 10.

12. Skogan, “Representing the Community,” 57.

13. Community Policing Consortium, *Understanding Community Policing*.

14. Cordner, “Community Policing: Elements and Effects.”

15. Seagrave, “Defining Community Policing.”

16. Schneider et al., *Community Policing in Action*, 3.

17. Wells et al., “Community Characteristics and Policing Styles,” 566.

18. *Ibid.*, 584.

19. Thacher, “Conflicting Values.”

20. *Ibid.*, 765.

21. *Ibid.*, 766.

22. *Ibid.*, 793.

23. Rosenberg et al., “Police Officer Attitudes.”

24. See Chappell, “The Philosophical versus Actual;” Skogan and Frydl, “Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing;” Engel and Worden, “Attitudes, Behavior and Supervisory Influences;” Gaines et al., *Police Administration*.

“This includes modifying performance measures so they reflect the philosophy of community policing to avoid the inherent conflict in expecting police officers to engage in community policing activities when they must simultaneously answer calls for service.”

organizational change, namely one that does not directly reinforce the traditional structure of top-down decision making and a response-focused mindset in reacting to crime, often creates a challenge for police departments when employing community policing strategies.²⁵

Fourth, community policing requires new approaches to performance measures. Calculating its success is more imprecise than traditional measuring of police performance. Integrating performance measures that assess the extent to which officers practice community policing requires evaluating how police affect quality of life and identifying the problems they solve, rather than measuring definable statistics like arrest and crime rates.²⁶

One of the most important elements of community policing is community organization; however, these metrics are often excluded in officer assessments.²⁷ A study of community policing in a medium-sized agency in Florida found that community policing is “more of a departmental philosophy than a set of operational procedures,” thus, agencies must align administrative priorities with operational procedures.²⁸ This includes modifying performance measures so they reflect the philosophy of community policing to avoid the inherent conflict in expecting police officers to engage in community policing activities when they must simultaneously answer calls for service.²⁹

In order to execute community policing strategies effectively, law enforcement organizations must embrace these paradigm shifts, meaning they must embrace deep-seated institutional change; however, the lack of training and performance measures that reflect a commitment to community policing principles produces significant barriers to implementing community policing approaches.³⁰ In addition, frequent changes in local government can inhibit an institutional commitment to this philosophy.

To overcome these barriers, police leaders should take steps to engage and collaborate with other community agencies to improve the quality of life for residents, ultimately employing community policing principles across community service organizations. The police leaders must then translate this collaboration throughout the entire law enforcement organization. Furthermore, command ranks that embrace a community policing philosophy can transfer commitment to line officers by

- reinforcing a clear mission statement;
- recruiting service-oriented individuals;³¹
- supporting community-service-based performance measures;
- allocating resources for appropriate training in how to translate the philosophy into practice by empowering officers to recognize they can be part of the solution to social problems in the community;
- training to identify and solve problems related to reoccurring crime and disorder within a community;³²
- ensuring leaders continue to address any organizational barriers that could inhibit an officer’s capacity to engage in problem solving and community outreach.³³

25. Vito et al., “Community Policing: The Middle;” Smith et al., “Community Policing and the Work Routines.”

26. Alpert et al., “Community Policing Performance Measures.”

27. Rosenbaum and Lurigio, “Inside Look at Community Policing Reform.”

28. Chappell, “Philosophical Versus Actual Adoption,” 22.

29. Ibid.

30. Giacomazzi and Brody, “The Effectiveness of External;” Alpert et al., “Effective Community Policing Performance;” King and Lab, “Crime Prevention, Community Policing.”

31. Diamond and Weiss, *Looking to Tomorrow*.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

“Community policing’s applicability to fighting terrorism demonstrated its broader use in the public safety sphere.”

In terms of how to institutionalize community policing, commentators and analysts agree that “the endurance of community policing will depend upon the extent to which it becomes both philosophically and operationally integrated with routine police operations.”³⁴ Although community policing is ever-changing and its implementation is time consuming, this philosophy and practice are less likely to fade over time when agencies incorporate them properly. Furthermore, “community policing is a progressive step toward institutionalizing the flexibility that will enable modern police organizations to continue to align their operations with changing social condition.”³⁵

Community policing, information/intelligence gathering, and building trust

In the post-9/11 environment, scholars began exploring the possible contradiction between the expansion of the community policing movement and the timely need to fight terrorism aggressively. Despite initial perceptions that the two might be incompatible, a body of academic work demonstrates how the philosophy of community policing can benefit homeland security goals associated with gathering information and intelligence.

For example, local police engaging in information gathering actively involve the community and other state and federal agencies in crime control and the maintenance of order.³⁶ As a result, community policing creates a solid intelligence base in the community that can help achieve the homeland security goal of intelligence gathering. Moreover, because community policing fosters trust and mutual respect between itself and its community, this community intelligence base is more likely to come forward and help law enforcement to uncover early warning signs about terrorist acts, whereas a more authoritarian policing model tends to distance police from the rest of the community.³⁷

Community policing’s intelligence capability not only proved helpful in fighting terrorism after 9/11 but also encouraged local law enforcement agencies to expand their collaborative efforts with other law enforcement agencies and increase their information sharing abilities.³⁸ Moreover, its applicability to fighting terrorism demonstrated its broader use in the public safety sphere (e.g., identifying potentially violent individuals).

In order for law enforcement agencies to use community policing’s full potential, agencies must develop relationships with community elements previously disengaged from police. For example, one paper argued about the necessity of agencies building trust with those community members least likely to assist the police willingly.³⁹ Another article argued about the need to include youth and young adults as part of the community policing model.⁴⁰ This same article also pointed out how community policing “rejects the discredited ‘warrior’ approach to policing, in which inner-city communities were viewed as implacably hostile to the police enterprise” and instead seeks to foster trust by having police work hand-in-hand with community members on public safety issues.⁴¹

Even though building trust with groups inclined to view police disparagingly poses a challenge, “if community policing is to succeed and be embraced by the vast majority of community residents, greater efforts will have to be made in securing the necessary partnership.”⁴² In this effort, an assessment of community policing in the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department demonstrated the importance of establishing a media campaign to educate the public about community oriented policing. Furthermore, the assessment found that fostering officer-citizen relationships through door-to-door police contact, foot patrols, and involvement of existing community leaders, such as pastors, was critical to building the trust necessary for community policing’s success.⁴³

34. Williams, “Structuring in Community Policing.”

35. Ibid., 128.

36. Friedmann and Cannon, “Homeland Security and Community Policing.”

37. Murray, “Policing Terrorism,” 358.

38. Murray, “Policing Terrorism;” Lyons, “Partnerships, Information and Public Safety.”

39. Ibid.

40. Forman, “Community Policing and Youth as Assets.”

41. Ibid, 2.

42. Bohm et al., “Perceptions of Neighborhood Problems,” 461.

43. Leech and Drury, “Potential of Community-Oriented Policing.”

“The paradigm shift that occurs in law enforcement agencies that embrace community policing, especially the focus on proactive problem solving as opposed to traditional reactive policing, aligns closely with the summit’s emphasis on stopping incidents before they reach the point of violence.”

Community policing as a framework for summit analysis

Community policing presents an opportunity for law enforcement to implement a prevention-focused mindset for community safety. The strategies associated with community policing improve the efficacy of a community, couching it as a “co-producer of social order by enlisting [individual members’] voluntary support for reporting crime and actively engaging in community-based problem solving.”⁴⁴

Community cohesion increases a community’s capacity to recognize problems, identify strangers, and engage in prevention against social problems.⁴⁵ A strong community in which residents come together to address problems and ensure public security will often readily engage with local law enforcement on community policing strategies. Fostering community efficacy is often a significant factor in the success of community policing approaches, and a thoughtful and relevant agenda, not focused solely on crime rates and fear of crime, can sustain community engagement.⁴⁶

Community oriented policing provides a conceptual lens through which the summit partners analyzed the discourse that occurred over the three-day period. Specifically, the criticality of law enforcement forming effective partnerships with various community elements and the organizational change that is necessary to do so are concepts that inform the dialogue about how various disciplines can work together in preventing multiple casualty violence. The paradigm shift that occurs in law enforcement agencies that embrace community policing, especially the focus on proactive problem solving as opposed to traditional reactive policing, aligns closely with the summit’s emphasis on stopping incidents before they reach the point of violence. Last, integrating the information-gathering aspects of community policing into the post-9/11 focus on fighting terrorism is parallel to applying community policing to the prevention of multiple casualty violence.

44 Thurman, “Community Policing,” 176.

45 Sampson and Groves, “Community Structure and Crime.”

46 Kerley and Benson, “Does Community-Oriented Policing Help?”

Perspectives on Information Sharing: Challenges and Opportunities

Information sharing across professional communities is a critical component to a multidisciplinary approach to preventing multiple casualty violence, yet numerous barriers inhibit it. These include lack of reporting on the part of individuals in both personal and professional capacities, inconsistencies inherent in a decentralized law enforcement framework, cross-disciplinary communication issues, and perceived legal roadblocks. The 2013 summit participants discussed these challenges to information sharing as well as opportunities to close existing gaps.

Members of the public, as well as professionals in numerous disciplines, do not report information about potentially violent subjects for a variety of reasons. The tabletop exercise (see page 25) and community panel (see page 27) at the beginning of the summit illuminated many of these, one of the most significant of which was the hesitancy to report loved ones. This reluctance stems from not only fear of stigmatizing relatives and friends but also anxiety over potentially involving them with the criminal justice system. In other cases, students are afraid to report classmates due to concerns about their own safety, specifically that they will become targets. Different parenting styles may also dictate whether parents are willing to report their children to law enforcement or mental health systems, with many believing they can and should handle situations themselves. Last, community panel participants observed that professionals who speak with people in the course of pastoral or counseling sessions are often reluctant to report information because they fear legal action associated with breach of confidentiality and because they fear violating a “confidence” will destroy trust and consequently foil future opportunities to provide counseling and guidance.

Juxtaposed to this pronounced reluctance of families and friends is the reality that those positioned to help a potential subject or to protect the public will become aware of emerging problems only if people with personal knowledge are willing to share information. Summit participants noted that family, friends, and acquaintances of those exhibiting signs of potentially violent behavior need to be equally responsible and accountable for reporting their observations and ascertained an overarching need to inculcate into the fabric of our national culture a willingness to report information.

Furthermore, even if everyone were willing to report, one of the most difficult barriers to overcome is individual, unpredictable characteristics. For example, while some people may know the right place to report suspicious behavior, some individuals simply may not know where to turn. In other instances, people may have personal preferences regarding which entities they are comfortable talking to and some are inherently distrustful of law enforcement or other authority figures. While some people may naturally communicate with mental health counselors, others may gravitate toward law enforcement.

These personal choices underscore the reality that rarely does one individual have all the information necessary to put together all the puzzle pieces. Another major factor in whether and how people share information is the variation in the relationships among the various levels of law enforcement and other disciplines involved in preventing multiple casualty violence. In some states and communities, law enforcement naturally cross-communicates with mental health care providers. In some instances, the quality of communication among various entities depends on the size of a municipality. For example, a behavior that might gain attention in a small town may not end up on the radar of a large metropolitan police department. Furthermore, while some universities have good communication with local departments, in other areas, especially in situations involving large campuses, communication is sometimes less robust.

Another barrier to sharing information can be specific characteristics of the cultures of particular professions. For example, a law enforcement officer might be reluctant to become involved in a potentially threatening situation because a crime has not yet been committed. Summit participants revisited the issue of law enforcement as “peace officer” multiple times, observing that a cultural shift within the profession itself would be necessary in many cases to overcome this. Yet law enforcement can play this role only if it is able to interact effectively with the mental health community as well as many other elements of society.

“...well before a person reaches the point of committing an act of multiple casualty violence, numerous institutions have interacted with that individual throughout his or her life, such as teachers, social workers, and colleagues.”

Similarly, trust is the foundation of the doctor-patient relationship, and many health care practitioners are extremely hesitant to breach confidentiality due to concerns about undermining the therapeutic process. Privacy empowers them to help clients, and there is a legitimate concern that individuals will stop seeking treatment if they believe information about their mental health will be shared with other entities.

The need to simultaneously share information about potentially violent individuals and protect privacy creates both real and perceived barriers. Echoing a theme that emerged during the 2012 summit, participants discussed not only the tangible limitations the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) places on health care practitioners in terms of information sharing but also the misperceptions regarding what they can actually share. Similarly, because changes to the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) have significantly loosened restrictions on the educational community's ability to share information, the participants observed that law enforcement often mistakenly believes this law is still a realistic barrier to information sharing.

Maintaining proper equilibrium between the rights of an individual and those of society is also relevant to the type of information available to various professionals. For example, while discussing a previous incident where the perpetrator sold his prized possessions shortly before his attack, participants acknowledged that the availability of information about sales transactions would have been beneficial to law enforcement; however, providing access to this kind of information can raise concerns about intrusiveness into private affairs.

In addition to discussing various barriers, dialogue throughout the 2013 summit also revealed many missed opportunities for information sharing. A key juncture during which institutions often fail to pass on information occurs when a particular organization ejects an individual for disruptive behavior or when the person leaves on his or her own accord. For example, when a student who exhibited suspicious behavior graduates from high school or when the military discharges someone who was cause for concern, there is a gap in terms of follow-up with that person by any particular community element. Summit participants questioned whether a democratic society has an obligation to do a welfare check when potentially violent individuals move beyond a particular institution's physical boundaries.

As for the public sector, communities miss opportunities to identify potentially violent individuals when they focus too narrowly on appearance factors such as dark clothing, unusual makeup or hairstyles, decorative tattoos, and body piercings to the exclusion of potential behavioral indicators, such as absenteeism, abnormal hygiene, unusually aggressive or socially disengaged behavior, and relationship problems. Summit participants cautioned against stereotyping, which can occur when people fail to view behavior comprehensively. Focusing more broadly on risk may help address existing gaps.

Last, summit participants observed that well before a person reaches the point of committing an act of multiple casualty violence, numerous institutions have interacted with that individual throughout his or her life, such as teachers, social workers, and colleagues. Determining a mechanism through which various community institutions can communicate and collaborate across disciplinary boundaries is critical to avoid missing opportunities for information sharing.

2013 Summit Outcomes

Perspectives on the 2012 summit recommendations

The 2013 summit participants had several opportunities to discuss the recommendations from the 2012 summit, all of which involve maintaining a multidisciplinary approach to preventing multiple casualty violence through increased collaboration across professions. These recommendations comprise two major categories: one focused on the various institutions positioned to help prevent future incidents and one centered on the subject (or potential perpetrator) and, to be more specific, on improving the community's ability to recognize and report potentially threatening behavior.

The institutions-focused recommendations are as follows:

1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act.
2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.
3. Develop a public service campaign to begin a cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting.
4. Better educate various professional disciplines about HIPAA, FERPA, and the Privacy Act to alleviate perceived barriers to sharing information.
5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior.

Discussions about these recommendations centered on the need to establish multidisciplinary prevention teams and to provide information to both specific professional communities and to the public at large about what they can do to help prevent multiple casualty violence.

The remaining, subject-focused recommendations are as follows:

6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and sending alerts about incidents.
7. Develop a national, searchable database of information pertaining to individual behavior indicative of escalation toward a violent act, and facilitate sharing such information across jurisdictional boundaries.

8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

While the 2013 summit planners anticipated that participants would help identify which entities should take ownership of the recommendations, the conversations frequently expanded to more in-depth discussions of the recommendations themselves. One likely reason is that for many participants, nearly 70 percent, the 2013 summit was their first opportunity to talk at length with colleagues about these specific topics in this kind of setting. Second, the 2013 breakout sessions consisted of relatively homogeneous groups of professionals, as opposed to the multidisciplinary groups of the 2012 summit. Thus, the revised format provided an opportunity for experts to discuss the recommendations in the context of their own disciplines, bringing forth some different viewpoints.⁴⁷

In fact, the 2013 summit participants challenged several of the recommendations. Specifically, they expressed reservations about the fifth recommendation, establishing affirmative requirements to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior. The legal breakout group in particular articulated possible negative consequences for such a statutory change, the most significant of which is the potentially chilling effect on the therapeutic environment. To be more specific, such a law might deter people from seeking treatment. In addition, doctors have a natural disposition to be client-focused whereas an affirmative reporting requirement could pit a therapist against a client in a criminal case. Also, the attorneys expressed concern that this could lead to profiling members of particular groups. Thus, other participants observed that mandating reporting through the various professional codes of ethics might be easier than enacting statutory changes.

47. See Appendix H for a description of the 2013 summit participants' dialogue on the recommendations from the 2012 summit.

“...the campaign must dismiss the notion that ‘minding one’s own business’ is acceptable and instead instill a sense of moral obligation to protect fellow community members.”

The participants also were not universally supportive of the seventh recommendation, developing a national, searchable database of information pertaining to individual behavior indicative of escalation toward a violent act. The most significant problem relates to the perception of “big brother,” as participants observed that such a system would invoke a visceral response related to privacy issues. Furthermore, establishing a national database could have the unintended negative consequence of instilling a reluctance to report information and could lead to questions regarding who has access to it. The attorneys discussed at length questions regarding the legality of retaining information and, particularly, implications for civil rights and civil liberties.

In lieu of a national database, participants suggested developing a scalable model replicable at the local level that would connect law enforcement, schools, churches, and other elements of the community and track behavioral information, not just existence of mental illness. Participants believed people would be more willing to input information that could be seen locally rather than across states. A pointer system could eventually connect various systems, thus making standardized collection fields necessary.

Despite these unanticipated concerns, participants still expanded the dialogue on the recommendations from the 2012 summit. The first recommendation, to maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act, is one that should continue to pervade almost all prevention efforts. The participants also explored in greater detail the second and third recommendations, identifying and promoting the use of interdisciplinary models and developing a public service campaign.⁴⁸

The discussions surrounding the remaining recommendations revealed the need for further exploration in domains outside of the summit planners’ mission scopes. The FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU are hopeful that appropriate entities will carry on these efforts as the nation continues to pursue strategies for preventing multiple casualty violence.

Developing a public awareness campaign

Increasing public awareness about detecting and appropriately addressing indicators of potential multiple casualty violence is fundamental to prevention. With this in mind, the 2013 summit participants described the goals and elements of a public awareness campaign of which public service announcements (PSA) using various dissemination channels are a critical component.

The first, central goal of a public awareness campaign for preventing multiple casualty violence is to reduce individuals’ reluctance to come forward by increasing trust between law enforcement and the general public. Summit participants discussed this method in the context of a cultural shift, one in which the public moves away from perceiving law enforcement exclusively as the entity responsible for arresting people and toward understanding the role police officers play in offering services and resources to people in crisis. Focusing on the police as “peace officers,” the participants observed commonalities between them and school resource officers, who develop relationships and trust with students.

Second, the campaign must dismiss the notion that “minding one’s own business” is acceptable and instead instill a sense of moral obligation to protect fellow community members. Summit participants likened this kind of cultural shift to that which other public awareness campaigns have accomplished, such as the anti-smoking, anti-bullying, and anti-drunk driving campaigns.

Third, a public awareness campaign must direct people to available resources. Summit participants indicated that when people know help is available, they are more likely to come forward with information. Therefore, the campaign needs to educate families and various professional communities about available resources, so they know who to contact should they become aware of someone exhibiting indicators of potentially violent behavior. For example, a readily available list of advocacy agencies would help people with relatives or friends exhibiting troubling behavior.

⁴⁸ See “Developing a public awareness campaign” above and “Training in multiple casualty violence prevention” on page 17.



To help facilitate the third goal, summit participants recommended various modalities for people to report information, such as via the telephone, the Internet, and texting. They observed that DHS already has a tip line, noting the potential value of such a tool for capturing information from a broad audience. If the public could call such a hotline, similar to a suicide hotline, the staff could direct individuals to various resources depending on the particular situation at hand.

In terms of the overall tone and audience for a public awareness campaign, participants observed the benefit of using not only “negative” messaging to create shock value but also “positive” messaging to catalyze a cultural shift toward shared community responsibility for reporting information and working together to prevent multiple casualty violence. In addition, participants noted that the campaign should promote the “peace officer” role of law enforcement. To be more specific, it should convey that officers do more than just to react to crimes, that they serve as a valuable resource in preventing escalation toward violence.

To help capture the public’s attention, several participants recommended identifying a national figure to represent the campaign, and some suggested featuring parents of victims or perpetrators as a powerful means of impressing upon the public the urgency to act to prevent future tragedies. These individuals could appear in a public service announcement

(PSA) and would become national representatives of the overall message. Summit attendees acknowledged the importance of keeping the campaign apolitical, reaching all age brackets, and addressing a widespread audience, including professional communities specifically positioned to interact with potential subjects and the general public.

Disseminating public awareness campaign materials would best be accomplished through multiple avenues because people receive information through so many different means. Participants suggested various electronic outlets, such as social media, websites, and smart phone applications, and print media, such as newsletters and billboards. In-person messaging during professional association meetings and orientations would also be effective channels for dispersing information, with groups individualizing the overall message for their particular audiences and tying it to their particular codes of ethics. Examples of these professional associations include the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the American Medical Association, the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training, the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, the American Psychiatric Association, the National Association of Social Workers, the National Governors Association, and the American Bar Association. Furthermore, there may be opportunities to insert PSA-related information into products these organizations already disseminate.

Participants overwhelmingly supported developing a national campaign that individual regions, cities, and communities could tailor to their needs. A national campaign would ensure the message not only reaches the broad national audience in a consistent manner but also makes sense to people at local levels. Specifically, participants observed that a 30-second PSA could consist of 20 seconds of the “national message” featuring a national spokesperson, and the final 10 seconds could contain the local message that could include information about where to go in a local community for assistance. Participants suggested both the COPS Office and DHS as entities that could oversee a campaign but noted the need to involve marketing or public relations experts in developing its content. In addition, participants observed that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) might be helpful in implementing the workplace component because it is in a position to make disseminating the message mandatory.

Last, each summit’s participants largely supported developing a public campaign to raise awareness about how citizens can help prevent multiple casualty violence. The multidisciplinary dialogue that occurred during the summits elicited valuable ideas for both campaign content and ownership. The next step in furthering this recommendation is for an appropriate national entity to take ownership of the initiative and begin taking the steps necessary to implement it.

Identifying and cataloging successful prevention models

At the 2012 summit, participants articulated the need to identify existing multidisciplinary models for preventing multiple casualty violence and to share them with various communities of interest. Building upon this key outcome, the 2013 summit revealed some existing best practices and generated healthy discussions about how they can be shared.⁴⁹



The presentation on the Student Protection Teams in Kennewick, Washington, demonstrated the successes to be found when law enforcement, education, mental health, and parents come together to comprehensively examine what has occurred in a student’s life in an effort to uncover indicators of potential violence. To be more specific, if these teams take any kind of action, they share the information throughout the school district so others can learn from past issues and have knowledge about students who may move on to another school. Summit participants discussed expanding this kind of school-based model into a community safety model to help eliminate the gaps that exist when students leave high school.

The presentation on the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model revealed the criticality of involving the mental health community and diverting people exhibiting troubling behavior from the law enforcement sphere so they can receive mental health treatment as quickly as possible. Similar to how school resource officers in high schools build trust with students through relationship building, the CIT model calls for law enforcement to provide resources and support to families. As a result, one of this model’s major successes has been reducing the hesitance on the part of family members to call police when they have information to share about their loved ones who may pose threats to themselves or others. Summit participants noted the promise in broadening the CIT model to include the elements of early prevention.

⁴⁹ See Appendix E for a summary of the 2013 summit presentations.

“Drawing on identified successes, the summit participants suggested creating a national toolkit that would enable communities to build their own models that various disciplines could also adapt.”

Drawing on identified successes, the summit participants suggested creating a national toolkit that would enable communities to build their own models that various disciplines could also adapt. Including people from the professions that would be involved in the actual prevention process would be crucial to developing such a successful package. Participants discussed the complexities involved in developing models in large cities but maintained that breaking down large cities into smaller units with their own teams would still be feasible. Recognizing the challenges that might emerge when implementing community prevention models in rural areas where resources are scarcer, participants recommended developing regional models and possibly utilizing mobile units that could deploy to rural areas.

The process of cataloging these prevention models begins with identifying those deemed “successful.” Despite noted challenges in ascertaining success due to the difficulty in quantifying successful preventions, participants believe it necessary to identify a “gatekeeper” to assess models and decide which should be shared.

This gatekeeper must balance the requirement to document what constitutes good practices with the need for quick implementation of prevention models. After the gatekeeper identifies successful models, participants recommended that a credible national source package and disseminate them to the various pertinent professional communities. Specifically, they suggested that such a national entity could disseminate information to law enforcement agencies through the Peace Officer Standards and Training commissions and law enforcement training academies in each state. In addition, the research and practitioner communities should distribute information, and participants discussed whether creating an Educational and Advocacy Office would be possible. Furthermore, various organizations that bring together specific professional disciplines, such as teachers, mayors, and governors, are also well positioned to disseminate information on community prevention and threat assessment models.

Last, although the 2013 summit highlighted the powerful potential of community-based intervention models in preventing multiple casualty violence, further multidisciplinary dialogue is needed to identify the elements that make particular models effective and to determine a systematic process for cataloging and disseminating them to pertinent audiences.

[Training in multiple casualty violence prevention](#)

FLETC training design experts observed all sessions of the 2013 summit to begin assessing law enforcement training needs in preventing multiple casualty violence. Several themes emerged during the summit, and subject matter experts will continue to explore the appropriate way forward in developing or modifying training curriculum in relevant topics. Beyond specific training content that particular disciplines may develop to support multiple casualty violence prevention, summit dialogue illuminated the potential utility in altering the overall tone of public safety education to one focused on multidisciplinary, community-based approaches.

Participants observed that developing training in how to recognize threats and suspicious activity would complement educating law enforcement about how to interact with family members and about what resources are available in communities. Specific areas that might be covered include what to look for on social media, what behaviors should raise red flags, the types of probing questions to ask those exhibiting suspicious behavior, how to deal appropriately with individuals with mental health issues, and the concept of involuntary commitment.

The fourth recommendation from the 2012 summit was to better educate various professional disciplines, including law enforcement, about HIPAA, FERPA, and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines. To be more specific, such training might focus on the exceptions and circumstances under which information can be shared. In addition to law enforcement, the audience could include community non-governmental organizations, school personnel, and mental health professionals.

“...a mindset needs to be imparted to law enforcement officers that their role is not simply to arrest but rather that they often have a real opportunity to address problems early, before individuals reach the point of committing violent acts.”

Training in forming crisis intervention teams (CIT) or threat assessment teams is another potential content area for development. Because these teams consist of individuals from multiple disciplines, training is critical for each group to learn about the others' duties, responsibilities, and restrictions. The 2013 summit participants recommended developing a package that would serve as a guide when communities form these kinds of teams.

Although the FLETC is specifically focused on law enforcement training, dialogue at the summit also revealed the need for training in other professional disciplines. For example, mental health professionals and the public health community need additional training in identifying suspicious behavior. Likewise, police dispatchers could benefit from training in eliciting information about mental health from third parties. Furthermore, multidisciplinary training would be helpful in implementing successful community prevention models.

Participants also expressed the need for training in what law enforcement officers can do if family members approach them about their loved ones' unusual behavior. Because this is an intensely private matter, officers are often naturally inclined to avoid getting involved, despite the fact that they are often best positioned to intervene and redirect someone to critically needed mental health and other services. Participants observed that a mindset needs to be imparted to law enforcement officers that their role is not simply to arrest but rather that they often have a real opportunity to address problems early, before individuals reach the point of committing violent acts (see “Community policing as a paradigm shift” on page 7).

While specific themes and potential content areas for training development emerged during the summit, further needs-assessment activities are necessary to ascertain whether new training programs are needed or whether certain topical areas can be incorporated into existing basic or advanced law enforcement training programs. Beyond traditional training development activities, the dialogue that occurred during the 2013 summit illuminates a potential paradigm shift in how the law enforcement training community defines its audience. Specifically, there is a need to think broadly about public safety and to incorporate new audiences as appropriate to advance the goal of building collective responsibility for preventing multiple casualty violence.

Next Steps

Participants of the 2013 summit made significant progress in advancing the dialogue related to developing a public awareness campaign focused on preventing multiple casualty violence. In addition, participants with legal expertise further refined the debate surrounding statutory strategies and the need to clarify misperceptions about limitations of existing laws. Although the FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU-SOE have ascertained that some entities are more appropriate to lead these efforts, the summit partners remain committed to supporting the progression of these areas that require further development and attention.

In contrast, the summit partners are well positioned to spearhead the third major area covered in the summit that requires further development—strategies related to identifying successful community intervention models and, more broadly, incorporating community oriented policing as a strategy in multiple casualty violence prevention. To be more specific, the summit highlighted the opportunities to be found in expanding the use of community-based intervention models and threat assessment teams. In addition, participants discussed elements of community oriented policing that are effective in enhancing prevention efforts. Focusing public safety on community-based approaches and broadening the application of policing within the community emerged as opportunities for institutionalizing a public mindset of shared responsibility for preventing these incidents that continue to shock the public consciousness.

The essential components of community policing — community partnerships, organizational transformation, and problem solving—help frame the approach public safety can take in implementing community-based prevention models. The significant shifts in policing philosophy that have caused agencies to be collaborative rather than autonomous, to empower officers at all levels, to measure success based on quality-of-life effects versus arrest and crime rates, and to be proactive instead of reactive have created environments in agencies that are conducive to applying the community policing philosophy to preventing multiple casualty violence.

“The 2013 summit highlighted the opportunities to be found in expanding the use of community-based intervention models and threat assessment teams.”

Continuing the concept of a multidisciplinary approach, the next summit, planned for 2014, will bring together professionals from a wide range of fields to address how the various components of a community can effectively work together to identify indicators of potential violence and to implement prevention strategies. As a constant in all communities, local law enforcement is a natural nexus for coordinating community-based models and, therefore, will be a principal participant in the summit. However, participation across professional disciplines is needed again in Summit III to ensure the identification of best practices in implementing such models, as well as the thoroughness and appropriateness of any emergent training.

Feedback from numerous 2013 summit participants further supports the intended approach for 2014. Several participants expressed a need to continue the multidisciplinary approach, noting there is no single “owner” of this problem. Another observed “there has to be a community policing approach to solving the issue,” with another supporting the development of national community-based models and associated multidisciplinary training in how to use them.

Through continued multidisciplinary work, the summit partners aim to institutionalize community-based approaches to preventing multiple casualty violence. The 2013 summit’s community panel represents a microcosm of the public safety community in one locality. The panel members’ dialogue reflects opportunities for information sharing, a practice in which they would welcome engaging if given the structures and mechanisms to do so.

Therefore, the principal anticipated outcome of the 2014 summit is creating a prevention toolkit adaptable to individual communities that will accomplish the following:

- Identify basic principles for threat assessment and community-based prevention strategies.
- Delineate best practices in community-based prevention models.
- Provide public safety communities with a framework for working effectively across disciplines.

“...the problem of multiple casualty violence requires a mindset of shared responsibility beyond the parochial interests of any particular institution or profession.”

To help accomplish this, 2014 summit participants will analyze thwarted attacks to determine key strategies that worked in preventing incidents. The summit will also feature a panel discussion among community leaders in localities that have embraced community oriented policing, specifically focusing on the cultural shift required for successful implementation. This session will aim to unveil what communities must do to adopt the collective mindset necessary to engage proactively in prevention strategies.

Each of the disciplines represented at both the 2012 and 2013 summits has its own defined purpose. However, the discourse that occurred during both affirms that the problem of multiple casualty violence requires a mindset of shared responsibility beyond the parochial interests of any particular institution or profession. Therefore, the 2014 summit will embrace the concept that the comprehensive public safety community must immediately engage in collective efforts to render safer communities. While the nation will always mourn those lost to senseless tragedies like those that occurred at Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook Elementary School, and the Century movie theater, it is incumbent upon all of us to empower communities to avoid future heartbreak.

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Appendix A:

2012 Summit Recommendations

Summit recommendations fell into a framework comprising one set focused on what institutions, including governmental and non-governmental organizations, can do to improve the prevention of multiple casualty violence, and one set centered on improving prevention efforts pertaining to individual subjects.

The institution-focused recommendations are as follows:

1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act.
2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.
3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting.
4. Better educate health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines.
5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior.

The subject-focused recommendations are as follows:

6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and sending alerts about incidents.
7. Enhance existing resources to develop a national, searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining to individual behavior that is indicative of escalation toward a violent act, and facilitate the sharing of such information across jurisdictional boundaries.
8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

Appendix B:

Definitional Framework from the 2012 Summit

The 2012 participants' refined the definitional framework the summit planners originally provided as follows:

Identification. The process of recognizing that an actor poses a possible threat of violent conduct.

The identification aspect of prevention has many possible factors. The recognition of a change in behavior or character may be observed by any number of contacts. These contacts may range from family members, co-workers, fellow students, friends, neighbors, counselors, mental health professionals, or law enforcement personnel. Each, and all, is based on the level of interaction with the actor(s). Another aspect of these observations must be the recognition that being “different” or “quirky” is not a crime and alone may not be enough to cause alarm. A combination of factors should lead an observer to have concern and take the next step: i.e., notifying an appropriate authority.

Notification. Providing information to an appropriate authority (someone with actionable responsibility) regarding a possible threat.

Once observers identify what they believe is a reason for worry, they must take the next step and notify an appropriate authority about their concerns. Based on the connection between the observer and the actor, the appropriate authority can be different people. For example, in a school setting, the appropriate authority could be a counselor, principal, or other person in a position of responsibility. In the workplace, the appropriate authority could be a supervisor, a manager, a human resources person, or, based on the level of concern, a security person. In many instances, the appropriate authority may be the police. In situations where the actor is a family member, friend, or neighbor, the police are the likely first line of responsibility to deal with the situation. In many cases, the police will be notified by an appropriate authority to interact with an actor.

In all cases, the most important factor in reporting the concern is that the authority figure has actionable responsibility to reply to the situation. This greater level of responsibility ensures that the concern is acted upon and not simply noted.

Evaluation. The analysis and determination of threat credibility (this includes the capacity and capability to conduct an act of violence).

Many threat assessment models are successfully utilized by law enforcement, schools of higher education, mental health professionals, and the workplace. Each of these models takes into account a number of factors: what is the capability of an actor to carry out an act of violence; what is the capacity of an actor to carry out an act of violence; what if any communication has been received from the actor; what is the actor's motivation to commit an act of violence; and what is the overall context of the threat? Numerous other factors are included in these assessments that are based on the intended target (if known) and method of violence, etc.

The goal of any assessment is to determine if the actor does or does not pose a threat. If a level of threat is determined, then the next step must be some form of intervention or interruption of escalation toward an act of violence.

Intervention. The deliberate interruption of the planning phase of a multiple casualty shooting event (the planning phase is comprised of the stages of escalation toward a violent act).

Determining when the planning phase ends caused much dialog among the participants. They finally agreed that the planning phase continues until the point of execution. At the execution phase, the actor is carrying out the act of violence.

During the planning phase, the actor is completing the physical elements (gathering weapons, ammunition, etc.), as well as the cognitive and emotional elements. The intervention must occur before the move from ideation to action.

There are many methods of intervention, each based on the type of professional interaction. In the medical/mental health profession, intervention may be diagnostic, medication, psychological evaluation (voluntary and involuntary), and long-term treatment. In school settings, the intervention may include school sanctions, as well as a referral to a law enforcement agency for assistance. Based on when and where the intervention occurs during the planning phase, mental health professionals will be involved, as may the police. This can be due to an emergency petition for psychological evaluation or crisis counseling.

Documentation and Dissemination. Documentation is the written record of all activities involved in the intervention, including related activities that preceded or followed the intervention; dissemination is the sharing of documentation and all relevant information across multidisciplinary and jurisdictional boundaries in accordance with applicable laws.

While the law enforcement profession documents potential incidents that have been prevented, other professions involved in the prevention do not typically contribute information that becomes part of this documentation. Comprehensive information from all involved professions could be used for future deterrence of multiple casualty acts of violence, particularly if it is disseminated across professions. A repository should be created for accumulating reports from all pertinent professions on the indicators of potential violence that helped prevent violent incidents with the intent of providing information on events, subjects, and methods that any jurisdiction could use to prevent a future event.

Appendix C:

Tabletop Exercise

This scenario, which was used in the tabletop exercise session of the 2013 summit, provided a fictional history of a potential offender from behavioral/psychological characteristics to the time the hypothetical event occurred. The scenario provided a variety of behavioral patterns displayed during specific periods of past offenders in multiple casualty violence.

Subject history

Our subject, John Q. Public, is a 20-year-old white male raised in a middle-class family in a suburban setting, spending most of his life in Southeast Georgia. He is the only child of Mr. and Mrs. Public, both of whom were active in full-time careers. During much of his childhood, due to the dynamics of career-centered parenting, he had little to no participation in community events: i.e., youth athletics, boy scouts, or religious youth activities. The family attended church services during holidays and seasonal events. Mr. and Mrs. Public divorced during his junior year in high school, and he resided with his mother.

The first documented intervention with mental health professionals was at the age of 13 when he began displaying unpredictable outbursts of frustration and anger and a lack of respect of school staff and authority figures. These behavioral patterns progressed to physical aggression and seemed to diminish through prescribed medication.

Socially, he maintained infrequent short-term relationships with children his age. He was often alienated from student peers and was frequently bullied for being different. His primary source of social interaction was through computer-based networks such as Facebook and Twitter. He possessed an infatuation with violent video games.

Upon graduation from high school, he attended the University of Georgia where he was expelled for a progression of offenses, starting with disruptive outbursts during class discussion, possession of alcoholic beverages on school property as a minor, assault and battery of another student, and allegations of harassment/stalking.

At the onset of this six month scenario, John is enrolled in the Southeast University, seeking a technical degree in computer electronics. He lives at home with his mother in a basement studio apartment.

Scenario timeline

At 6:30 PM this evening, the university has a scheduled basketball game with rival, State Tech, to a near sold-out crowd.

6–3 months prior to the event

1. Friends and family notice repeated rants about frustration with government control and regulation.
2. John works intermittently through a university temp service, doing manual labor as required by the agency clients.
3. John's mother notices his friends have stopped visiting him at home; when she questions him about their relationships, he makes a statement that they do not understand him.
4. An ex-girlfriend contacts John's mother, asking her to speak with John about his threatening Facebook messages and texts or the ex-girlfriend will report him to law enforcement.
5. John's mother notices his infatuation with violent first-person shooter video games increases and that he seems to spend hours a day playing, often into the early morning.
6. John's mother contacts the mental health counselor and shares his recent changes and increased anger and frustration. She states she has observed him spending a lot of time at the computer, researching YouTube videos of violent acts and shootings. She observed his Facebook page full of statements about violence toward an ignorant society.

3–1 month(s) prior to the event

1. John's mother becomes aware of John's increased isolation and suspects he has discontinued taking his prescribed medication.
2. The university places John on conduct probation for an anger outburst during a Comparative Politics lecture.
3. The mental health counselor notes his anger toward society's norms and his relationship issues, but John makes no threats of physical violence. The counselor confirms John has quit taking his prescribed medication, stating there is nothing wrong with him and he does not need them.
4. John's mother discovers credit card charges of \$349.83 to Bill's Pawn, and \$417.53 to an online military surplus company. When questioned, John states it is for camping gear and survival equipment for a trip he has planned in a month.
5. John is fired from the temporary employment service when several clients request he not return due to his poor attitude and anger outbursts.
6. Local law enforcement receives a complaint from John's ex-girlfriend about threatening messages. An officer notes a phrase in one of the messages that stated "all will feel my pain." John is cited for harassment and receives a court summons for the offense.

1 month prior to event execution

1. John appears in court and pleads not guilty for his court summons of harassment.
2. John's Facebook and Twitter posts are increasingly directed at a specific target with statements of a "shock to the public eye."
3. John is placed on academic suspension for a semester for poor attendance and performance at the university.
4. Local law enforcement receives a report from a local gun dealer about an odd customer purchasing a firearm who "just did not seem all together." The store owner provides a copy of the background questionnaire under the name of John Q. Public and states there is nothing against the law for being weird so he felt compelled to sell him the firearm.
5. Campus security interviews and releases John when they find him in the service access area of the university arena during a scheduled university basketball game. Campus police also cite his vehicle that is illegally parked in the employee parking area of the arena.
6. A father and son are at a local gun range and observe a young white male dressed in camouflage, shooting at the range next to them. Initially they did not think his actions were out of the norm until they observed him place several silhouette targets on the ground and shoot at them.
7. At 5:43 PM this afternoon, John's mother observes a Facebook photo of him in the mirror dressed in tactical gear holding two semiautomatic firearms.

Appendix D:

Community Panel Summary

The community panel consisted of seven members representing various sectors of a medium-sized community in the southeastern United States. Participants included a pastor, school resource officer (SRO), youth sports leader/pastor, psychiatric nurse, school counselor, small business owner, and fire department deputy chief. A moderator led the panel through a series of questions related to reporting suspicious or potentially violent behavior. The following summarizes participants' responses to each question:

1. What behaviors would make you suspicious that someone is thinking about / capable of committing an act of multiple casualty violence?

The participants noted a wide array of behaviors and actions that may be indicative of the capability to commit an act of multiple casualty violence. The small business owner explained that some people just give off a "weird vibe," which can cause suspicion. Adding to this, the pastor noted that the posting of dark material on social media can be cause for concern and observed that people often yield more trust during spiritual conversations. He also pointed out that people whose jobs require them to help people with problems are in a better position to observe potentially violent behavior.

Several participants discussed body language and other physical signs of potential violence. For example, the fire deputy chief indicated that he looks for quiet signs of anger in people, such as clenched fists, and the psychiatric nurse agreed, observing that someone's stance or hunched shoulders can be indicative of a problem. Moreover, the youth sports leader/pastor and the psychiatric nurse noted that sometimes potentially troubled people will wear unusual clothing, such as overly heavy apparel during the warm summer months, which the nurse observed can be a subconscious means of protecting oneself.

The school counselor and nurse pointed out that identifying kids who isolate themselves from others is relatively easy, with the school counselor adding that changed behavior such as poor attendance or slipping grades can be signs of trouble. The nurse added that while bullying is a problem, there are also some young people whom others will avoid because they find him or her "scary."

The SRO added that because he has worked at the same school for seven years, he has built a rapport with the student body, so much so that students feel comfortable telling him if they believe someone is acting strangely.

2. Are these behaviors the same if the person plans to inflict self-harm versus harm to others?

The youth sports leader/pastor observed that often an event, such as the suicide of a friend, triggers a person to start behaving strangely. The psychiatric nurse agreed, noting that while a suicidal person tends to be hopeless or helpless, a homicidal person tends to express anger, whether it be focused toward someone or just generalized.

The deputy fire chief noted that while a suicidal person might be more likely to talk about his intentions, the homicidal person would be less likely to do this; thus, he emphasized the importance of listening to people.

3. What would keep you from reporting suspicious activity that might be indicative of multiple casualty violence?

The SRO observed that young people don't want to get involved because they fear that someone else in the person's family will retaliate against them.

The psychiatric nurse noted that while she tends not to hesitate, she has observed people hesitant to become involved in someone else's business. She also noted that people have a tendency to minimize problems or deny them, assuming they are not a big deal.

The deputy fire chief observed that in his community, a lack of trust toward law enforcement and other authority figures causes reluctance to come forward with information. The pastor observed that for professionals who are mandated to report, such as counselors and pastors, they may fear the person bringing legal action against them for breach of confidentiality.

The local merchant noted that there are no set guidelines for what he should do if he believes he shouldn't sell a weapon to a particular individual.

- 4. For the pastors, what tools can law enforcement give you to help your congregation? What can we do to help your congregation feel safer?** [Note: A summit participant spontaneously asked this question, separate from the planned moderator-initiated questions.]

The youth sports leader/pastor noted that consistent relationships between law enforcement and the church, including regular programming and seminars about how congregants can assist law enforcement, would be helpful. The other pastor noted that people need guidelines for how to report information.

A discussion ensued about the different steps pastors would take if congregants came to them with suicidal or homicidal ideations. Both pastors agreed that they probably would not report people for just thoughts; however, if congregants spoke about specifics, it would reach the level at which they would address it. For homicidal thoughts, they would go to law enforcement authorities, but for suicidal thoughts, they would utilize other available resources. The deputy fire chief noted that he knows many other pastors in this community who would behave similarly.

- 5. In your personal and professional experience, can we prevent somebody from having the mindset to commit acts like those that occurred recently in Newtown and Aurora? If so, who would have to act?**

The deputy fire chief spoke about the balance that must be struck between “over-treating” people with mental illness and providing needed treatment. The psychiatric nurse observed that many incidents probably have been prevented through recognition that someone presents a risk and appropriate intervention. She noted the importance of de-stigmatizing the act of identifying people who are at risk. The school counselor added that counselors need to develop relationships with students and parents so that if a counselor identifies an at-risk student, the parents understand the counselor’s purpose is to help.

- 6. What do you think is the general public’s responsibility to report suspicious behavior to prevent acts of violence? Do you feel the neighbor down the street has a responsibility?**

The discussion surrounding this question evolved into a conversation about the responsibilities of community. The deputy fire chief observed the importance of family values in a community, recalling how when he was a child, people who knew his family would report his misbehavior to his parents. The youth sports leader/pastor observed that people often don’t report information because they think it is not their business or do not think they will be taken seriously. Another participant asked how a set of social norms can be created wherein people know that certain behavior is out of bounds.

The participants discussed the effects of violent video games in desensitizing people. One participant articulated the five phases that lead to an act of multiple casualty violence: the fantasy phase, planning phase, preparation phase, and practice phase, culminating with the act itself. She observed that each phase has different intervention strategies and that law enforcement should not necessarily be involved in all five phases.

One of the summit participants observed the importance of studying the “near misses,” with another observing the use of this in the Army’s review of suicides. Another participant noted that severe mental illness and evil are distinct; therefore, a one-size-fits-all approach will not work.

Appendix E:

Summary of 2013 Summit Presentations

7. What audiences should be involved when we start talking about a public awareness campaign? Besides schools, EMS, clergy, local commerce, who should come to the table to help design it?

Panelists provided the following responses: faith community, youth, Parent Teacher Association (PTA), local recreation departments, and civic organizations. The psychiatric nurse observed that gaining consensus would be difficult if too many parties are brought to the table. One of the pastors noted that the same message needs to reach diverse groups, but different formats might work better for different audiences.

8. What kind of information should this campaign convey?

The summit participants discussed the importance of conveying the message that people have a responsibility to look out for one another, in contrast to a message that focuses on turning in one's friends and invokes fear. One of the attorneys observed that the message must focus more on behavior than on appearance. The participants also discussed the effectiveness of anti-smoking and anti-texting-while-driving campaigns.

Below is a brief overview of the 2013 summit presentations and the associated dialogue. Interested persons should coordinate release of specific presentation materials with each presenter.

Case Analysis: Sikh Temple Shooting – Oak Creek, Wisconsin

John Edwards, Chief of Police, Oak Creek (Wisconsin) Police Department

Chief Edwards provided an overview of the incident that occurred in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, in August 2012 and an analysis of events in the shooter's life leading up to the day of the shooting. He discussed the importance of collaborating with other departments in the area and the benefits of a consistent process when dealing with a major incident such as this.

In discussing what could be learned by studying this particular perpetrator's history, summit participants observed the usefulness of examining a person's life from as early as childhood to determine if any past incidents could have been considered harbingers of later problems. In addition, they observed the great extent law enforcement's response to such incidents has evolved over the years. Furthermore, participants highlighted how Fusion Centers shared information throughout the state in the immediate aftermath to enable quick responses at similar religious venues if this had been determined a coordinated attack. The discussion also addressed how to handle the inaccurate reporting that often flows from these events and how to coordinate the release of information.

Kennewick Student Protection Team – Kennewick, Washington

Ken Hohenberg, Chief of Police, Kennewick (Washington) Police Department

Chief Hohenberg briefed participants on the Kennewick Student Protection Team, which is a successful model for addressing concerns related to school safety and violence. Chief Hohenberg provided an overview of the model, examples in which the team has been called together to address concerns, and the community partnerships needed for the model to be effective.

Participants recognized the benefits of having similar models in all K–12 schools and discussed the Kennewick model’s adaptability to universities and whole communities. Expanding the discussion about higher education, participants observed that many colleges and universities have similar models to identify and assess threats on campuses. Last, they discussed how to build relationships among multidisciplinary groups within communities for the purpose of identifying potential threats.

U.S. Secret Service Threat Assessment Model

*Lina Alathari, Ph.D., Research Psychologist
National Threat Assessment Center, U.S. Secret Service*

Dr. Alathari presented the U.S. Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center as an example of a threat assessment-based approach model. Dr. Alathari also provided an overview of the research that supports the model and the findings of the Exceptional Case Studies and the Safe School Initiative Study, which National Threat Assessment Center personnel participated in conducting.

This presentation generated discussion regarding additional research needed to address the prevention of multiple casualty violence. Specifically, participants identified the need to study recidivism rates of those who have made threats or who have been deemed threats, the impact of playing violent videos games on those who commit acts of violence, and the bystander effect (the phenomenon of people observing troubling behavior but not reporting it).

Crisis Intervention Teams

*Major Sam Cochran, Memphis (Tennessee) Police Department (Retired)
and University of Memphis, CIT Center*

*Ron Honberg, J.D., National Director for Policy and Legal Affairs,
National Alliance on Mental Illness*

To address concerns about the relationship between law enforcement and those suffering from mental illness, Major Cochran and Mr. Honberg described the Memphis Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model, which the Memphis Police Department, the Memphis Chapter of the National Alliance on Mental Illness, mental health providers, and two universities, in coordination with numerous strong

community partnerships, established in Memphis, Tennessee. The presentation focused on the CIT as a community program rather than a law enforcement one and on the partnerships needed to ensure the model’s success. They noted that the model is adaptable based on the size of the community and resources available. Dr. Honberg also discussed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to demonstrate the disconnect between what the law states and how people interpret it. He also described the Assertive Community Treatment Act, specifically its benefits beyond medication in treating mental illness.

Summit participants agreed that the CIT model works in many communities and discussed the need to identify ways communities with limited resources can adapt and implement it.

Case Analysis: IHOP Shooting – Carson City, Nevada

*Ken Furlong, Sheriff, and Craig Lowe, Sergeant
Carson City (Nevada) Sheriff’s Office*

Sheriff Furlong and Sergeant Lowe provided a brief overview of the incident that occurred at the IHOP restaurant in Carson City, Nevada, in September 2011. They described the response and then narrowed the discussion to the facts leading up to the day of the event to allow participants to focus on prevention.

Participants discussed incidents, triggers, and possible intervention opportunities leading up to the day of the shooting, and they identified possible avenues for sharing information and providing community services to those in crisis.

Appendix F:

Breakout Questions

Moderators asked 2013 summit participants in each breakout group to discuss specific recommendations from the 2012 summit that were applicable to each group. The recommendations each group reviewed, as well as the probing questions moderators used to elicit dialogue, are listed below.

The practitioner groups

Recommendation 1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act.

- What best practices from your respective fields have been identified as a means of preventing violent acts?
- What entity (organization) should serve as the lead for identifying best practices?
- How are best practices shared in your respective fields?
- Which entity has the potential to share information related to best practices for preventing violent acts to the various disciplines?
- What avenues are currently available to share information?
- What avenues would you recommend be used to share information and resources?

Recommendation 2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.

- Based on the models presented during this summit and models of which you have knowledge, how do you recommend organizations proceed to do the following:
 - Identify threat assessment models
 - Catalogue threat assessment models
 - Identify community-based prevention models
 - Catalogue community-based prevention models
 - Promote the use of such models
 - Adapt models to various disciplines
 - Train on the use of models
 - Develop models for communities
- What entity is responsible for each of the above?

Recommendation 3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward acceptability of reporting.

- What has been implemented in your field to encourage reporting potential violence?
- Thinking about your specific discipline, if you receive information regarding potentially violent behavior, what would you do with the information?
- How is information provided to the public regarding how to report information?
- What are some additional methods that can be used to receive information from the public?
- What are some additional methods that can be used to provide information to the public?
- Which entity do you suggest take the lead in developing a public service campaign?
- Should one discipline take the lead or should several partners in developing a public service campaign?

Recommendation 7. Enhance existing resources to develop a national, searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining to individual behavior that is indicative of escalation toward a violent act, and facilitate the sharing of such information across jurisdictional boundaries.

- What databases currently exist to share information?
- How do you recommend these databases be used in the prevention of multiple casualty violence?
- What additional resources are in place to collect/share information?

The awareness group

Recommendation 2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.

- Based on the models presented during this summit and models of which you have knowledge, how do you recommend organizations proceed to do the following:
 - Identify threat assessment models
 - Catalogue threat assessment models
 - Identify community-based prevention models
 - Catalogue community-based prevention models
 - Promote the use of such models
 - Adapt models to various disciplines
 - Train on the use of models
 - Develop models for communities
- What entity (organization) is responsible for the above?

Recommendation 3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward acceptability of reporting.

- What public awareness campaigns exist that have shifted the culture of the public as a whole?
- How can existing public awareness campaigns assist in developing one's related to preventing multiple casualty incidents?
- What organizations should work to create public awareness campaigns related to the following:
 - Mental health issues
 - Threat assessment
 - Community-based prevention models
 - Response

Recommendation 4. Better educate health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty and staff; and law enforcement professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines.

- What organizations can work together to produce educational information related to HIPAA, FERPA, and the Privacy Act?
- How should that information be disseminated?

Recommendation 6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and sending alerts about incidents.

- What avenues are currently available to share information?
- What avenues would you recommend be used to share information and resources?
- What technology exists to report and receive information?
- What partnerships should form to leverage this technology?

The legal group

Recommendation 4. Better educate health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty and staff; and law enforcement professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines.

- Recognizing there are separate communities of interest (HIPAA-based on statute; FERPA-based on statute; and practitioner-based: law enforcement, mental health professionals, clergy, and educational systems), should these separate communities be merged by reducing the standard of disclosure to the statutes (HIPAA and FERPA) to allow information sharing among those communities of interest?

- How do you recommend sharing the information obtained regarding individuals who may have the potential for violence?
- What legal restrictions would you recommend be placed upon sharing information about potentially violent subjects?

Recommendation 5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professionals to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior.

- What statutes exist similar to those proposed in the recommendations?
- What can be done to strengthen existing statutes?
- What statutes need to be drafted to support the recommendations?
- What entities need to be key participants in drafting such legislation?

Recommendation 8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

- What statutes exist similar to those proposed in the recommendations?
- What can be done to strengthen existing statutes?
- What statutes need to be drafted to support the recommendations?
- What entities need to be key participants in drafting such legislation?

Recommendation 2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.

- What legal pitfalls have you identified after listening to the presentations and the model prevention assessments?
- What legal aspects have you identified as needing clarification?
- How do we proceed to provide that clarification?
- What organizations need to be included to address the legal aspects associated with preventing multiple casualty violence and, in particular, with sharing information?

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Appendix G:

Participants List

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Appendix H:

2013 Summit Participants' Dialogue on the 2012 Recommendations

The following summarizes the 2013 summit participants' dialogue regarding the recommendations from the 2012 summit. In addition to posing some challenges to the recommendations, the participants further refined and expanded the ideas that merged during the first summit.

Institutions-focused recommendations

The institution-focused recommendations from the 2012 summit are as follows:

1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act.
2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.
3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting.
4. Better educate health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines.
5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior.

Discussions about these recommendations centered on the need to establish multidisciplinary prevention teams and to provide information to both specific professional communities and the public at large about what they can do to help prevent multiple casualty violence.

The 2013 summit participants acknowledged that many best practices exist within specific professional disciplines and communities for preventing multiple casualty violence. Examples include mobile crisis teams and university crisis intervention teams that consist of persons from varied professional backgrounds who work toward violence prevention. Some participants recommended that identifiable communities of interest, such as school districts, police

departments, churches, and workplaces, establish behavioral assessment teams. If an individual's behavior becomes more concerning, it would "bubble up" to a threat team that would have people more adept at threat assessment and analysis and that would include law enforcement and mental health components. Participants also observed that existing tools can help classify different threat levels and that a kind of "cheat sheet" would be helpful for identifying all resources available in a community and describing how they interconnect.

Because existing effective models and programs are not consistently shared across disciplines, a common language needs to be established that will facilitate multiple disciplines viewing the problem from a blended perspective. Before that can happen, participants articulated the necessity of determining which models are effective. They observed that a federal entity such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) or a federally funded private entity could serve as a clearinghouse or repository for effective models.

Discussions about effective prevention models often overlapped with dialogue about developing a public awareness campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward acceptability of reporting. Participants overwhelmingly agreed that a consistent national message is necessary but that each local community should have the ability to tailor it to its own particular circumstances. One of the breakout groups recommended a marketing agency take the lead on developing the overall campaign. In one group discussion, the COPS Office emerged as a logical agent to create and disseminate a national toolkit while another breakout group cited DHS as an appropriate lead in overseeing the overall campaign.

Complementary to increasing public awareness about preventing multiple casualty violence, specific professional communities—including health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement—also need to be better educated about HIPAA, FERPA, and the Privacy Act. Participants observed that professional associations are well-positioned to serve this purpose at

national conferences and meetings. Other elements to this solution include granting mental health practitioners continuing education units (CEUs) for this type of training and offering a written guide or manual detailing what information mental health care providers can share. Participants also observed a need for personal liability training so professionals would be more likely to report within the parameters of their professions' ethical standards.

Establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professionals to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior goes hand-in-hand with expanding education about prevention to specific professional communities. While some participants recognized the benefits to drafting such a statute, many expressed reservations. The legal breakout group in particular articulated possible negative consequences for such a statutory change, the most significant of which is the potentially chilling effect on the therapeutic environment. To be more specific, such a law might deter people from seeking treatment. In addition, doctors have a natural disposition to be client-focused whereas an affirmative reporting requirement could pit a therapist against a client in a criminal case. Also, the attorneys expressed concern that this could lead to profiling members of particular groups. Other participants observed that mandating reporting through the various professional codes of ethics might be easier than enacting statutory change.

If this recommendation were to be adopted, the attorneys noted that narrowly defining the meaning of "potentially violent behavior" would be necessary. Furthermore, participants described the need to expand the scope of this recommendation beyond just the medical community to fields like human resources, public health, and education. Despite their hesitancy to endorse this specific recommendation fully, the attorneys largely agreed that codifying the Tarasoff standards,⁵⁰ which would facilitate warning third parties of foreseeable threats, might be helpful.

The attorney breakout group concluded that preventing multiple casualty violence is more contingent upon a cultural shift toward civic responsibility than drafting new statutes. They observed that organizations like the military, universities, and workplaces have particular purposes, and if a person within one of those communities behaves in a way that is contrary to the organization's mission, he or she is removed. However, that individual moves on to other sectors of society and ostensibly carries with him the potential for violent behavior. Raising a point applicable to all of the institutions-focused recommendations, the attorneys articulated the overarching need to instill civic responsibility beyond narrow institutional aims.

Subject-focused recommendations

The remaining, subject-focused recommendations are as follows:

6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and sending alerts about incidents.
7. Develop a national, searchable database of information pertaining to individual behavior indicative of escalation toward a violent act, and facilitate sharing such information across jurisdictional boundaries.
8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

The 2013 summit participants engaged in several lines of dialogue related to the seventh recommendation. The majority of those conversations revolved around potential roadblocks and negative consequences to developing such a database. The most significant problem relates to the perception of "big brother," as participants observed that such a system would invoke a visceral response related to privacy issues. Furthermore, establishing a national database could have the unintended negative consequence of instilling a reluctance to report information and could lead to questions regarding who has access to it.

50. *Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California*, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Cal. 1976).

The attorneys discussed at length questions regarding the legality of retaining information and, particularly, implications for civil rights and civil liberties. To be more specific, they observed potential Fourth Amendment issues related to giving law enforcement officers access to private information in a database. One attorney pointed out that because laws vary state to state, if such a database were developed, law enforcement would need to work closely with counsel from the beginning to determine what can be shared with other disciplines within the particular legal jurisdiction at hand. Because of this complexity, one participant recommended developing clear guidance on what kind of information is appropriate to collect, keep, share, and disseminate.

In lieu of a national database, participants suggested developing a scalable model replicable at the local level that would connect law enforcement, schools, churches, and other elements of the community and track behavioral information, not just existence of mental illness. Participants believed people would be more willing to input information that could be seen locally rather than across states. A pointer system could eventually connect various systems, thus making standardized collection fields necessary.

Participants discussed several specific localized databases already in use by university and law enforcement entities. These conversations illuminated a need to shift the focus of these systems from tracking criminal histories to other indicators, like past treatment for mental illness. One participant cited an example of a database used in the Ohio school system that allows professionals from a variety of disciplines, including education, health care, law enforcement, and social services, to enter information with the school system overseeing what information it disseminates. A multidisciplinary team meets weekly to review problems and solutions that have been identified, following the motto, “What happens in the community comes into the school, and what happens in the school flows out into the community.”

While the participants observed the opportunities this type of system presents, they also noted a major limitation in that professionals from other disciplines do not have access to the data, and this observation led to a discussion about a need for a repository among disciplines. Furthermore, participants did not agree on who should manage such a system, with some believing social workers are best suited for case management, some believing law enforcement should handle it because they have access to multiple databases, and others believing that management should depend on the case.

Although the participants supported localized databases and associated case management, they acknowledged challenges, particularly legal limitations, regarding what can be tracked. In addition, some expressed concerns about overloading a system with too much information. Also, because the percentage of a community that fits the definition of “actionable perpetrator” would be very small, some observed that it might be more prudent to expand existing systems, such as the suicide hotline or procedures associated with background checks before firearms purchases. Notwithstanding potential problems and possible alternatives, participants observed that locally based databases could create community ownership, involvement, and trust, which in turn creates viability and sustainability. If a system like this were established, a pointer system could eventually be developed that would appropriately pass on information to different entities.

Closely related to developing a database to track information about potentially violent individuals is the sixth recommendation, using technology to facilitate reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior. Overall, participants observed that systems already in place like phone calls and text messages are effective ways for both the general public and various professionals to report information. One breakout group talked specifically about creating a website where people could populate information that could be accessible to law enforcement. In several instances, participants also noted that intelligence analysts in Fusion Centers are already trained to analyze and properly route information.

Last, participants discussed the eighth recommendation, developing a model statute limiting liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior. Although participants did not find this as controversial as mandatory reporting on the part of particular professions, the attorneys still noted the challenges that would arise in defining “potentially violent behavior” and the possibility of creating a “slippery slope” of over-reporting. While they did not specifically endorse a particular organization taking the lead on drafting a statute, they articulated several existing “Good Samaritan” statutes that could help in this process, including 6 USC 1104 (Immunity for Reports of Suspected Terrorist Activity) and an anti-hazing statute in Texas that provides immunity for those who report it.

About the COPS Office



THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS OFFICE) is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation's state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.

Rather than simply responding to crimes once they have been committed, community policing concentrates on preventing crime and eliminating the atmosphere of fear it creates. Earning the trust of the community and making those individuals stakeholders in their own safety enables law enforcement to better understand and address both the needs of the community and the factors that contribute to crime.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy cutting-edge crime fighting technologies, and develop and test innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders and all levels of law enforcement. The COPS Office has produced and compiled a broad range of information resources that can help law enforcement better address specific crime and operational issues, and help community leaders better understand how to work cooperatively with their law enforcement agency to reduce crime.

- Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than \$14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation's streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing.
- By the end of FY2013, the COPS Office has funded approximately 125,000 additional officers to more than 13,000 of the nation's 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country in small and large jurisdictions alike.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- As of 2013, the COPS Office has distributed more than 2 million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs.

COPS Office resources, covering a wide breadth of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—are available, at no cost, through its online Resource Center at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This easy-to-navigate website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.

About the FLETC



THE FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTERS (FLETC), a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for 91 federal partner agencies and also provides training to state, local, rural, tribal, territorial, and international law enforcement agencies. During FY2013, the FLETC trained over 63,000 students, and it has trained over 1,000,000 law enforcement officers and agents since its establishment in 1970. Its mission statement is: “We train those who protect our homeland.”

The FLETC is headquartered at Glynco, Georgia, near the port city of Brunswick, halfway between Savannah, Georgia, and Jacksonville, Florida. In addition to Glynco, the FLETC operates two other residential training centers in Artesia, New Mexico, and Charleston, South Carolina, as well as a non-residential facility in Cheltenham, Maryland. The FLETC also maintains an office in Orlando, Florida, which provides a gateway to technology and training expertise within a nationally recognized hub for simulation and training. Since 1995, the FLETC has participated in the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Program. In addition to providing instructors for the core and specialized programs at the ILEAs located in Hungary, Thailand, Botswana, and El Salvador, the FLETC has personnel assigned as the director of the ILEA in Botswana and deputy director of the ILEA in Thailand.

As an interagency training organization, the FLETC’s staff comprises professionals from diverse backgrounds. Approximately half of its instructors are permanent FLETC employees, and the remaining half are federal officers and investigators on assignment from their parent organizations or recently retired from the field. The mix provides a balance of instructional experience and fresh insight.

Consolidation of law enforcement training permits the Federal Government to emphasize training excellence and cost-effectiveness. Through professional instruction and practical exercises, the FLETC not only prepares students for their law enforcement responsibilities but also affords opportunities to interact with students from many other agencies. Students become acquainted with the missions and duties of their colleagues, forming the foundation for a more cooperative law enforcement effort. Partner Organizations provide input regarding training issues and functional aspects of the FLETC, taking part in curriculum development and review conferences and helping to formulate policies and directives. Through this collaboration, the FLETC remains responsive to the training mission.

As the trainer of choice for federal, state, local, rural, tribal, territorial, and international law enforcement agencies, the FLETC is committed to continuously modernizing its training programs and facilities. Through partnerships with the military and cooperative agreements with the entertainment industry, leading technology companies, and academic institutions, the FLETC has become an innovator in the use of modeling and simulation to support law enforcement training. Both independently and through cooperative research and development agreements, the FLETC conducts original research to identify methods for offering more effective and efficient training. To support the training needs of today and tomorrow, the FLETC has recently added state-of-the-art training facilities such as the Counterterrorism Operations Training Facility (a network of various urban, suburban, rural, and intermodal training venues), the Simulations Laboratory, and the Cyber Forensics Building to support the training needs of today and tomorrow. The FLETC continues to invest strategically to meet the evolving training requirements of an increasingly complex law enforcement landscape.

THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC SAFETY LEADERSHIP (PSL) began in 1994 as the Police Executive Leadership Program (PELP). Dean Emeritus Stanley C. Gabor, who at the time led the Johns Hopkins University School of Continuing Studies, began this unique program, built on a demanding leadership, liberal arts, and humanities curriculum. Beginning with a single cohort of 24 police executives, PSL currently sponsors 15 cohort classes in multiple locations with a student population representing law enforcement, fire/EMS, emergency management, public health, transit, campus safety, private security, the intelligence community, and the military. Presently, PSL is within the **Johns Hopkins University, School of Education**, under the leadership of Dean David Andrews.

From its inception, PSL has been at the forefront of preparing current and future executives to deal successfully with the routine and complex issues associated with public safety and sustaining community well-being. To this end, the division provides graduate, undergraduate, and noncredit education designed to advance excellence in leadership. The division has won national awards and recognition for its academic programs, which include the Master of Science and Bachelor of Science in Management and Master of Science in Intelligence Analysis. The division's faculty is highly diverse, with academic and professional backgrounds in business, philosophy, education, law enforcement, law, psychology, intelligence analysis, physics, and medicine.

Today, over 1,000 students representing over 50 agencies have graduated from these programs. PSL alumni have advanced to head law enforcement agencies in over 70 jurisdictions throughout the United States. Other graduates have led major fire departments and become leaders in federal agencies, intelligence organizations, and the military.

PSL provides support and technical assistance to organizations nationwide, conducts research, and plays a key role in centers of excellence, work groups, and boards and commissions on behalf of federal, state, and local agencies. The division is home to two prestigious organizations, the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) and the Maryland Chiefs of Police Association (MCPA).

The American public has expressed increasing alarm over incidents of multiple casualty violence. While the law enforcement community has progressed in advancing training in the tactical response to incidents, there are significant gaps in strategies aimed at preventing multiple casualty violence. To address this need, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers is collaborating with the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership, to facilitate a series of national summits on preventing multiple casualty violence.

The second summit occurred in April 2013, bringing together subject matters experts from a wide range of disciplines positioned to help prevent multiple casualty violence, such as law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, education, and academia. Participants explored strategic approaches to information sharing in multiple casualty violence prevention, centering their dialogue on the necessary involvement of local communities in prevention strategies.



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To obtain details on COPS Office programs,
call the COPS Office Response Center at 800-421-6770.

Visit the COPS Office online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.