

# Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence



Homeland  
Security

JOHNS HOPKINS  
UNIVERSITY



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Community Oriented Policing Services  
U.S. Department of Justice

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University held a candlelight vigil on the Drillfield on April 16, 2010, as a Day of Remembrance to commemorate the tragedy that occurred there just three years earlier when a gunman killed 32 students and faculty and injured 23 others.



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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES  
Office of the Director  
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**COPS**

Dear colleagues,

On behalf of the entire U.S. Department of Justice and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, I would like to share my appreciation for the collaborative efforts made to develop this report and establish a base for continued discussion on preventing multiple casualty violence.

A key component of effective community policing is the advancement of partnerships and problem-solving strategies. Stronger partnerships yield effective communications and broader outreach and, coupled with new strategies to address public safety concerns, help law enforcement coordinate preventative initiatives to mass casualty incidents. But as the tragic assault in Newtown, Connecticut, demonstrates, threats and circumstances can change. The need for continued discussion, training, and vigilance on all levels remains critical.

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has made an enormous effort here to convene like-minded agencies and pair them with interested parties from various academic and medical backgrounds at the first National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. This report on the findings of the summit provides a significant step toward the development of universal practices to assist the field. This tool will help shape roles and responsibilities and help guide work toward early identification and more effective prevention.

The COPS Office is a proud partner of this effort and considers this initiative to be an ongoing priority. At every tragic occurrence involving multiple casualty violence, the same questions are asked about what could be done better to prevent such an act from happening. To see such a diligent and dedicated effort being made to find the answers is encouraging.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Bernard K. Melekian".

Bernard K. Melekian, Director  
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services



**Homeland  
Security**

Dear colleagues,

I am pleased to share with you the final report from the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings, a collaborative initiative of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; and the Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership, held at the FLETC headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, December 11–13, 2012.

This effort began in late July 2012, shortly after the tragic shooting at the Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado. While a great deal of progress has been made over the past decade in training law enforcement officers on active shooter response, there is a substantial need to advance our understanding of how multiple casualty acts of violence can be prevented. From the early planning stages of the summit, we recognized the importance of bringing together subject-matter experts from a wide range of disciplines—including law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, education, and academia—that could play a role in developing prevention strategies. By taking this holistic approach, the summit resulted in cross-cutting recommendations that I believe hold great promise in addressing the many dimensions to this complex problem.

As law enforcement trainers for more than 90 federal agencies, as well as for thousands of state, local, and international law enforcement officers, the FLETC is deeply committed to keeping our communities safe. Too many innocent lives have been lost in seemingly inexplicable acts of multiple casualty violence. The FLETC remains dedicated to collaborating across professional communities to help prevent future tragedies.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Connie L. Patrick".

Connie L. Patrick, Director  
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

**School of Education**

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Office of the Dean

Dear colleagues,

In July 2012, a partnership was established between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; and the Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership. One of the goals of this partnership was to conduct a national summit on multiple casualty shootings. This partnership succeeded in this goal by bringing together subject-matter experts from many disciplines at the FLETC facility in Glynco, Georgia, on December 11–13, 2012. Through facilitated discussion and open exchange, summit participants shared their knowledge and experiences on this vital topic.

Johns Hopkins University, through its many schools and centers, has been conducting research into characteristics of violence for many years. I am very proud that the School of Education, through its Division of Public Safety Leadership, was an active partner in developing and conducting the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings and in the creation of this summit report, which you are now viewing.

This form of violence continues to plague our country and take the lives of countless innocents, so the work is not done. I hope you will reflect on the contents of this report and ask yourself what you can do to continue the movement that was established during this first summit.

Sincerely,



David W. Andrews, Ph.D., Dean  
School of Education  
The Johns Hopkins University

# Acknowledgments

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The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, especially Director Bernard K. Melekian and Principal Deputy Director Joshua A. Ederheimer

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, especially Director Connie L. Patrick and Deputy Director D. Kenneth Keene

The Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership, especially Dean David Andrews

The principal authors of this report: John Paparazzo, MSM, Johns Hopkins University; Christine Eith, Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University; and Jennifer Tocco, M.Ed., MPA, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center



# Executive Summary

Immediately following the tragic shooting on July 20, 2012, at the Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, and in recognition of increased public alarm over multiple casualty violence in the United States, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) began partnering with the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership (JHU-PSL), to bring together a cross-section of stakeholders from a variety of disciplines, including law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, education, and academia, for the purpose of improving the nation's ability to prevent such incidents.

The three partners worked over the next several months to plan and coordinate the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings, held at the FLETC's headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, December 11–13, 2012. More than two dozen experts from multiple disciplines assembled in an effort to advance the safety and security of the nation's communities: educational institutions, workplaces, public venues, places of worship, recreational areas, etc. The summit goal was to bring together a cadre of leaders and subject-area authorities to develop and propose a national dialogue on multiple casualty violence and to create a path forward.

During the preliminary meeting phase of the summit, the planners developed a set of definitions to serve as a framework for discussions about preventing multiple casualty violence. The FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU-PSL invited subject-matter experts from a wide range of disciplines to engage a cross-section of professions positioned to help facilitate the prevention of multiple casualty violence.

Over the course of the three-day summit, these participants further refined and structured the national dialogue on multiple casualty violence and discussed, debated, and built consensus on potential strategies for preventing such incidents. Through careful examination of voluminous summit notes and documentation, summit partners synthesized definitions into a common framework and developed recommendations for future actions. These delineate the direction of future conversations and meetings on preventing multiple casualty violence.

# Summary of Summit Recommendations

Summit recommendations fell into a framework comprising one set focused on what institutions, including governmental and non-governmental organizations, can do to improve the prevention of multiple casualty violence, and one set centered on improving prevention efforts pertaining to individual subjects:

## Institution-focused

1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act.
2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.
3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting.
4. Better educate health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines.
5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior.

## Subject-focused

6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and sending alerts about incidents.
7. Enhance existing resources to develop a national, searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining to individual behavior that is indicative of escalation toward a violent act, and facilitate the sharing of such information across jurisdictional boundaries.
8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

# Background on Multiple Casualty Violence

Acts of violence resulting in multiple casualties, such as recent shootings of random victims in places like schools, theaters, and shopping malls, have increasingly alarmed the collective American society. These incidents generate significant interest and frequently dominate media coverage in their immediate aftermaths. While they continue to constitute a small proportion of American crime, the horror they inflict on the national consciousness has compelled researchers and policymakers alike to develop detailed definitions and frameworks for study, theorize about root causes, and explore avenues for prevention.

Scholars have defined terminology that helps to distinguish among the various types of multicide.<sup>1</sup> The three commonly defined classifications of multiple casualty violence are mass murder, serial murder, and spree murder. Points of distinction among these include the number of victims, the location of events, and the existence of a cooling-off period.<sup>2</sup> These definitions identify distinct patterns in multiple casualty events, and a common factor has been the emotional or mental health of the subject. Particularly in cases of multiple casualty acts of violence, prior to their rampages, subjects often had been perceived by at least one person as frustrated or angry and often had expressed these emotions prior to the event.<sup>3</sup> The manifestation of a potential subject's frustration or anger is likely to be expressed through threat or behavioral changes. In almost every incident of workplace homicide (99 percent), the actor made threats prior to engaging in the shooting event; similarly, most perpetrators of multiple casualty acts of violence that occurred in schools had a history of previous conflict.<sup>4</sup>

Historically, the majority of multiple casualty events have occurred in one of three places: the home, workplace, or school. In recent events, such as the shootings in Tucson, Arizona, and Aurora, Colorado, subjects have moved into public spaces where victims are members of the community and are targeted at random while engaged in recreation or daily life. While multiple casualty events are always a shock to the consciousness, the assault on innocence becomes particularly startling when children are the targets, as was the case in Newtown, Connecticut. The community and public at-large are left asking who could have done such a thing and how such a horrifying act could have been prevented.

While statistically rare, multiple casualty acts of violence are not a recent phenomenon; the first noted incident of violence occurred at a school in 1927.<sup>5</sup> The prevalence of these acts of homicide is very low, with an estimated 26 multiple casualty shooting incidents identified since 2000, including approximately seven acts in 2012.<sup>6</sup> However, given the far-reaching impact of violence on individuals and whole communities, public health scholars have conducted significant research on violence prevention.<sup>7</sup> The devastating effects of multiple casualty violence on individual families and on our collective national consciousness create an urgent need to transcend the boundaries of theoretical research in the development of practical strategies to improve prevention efforts.

1. Alvarez, A., and R. Bachman, *Murder American Style* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2003).

2. Douglas, J., and M. Olshaker, *The Anatomy of a Motive* (New York: Pocket Books, 1999).

3. Ibid.

4. Zinna, K.A., *After Columbine: A Schoolplace Violence Prevention Manual* (Silverthorne, CO: Spectra Publishing, 1999).

5. Bernstein, A., *Bath Massacre: America's First School Bombing* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

6. FLETC staff collected data from a variety of publicly available sources to list events that fall within the summit's scope, namely pre-planned multiple casualty violent events within the United States, excluding terrorist acts, killings in conjunction with the commission of other crimes, and domestic violence incidents in which only family members are killed. This compilation, found in Appendix A, was intended to inform the planning phase of the summit and is not necessarily comprehensive.

7. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Injury Prevention collects data on the prevalence and mechanism of death for certain, most-affected populations. Further, the National Violent Death Reporting System provides additional information into violent deaths; however, the system covers only 18 states across the United States. (See "National Violent Death Reporting System," CDC.gov, [www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/NVDRS/index.html](http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/NVDRS/index.html).)

# Background on the National Summit

In the wake of the July 2012 multiple casualty shooting in Aurora, Colorado, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) began partnering with the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership (JHU-PSL), to develop a plan for improving the nation's ability to prevent such incidents.

During the early planning stages of the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings, FLETC, COPS Office, and JHU-PSL personnel reviewed existing literature related to multiple casualty incident response and prevention. This work illuminated a need to explore specific gaps in preventing these kinds of incidents from occurring. The summit planners identified a panel of subject-matter experts from a wide variety of relevant professions to participate in a three-day summit with the goal of proposing a national dialogue on preventing multiple casualty shootings.

The summit concluded on December 13, 2012, only one day before the horrific event in Newtown, Connecticut—a tragic reminder of the urgency to act to protect our communities from such violence.

## Purpose and scope

Unlike a number of previous efforts, the purpose of this summit was not to examine law enforcement's tactical response to acts of multiple casualty violence; instead, the focus was on identifying pre-incident intervention strategies and opportunities for improving institutional systems to help reduce the likelihood of such incidents by employing a strategic, multidisciplinary approach. The goal of the summit was thus to advance the safety and security of the nation's communities—academic institutions, workplaces, public venues, places of worship, recreational areas, etc.—by bringing together a cadre of leaders and subject-area authorities to develop and propose a national dialogue on multiple casualty shootings.

To ensure the summit resulted in actionable and achievable recommendations, its scope was limited to only pre-planned violent events within the United States and excluded terrorist acts, killings in conjunction with the commission of other crimes, and domestic violence incidents in which only family members are killed. This approach enabled participants to focus the discussion on the kinds of events that are among the least understood and for which few prevention strategies are currently in place, especially on a national scale.

The catalysts for the summit were recent high-profile active shooter events in the United States. Thus, early discussions compelled summit planners to title the event the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. However, ensuing conversations during the planning phase and during the event itself did not focus on the nature of the weapons used in the incidents, and it became clear as time went on that the themes and recommendations emerging from the summit were not dependent upon the weapon of choice. Thus, this report deemphasizes the subject's choice of weapon, and future work resulting from this summit is expected to be nonspecific on this point.

## Objectives

The objectives for the summit were as follows:

1. Identify and place in order of priority the concerns, issues, and needs challenging the prevention of multiple casualty shootings.
2. Identify notable successes in the identification, notification, evaluation, intervention, documentation, and dissemination of information for addressing multiple casualty shooting threats.
3. Suggest a course of action, short-term and long-term, for advancing the dialogue regarding the prevention of multiple casualty shootings.

## Anticipated outcomes

Anticipated outcomes of the summit were as follows:

1. Delegates, in concert with summit sponsors, develop an interdisciplinary network for information sharing, communication, and strategy development for addressing the threat of multiple casualty shootings.
2. Delegates reach a consensus on common themes associated with the prevention of multiple casualty shootings with the focus on furthering this dialogue on a national level.
3. Delegates submit a report citing recommendations designed to address the identified issues.

## Summit format

This summit extended over three days and comprised four breakout sessions, four large-group sessions during which individual groups reported out on their findings and recommendations, a presentation from legal experts regarding topics significant to preventing multiple casualty shootings, and a plenary session on the final day. Breakout sessions were intended to elicit cross-professional perspectives, and the plenary session aimed to build consensus among summit participants regarding next steps. These discussions established a foundation for future summits that are expected to focus on specific issues relating to prevention of multiple casualty violence.

Approximately three weeks in advance of the summit, the JHU-PSL planners e-mailed the participants a letter asking them to complete a web-based pre-survey to elicit any preconceptions regarding approaches to preventing multiple casualty shootings. Specifically, the survey queried participants' confidential perceptions of the current state of pre-event capabilities and capacity to identify and interrupt a potential act of multiple casualty violence. Responses to this survey helped the summit planners refine the research questions to be used at the summit and facilitate discussions during the three-day event.<sup>8</sup>

8. See Appendix B for a copy of the survey.

The summit began with a facilitated discussion among young adults between the ages of 16 and 21. The purpose of this Young Adult Panel was to elicit perspectives on leveraging social media for identifying potential perpetrators and reporting suspicious activity or threatening behavior. The summit planners specifically chose the young adult demographic due to the explosion in the use of social media over the past few years in daily communications and in emotional expression, especially among this generation. Prospects for prevention are likely to be prevalent among peers who interact with potential subjects in their daily lives; therefore, their perspectives and habits are crucial in understanding prevention and interruption opportunities.<sup>9</sup>

Following the Young Adult Panel and a brief opening introductory session, the summit participants were assigned to breakout groups that became their teams for the duration of the summit. Initial breakout sessions were intended to validate the framework the summit planners formulated—namely, structuring dialogue that related to prevention around the identification of potential threats; notification protocols, processes, and procedures; evaluation strategies; pre-incident interventions to interrupt planning and preparations; and documentation of pre-incident activities, along with the appropriate collection, storage, and dissemination of those documents.<sup>10</sup>

Later breakout sessions explored current activities in the participants' professions related to multiple casualty violence prevention, including discussion on existing gaps and opportunities for improvement. During the plenary session, the summit facilitator worked with participants to synthesize recommendations and build consensus around central themes and solution strategies.

## Selecting the delegates

From the early planning stages, the summit planners committed to bringing together a multidisciplinary group of experts, believing that the most effective solution strategies could be derived only through debate and discussion

9. See Appendix C for a summary of the Young Adult Panel.

10. See Appendix D for the research questions posed to participants during the breakout sessions.

among experts in all fields and professions positioned to facilitate prevention of multiple casualty violence. Indeed, by explaining the opportunities, strengths, and limitations of particular disciplines, the participants were able to engage in meaningful, action-oriented dialogue.

While law enforcement communities have traditionally taken the lead on the tactical response to active shooter incidents, other professionals and practitioners are likely to have contact with those planning incidents at various stages, and additional experts possess significant academic knowledge in topics relevant to the prevention of multiple casualty violence.

For example, psychologists and psychiatrists may serve patients who exhibit signs that might be indicative of a propensity toward violence. Educators and other school personnel may work with or encounter students who likewise present behavior common among individuals who have perpetrated multiple casual shootings. Similarly, law enforcement officers may encounter persons demonstrating signs of threatening behavior during the course of their daily duties.

Health care administrators bring experience with identifying patterns associated with persons admitted to hospitals, and potential mental health care follow-up, as well as knowledge about the health care system in general. Academics, particularly those in fields such as psychology, psychiatry, education, and public health, have studied various aspects of multiple casualty violence, each examining particular aspects of the phenomenon without much opportunity to synthesize viewpoints and findings.

Those with expertise in intelligence analysis understand how to identify and mitigate risks and how to piece together information to identify patterns. Private security practitioners bring experience related to both physically securing buildings and identifying suspicious persons or activities in closed locations. Finally, those who have lived through multiple casualty shooting incidents, especially in law enforcement leadership capacities, bring practical perspectives and lessons learned that add realism to conversations related to all phases of multiple casualty acts of violence.

The summit planners selected delegates in all of these professions, disciplines, and areas of expertise, resulting in a final cadre of 22 professionals. Several notable subject-area experts were regrettably unable to attend but expressed interest in participating in future summits and dialogue.<sup>11</sup> Due to the complexities of the HIPAA, FERPA, and Privacy Act, the summit coordinators invited legal experts to serve as technical advisors during all working sessions. Attorneys were present to answer technical questions, ensuring discussions were based on accurate perceptions of existing laws.<sup>12</sup>

## Reporting on the summit

Although the summit aimed to build consensus among participants, gaining complete agreement on every point is nearly impossible when a group of experts comes together representing a diversity of professional viewpoints, areas of expertise, and past experiences. Indeed, healthy debate often produces the most profound insights.

The recommendations included in this report reflect the major themes that emerged, focusing on those that the majority of participants supported. The discussion points in this report reflect the participants' debates and dialogue throughout the three-day event.

11. See Appendix E for the list of summit participants.

12. See Appendix F for a summary of the presentation provided by legal experts during the summit.

# Academic Research and Emerging Perspectives on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Important academic work has been done in the area of multiple casualty violence. However, there remains no specific profile of rampage shooters due to the limited number of events to study. Furthermore, the epidemiological research approach often taken with respect to multiple casualty violence does not include exploring the context of such events, including potential socio-cultural triggers.

A framework of identifiable characteristics could provide a collective understanding of the risk factors or underlying causes of these acts of violence, which should improve prevention efforts. Existing literature and perspectives that emerged during the summit point to the need to fill this gap. Developing and implementing effective prevention strategies will require the interaction of both the individual- and institutional-level factors that are present as escalation toward violent acts occurs.

The social sciences can inform these conversations in ways that focus not solely on the individual but also on the subject's social context and interpersonal interactions, providing a macro-level approach to understanding the roles of social norms, social networks, communities, and neighborhoods. In a review of school shootings, Katherine Newman and colleagues identified five key sociological similarities across the shooters: individual marginalization, a magnification of this marginalization by psychological issues, exposure to cultural scripts, a failure of surveillance, and access to guns.<sup>13</sup>

Although this research specifically examined incidents involving shootings, summit participants broadened the discussion to address access to any kind of deadly weapon. While the factors Newman and colleagues identified focused on the similarities at the subject level, they also suggest missed opportunities for intervention at the societal level. Individual marginalization rarely goes undetected by family, friends, teachers, or colleagues; however, in many cases, post-event evidence identified that changes in the subjects' behavior were not effectively communicated in ways that could have prevented tragedies.

13. Newman, K.S., C. Fox, D.J. Harding, J. Metha, and W. Roth, *Rampage: The Social Roots of School Shootings* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

The significant interaction between social marginalization and mental health issues is another area where missed opportunities for intervention can occur. Many recent events have involved offenders who were known to have mental health problems. Research indicates that while violence is no more prevalent among the mentally ill population than in the general population, mentally ill individuals who engage in violence target family and friends typically in home settings.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, as the public discusses multiple casualty violence, mental health issues are often cited as contributing factors in multiple casualty violence.

Developing a prevention strategy for a phenomenon with a low rate of occurrence is difficult, but there are opportunities to build on existing research to further the knowledge base in this area. Risk assessment studies have found that the elimination of major mental disorders can reduce community violence by an estimated 5 percent.<sup>15</sup> Further discussion and research in this area might include discerning the barriers to effective mental health identification and treatment, recognizing the continuing social stigma of mental illness and its negative impacts on cultural scripts, and improving the overall health and wellbeing of individuals with mental illness to increase social acceptance.

The primary prevention focus for such acts of violence requires a cultural shift in the way in which society looks at the risk of multiple casualty acts of violence, from one driven by fear of reporting relatives and friends, to one in which reporting to authorities is viewed as a safe way to help loved ones in crisis. While multiple casualty incidents are statistically rare, striking similarities exist among many of them—namely, the individual's marginalization from his or her familial or social network, a recognized change towards aberrant behavior, and a failure of friends and family to report when behavior changes became a threat to public health and safety. The natural order of the family unit is to protect and care for its members; however, the family has the potential to serve as the first source of identifying that

14. Monahan, J., H.J. Steadman, E. Silver, P.S. Applebaum, P. Clark Robbins, E.P. Mulvey, L.H. Roth, T. Grisso, and S. Banks, *Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

15. Swanson, J.W., "Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and Community Violence: An Epidemiologic Approach," in *Violence and Mental Disorder: Developments in Risk Assessment*, edited by J. Monahan and H.J. Steadman, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 101–136.

a potential problem exists with one of its members. In the context of the existing stigma surrounding mental illness, a family or close friend may try to protect an individual experiencing a mental health crisis in an attempt to limit further stigmatization.

An individual's identity is often negatively impacted by the social stigma, or "labeling," frequently associated with mental illness, leaving the person emotionally withdrawn, depressed, and feeling rejected.<sup>16,17</sup> Attempts by friends and family to intervene on their own are not always successful and have the potential to further isolate the individual struggling with a mental health crisis by fostering the stigma within the home. In an attempt to help and care for an individual in need, the family or friend actually becomes more of a barrier to successful intervention by not reporting potentially threatening behavior. This occurs because the family or friend hopes to avoid further stigmatization and fears losing the loved one's trust and, consequently, the ability to ensure the individual's safety and wellbeing.

A phenomenon known as the bystander effect may also facilitate understanding regarding why individuals who pose credible threats are not reported to appropriate authorities. In recent multiple casualty acts of violence, such as the one in Carson City, Nevada, in 2011, the subjects openly carried weapons into public places. How and why no one acted to thwart these individuals' actions immediately prior to the shootings can be explained in part by the bystander effect—the failure to act in an emergency situation.<sup>18,19</sup>

In order for an event to be prevented, members of a society must recognize behavior as problematic, interpret that behavior as a potential threat, and be willing to take responsibility for some sort of intervention that would interrupt the event. This intervention does not require direct contact with the individuals and could be as simple as an anonymous phone call to an authority. However, it does require a cultural shift toward shared responsibility for public safety.

This cultural shift requires an inculcation and acceptance that reporting abnormal behavior is in the best interest of society, and in fact, is a civic responsibility. Research suggests that one of the primary barriers to reporting threatening behavior is the overall fear of stigmatization or future victimization on the part of the reporter. The general concern is that, without the appropriate protections in place, whether in school or public settings, reporting threatening behavior can have negative consequences on the person doing the notifying if not kept confidential.<sup>20</sup> Thus, in addition to the stigma that can be placed on the individual posing the threats, there is a perception of potential stigmatization of family, friends, or even bystanders who report behavior indicative of violence without confidential protections in place. This results in fear ranging from being labeled a snitch to becoming a target of violence.<sup>21</sup>

Acts of violence that take multiple lives, particularly those that occur during violent rampages, shock the societal consciousness. These acts are differentiated from other homicides and assaults that, while continuing to decline, are somewhat more pervasive in our society.<sup>22,23</sup> In an attempt to make sense of a senseless act, society often scrutinizes the assailant and points to any distinguishing factor that could explain how and why someone could commit such a heinous act. Behavioral characteristics, while important in understanding the act, are not the only pieces of the puzzle.

16. Goffman, E., *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1963).

17. Cox, W.T.L., L.Y. Abramson, P.G. Devine, and S.D. Hollon, "Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Depression: The Integrated Perspective," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 7 (2012): 427–449, <http://pps.sagepub.com/content/7/5/427.abstract>.

18. Latané, B., and J.M. Darley, "Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 10 (1968): 215–221.

19. Tassione, D.D., *Adolescent Connectedness, the Student Bystander, and Targeted School Violence* (Texas Woman's University, 2006).

20. Wilson-Simmons, R., K. Dash, P. Tehranifar, L. O'Donnell, and A. Stueve, "What Can Student Bystanders Do To Prevent School Violence?" *Journal of School Violence* 5 (2006): 43–62.

21. Ibid.

22. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), *Crime in the United States, 2011*, Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012).

23. Blumstein, A., and J. Wallman, "The Crime Drop and Beyond," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 2 (2006): 125–146.



A systems approach is required to understand how someone could have perpetrated such an extreme act of violence and particularly where in that system a failure could have occurred. This requires understanding the social and cultural explanations for individual behavior, as well as developing a better understanding of the subject so that early identification of a potential threat can occur and lead to a successful intervention to prevent future acts of multiple casualty violence.

In addition to issues associated with stigmatization and the potential consequences of the bystander effect, misperceptions associated with laws intended to protect individual privacy, particularly in the medical and educational domains, are barriers to timely and effective reporting of potentially threatening behavior. While the HIPAA, FERPA, and Privacy Act do not generally prohibit professionals from coming forward with or sharing information that could help prevent acts of violence, there are widely held, though inaccurate, perceptions that these laws place limitations on information sharing and reporting that prohibit effective prevention. Moreover, fears of personal liability create a public reluctance to come forward with information in cases where indicators of potentially violent behavior may be present. This, coupled with concerns about retribution, contributes to a hesitancy to report.

There is a need to elevate awareness regarding behaviors indicative of potential violence, taking into account both individual-level characteristics and the social context in which subjects live, study, and work. The prevalence of mental health issues among perpetrators, as well as relatives' and friends' reluctance and resistance to report suspicious or potentially threatening behavior, are areas that must inform future dialogue on prevention. The misperceptions of limitations imposed by laws such as HIPAA, FERPA, and the Privacy Act, as well as public reluctance to report, are further barriers that require clarification as experts develop practical strategies to address this alarming national crisis.



# Framing the Summit Recommendations

Academic perspectives and summit discussions point to the need to foster a cultural shift away from stigmatizing the need for mental health care and to focus on overcoming challenges associated with reporting suspicious and potentially threatening behavior. The participants' conversations were informed by the definitional framework the summit planners created to convey the essential, nonlinear components of multiple casualty violence prevention:

**Identification.** The process of recognizing that an actor poses a possible threat of violent conduct.


**Notification.** Providing information to an appropriate authority (someone with actionable responsibility) regarding a possible threat.

**Evaluation.** The analysis and determination of threat credibility (this includes the capacity and capability to conduct an act of violence).

**Intervention.** The deliberate interruption of the planning phase of a multiple casualty shooting event (the planning phase is comprised of the stages of escalation toward a violent act).

**Documentation and Dissemination.** *Documentation* is the written record of all activities involved in the intervention, including related activities that preceded or followed the intervention; *dissemination* is the sharing of documentation and all relevant information across multidisciplinary and jurisdictional boundaries in accordance with applicable laws.

In addition, the Young Adult Panel created a platform for dialogue particularly focused on improving the ability of governmental and non-governmental institutions and professions to identify potential perpetrators, provide the



**Figure 1.** Components of Multiple Casualty Violence Prevention

Source: The FLETC, JHU, and the COPS Office

necessary mental health services to individuals in need of them, ensure a safe and effective infrastructure for reporting suspicious activity, and shifting social values toward the acceptability of reporting loved ones and friends.

The young adult panelists emphasized the value of school resource officers (SRO), citing them as likely avenues for reporting information about specific behavior, particularly when given opportunities to do so anonymously. Specifically,

some indicated that the SRO would be the first person they would tell if they saw something suspicious, adding that the SRO might help them determine if a situation has risen to a level warranting intervention. In the context of prevention, SROs represent opportunities for identifying credible threats due to their frequent interactions with students and the resultant potential to identify students exhibiting potentially troubling behavior.

The participants' discussions about these definitions informed and impelled identifying current best practices, gaps in current strategies, and recommended solutions for improving prevention that focused on four key issues:<sup>24</sup>

- Focus on prevention approaches and the role of multiple disciplines in the essential, nonlinear components of the prevention process, including identification of potential threats; notification protocols, processes, and procedures; evaluation strategies; pre-incident interventions to interrupt planning and preparations; and documentation of pre-incident activities, along with the appropriate collection, storage, and dissemination of those documents.
- Create intolerance for inaction. Promote a shift in cultural and social values that makes potentially violent behavior unacceptable and fosters a more engaged public that is increasingly willing to report it.
- Target services to provide or expand mental health and social services to communities.
- Emphasize that although the familial bond can interrupt the escalation toward violence, it can also be an impediment to prevention due to family members' reluctance to report potentially violent behavior.

The data collected resulted in eight recommendations for action in preventing multiple casualty shootings (see the "Summit Recommendations" section). The five-part definitional framework and the Young Adult Panel provided common points of reference that informed the delegates' discussions and the emergent recommendations.

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24. See Appendix G for a summary of participants' refinement of the definitional framework summit planners provided.

# Summit Recommendations

The data collected during the summit point toward two major categories of recommendations for action on the part of government agencies and other institutions in the prevention of multiple casualty violence. One set focuses on the various institutions that are positioned to help prevent future incidents and specifically how they can work together more effectively to this end. The second set centers on the subject, or potential perpetrator, and specifically improving the community's ability to recognize and report potentially threatening behavior. Both involve maintaining a multidisciplinary approach through increased collaboration across professions.

## Institutions-focused

### 1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing escalation toward a violent act.

Summit participants widely acknowledged that a multidisciplinary approach is necessary to prevent future multiple casualty shootings. While the law enforcement community has developed tactical solutions for responding to events, a broader base of professions and the public must be engaged in preventing multiple casualty violence. Representatives from each field participating in the summit provided examples of existing practices<sup>25</sup> that have been used in preventing violent acts. The most effective preventative strategies will emerge when these efforts are coordinated, synthesized as appropriate, and adapted to meet others' needs. This approach should include creating avenues for networking and sharing information across disciplines, such as the collaborative website established by JHU-PSL for compiling reports and other documents related to preventing multiple casualty violence.

25. Although this report does not name specific models discussed during the summit to protect the anonymity of the summit participants, future summits will explore effective interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty violence.

### 2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention.

Summit participants discussed existing models designed to connect the various parties positioned to help prevent future multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and intervention. They articulated the value of identifying and cataloging existing effective models and disseminating best practices for adaptation and use in communities throughout the United States. These models include collaborative mechanisms for effective identification of potential threats; notification protocols, processes, and procedures; evaluation strategies; pre-incident interventions to interrupt planning and preparations; and documentation of pre-incident activities, along with the appropriate collection, storage, and dissemination of those documents.

Summit participants referenced numerous examples of threat assessment models, such as college and university approaches that bring together faculty, staff, and students to assess student behavior and threat potential and law enforcement approaches that coordinate communications with other professional communities such as education and mental health. Interdisciplinary, whole community models should include law enforcement (at all levels of government), educators, school counselors, medical and mental health professionals, sociologists, attorneys, academics and researchers, community leaders, clergy, private security, etc.

### 3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the identification and notification of potential threats to begin a cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting.

While research and progress continue in developing strategies to prevent multiple casualty shooting events, a more immediate measure is required to increase the public's willingness and ability to report potentially dangerous activity. Summit participants recommended developing a public service campaign, similar to the DHS "See Something, Say Something" initiative, with the purpose of educating the public on identifying suspicious behavior and potential threats. This campaign should aim to foster a culture of intolerance toward acts of violence, acceptability of reporting

(even by family members and friends), and accessibility to mechanisms both for reporting threats and for treating potential violent subjects in instances of valid threats. The intended change in social values mimics that which has been accomplished with initiatives such as anti-drunk driving, anti-smoking, anti-bullying, and seatbelt safety campaigns. While these campaigns have been effective, the results of this proposed awareness campaign may not be immediately realized. Cultural shifts take time; however, the campaign should begin in earnest.

An additional component of this campaign should include a brief, publicly accessible, and easily consumable awareness piece on immediate steps individuals should take if confronted with an active shooter situation. While seemingly tangential to preventing incidents before they reach the point of violence, preparing the public to minimize casualties is a critical component of overall prevention and is an area in which opportunities to save lives abound. Inculcating into the public what to do if an incident does occur instills a shift in the public from the mindset of a panicked victim to a reasoned reaction in the event of a crisis. While different in content to the overall prevention awareness campaign, this is an essential part of the comprehensive cultural shift that must occur.

4. Better educate health care practitioners; school administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines.

Summit participants articulated existing confusion among practitioners regarding what constitutes protected information and what may be readily provided to law enforcement without a subpoena. Consequently, they recommended better educating the health care, educational, and law enforcement communities about HIPAA, FERPA, and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information across disciplines. Strategies for accomplishing this recommendation include increasing awareness of misconceptions, providing training to pertinent professional communities, and disseminating information through professional organizations and journals.

5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of potentially violent behavior.

The summit discussions revealed the need to create a stronger infrastructure for reporting suspicious or potentially threatening behavior. Participants observed such opportunities in the creation of a model law establishing affirmative requirements for pertinent professions, such as law enforcement officers, medical practitioners, and educators, to report bona fide threatening behavior. The goal of this law would be similar to that which was accomplished with compulsory reporting requirements in cases of child abuse.

## Subject-focused

6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and sending alerts about incidents.

To facilitate anonymous reporting of suspicious behavior and potential threats, summit participants recommended leveraging social media in the development of technological tools such as mobile phone applications. These could serve to enhance both reporting of threats and sending public alerts during incidents.

With the proliferation of cellphone applications, participants suggested that mobile phone providers create a free, mandatory application for all smart phones sold in the United States, configured in a manner that prevents the application from being deleted or disabled and allows the reporting of suspicious activity to local law enforcement. The application might be in the form of a template that could send anonymous information as a text message to law enforcement.

In addition, participants noted that a free smart phone application could be developed that alerts students, workers, and the public of threatening conditions in a particular community. Beyond applicability to multiple casualty shooting events, this could enable transmission of information during all-hazards situations.

7. Enhance existing resources to develop a national, searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining to individual behavior that is indicative of escalation toward a violent act, and facilitate the sharing of such information across jurisdictional boundaries.

Summit participants recommended developing a national, searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining to pre-incident indicators and threats that is available to professionals involved in prevention activities across jurisdictional lines, within the boundaries of applicable privacy laws.

Numerous searchable databases exist at both the state and national levels which may be adapted to include criteria for potential multiple casualty shooters. For example, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) determines eligibility to purchase firearms. The current system uses criminal convictions to determine if a person is denied the purchase of a firearm and currently includes checks for court-ordered committals and convictions based on insanity pleas. The NICS could be adapted to include information on mental health dispositions, significant medication treatments, etc., enhancing the reliability and effectiveness of the NICS check. Implementing the use or reform of such a database for the purpose of sharing information would need to address potential barriers related to particular professionals accessing the system and inputting pertinent information.

In addition, an entity such as fusion centers should be charged with analyzing and synthesizing information relevant to preventing multiple casualty acts of violence. Fusion centers are operated by state and local entities with the support of federal partners and serve as focal points for receiving, analyzing, gathering, and sharing threat-related information among various levels of government and private sector partners. Summit participants suggested fusion centers could fill this role because they are already established and have the ability to disseminate information to partner organizations and could serve as conduits for sharing information pertaining to specific individuals.

8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior.

To encourage reporting by the public, a model statute should be drafted that provides limited liability for citizens reporting potentially violent behavior. It would establish a qualified immunity from civil actions for defamation. The goal is to increase the collective willingness to report suspicious or potentially violent behavior.

# Next Steps

Incidents such as those addressed at this summit are anomalies for most emergency responders, educators, mental health practitioners, and others directly involved in response and prevention, as well as for the public at large. Therefore, deterring such violence will require a shift in the national mindset from one of intense reaction immediately following tragedies to one of sustained capacity-building for prevention.

To continue advancing the national dialogue begun during the summit, one or more follow-up summits are anticipated to address the recommendations identified in this report. Future discussions will focus on which entities should take the lead on particular recommendations, as ownership is unclear. Additional topics for examination will likely include gaps identified during the initial summit, such as further definition of school resource officers' roles in threat assessment and private security entities' roles in preventing incidents.

The eight recommendations that emerged during the first summit centered on the need to develop a strategic approach to information-sharing for preventing multiple casualty violence. Consequently, future areas for exploration include educating the various disciplines and the public about how to identify behavior indicative of potential violence and how to notify appropriate parties when such behavior is observed. There is also a need to identify effective interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty violence, and to develop technological avenues for obtaining and sharing information pertaining to potential threats across jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, further attention is needed on the various legal issues involved in sharing information, such as alleviating misperceptions about limits imposed by existing laws and developing model statutes to protect those who report and to facilitate reporting by those in pertinent professions. A final publication, consolidating themes and recommendations from future summits and meetings, will be completed and disseminated among stakeholders.

In the days immediately following the shooting in the Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, the FLETC, the COPS Office, and JHU-PSL began a partnership committed to advancing a national dialogue and developing actionable recommendations to prevent such horrific acts of violence in society. The shock average Americans experienced, that they may not be safe engaging in typical recreational activities like going to the movies, instilled an urgency to act that became all the more powerful only one day following the summit's conclusion when parents became fearful of sending their young children to school. The summit partners remain committed to engaging the various professional disciplines through which joint efforts will promote solutions that keep the nation's communities safe.

# Appendix A:

## Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings

This matrix contains examples of the kinds of multiple casualty violent incidents addressed in this report. While not intended to be exhaustive, FLETC staff has attempted to compile information on as many incidents as possible to provide an overview of the substance and scope of multiple casualty violence in the United States.

### 2012 December 14

<b>Location</b>	<b>Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newton, CT</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	27 fatalities	2 injured	<b>29 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Adam Lanza	20 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Lanza first shot and killed his mother and then proceeded to do the same to 20 schoolchildren and six school faculty members before taking his own life at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Lanza had a history of mental illness and was known to be uncomfortable in social situations.		

### 2012 December 11

<b>Location</b>	<b>Clackamas Town Center, Clackamas County, OR</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	2 fatalities	1 injured	<b>3 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Jacob Tyler Roberts	22 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Roberts ran into a shopping center wearing tactical clothing and a white hockey mask and fired randomly at customers and employees with an AR-15 rifle. He fatally wounded two people and seriously injured one before committing suicide. Family and friends of Roberts offered no explanations regarding what motivated him to commit murder. Days beforehand, he sold all his possessions and was supposed to be moving to Hawaii but missed his flight.		

### 2012 August 31

<b>Location</b>	<b>Pathmark, Old Bridge, NJ</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	2 fatalities	0 injured	<b>2 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Terrence Tyler	23 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Tyler, a former marine with mental health problems, had only been working at the Pathmark for a couple weeks when he got into an argument with a coworker, left the store, and retrieved an AK-47 from his car. Employees who saw him retrieve the gun locked the supermarket door. He shot out the windows, went inside, and killed two people before committing suicide.		

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## 2012 August 5

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Sikh Temple of Wisconsin, Oak Creek, WI</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	6 fatalities	4 injured	<b>10 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Wade Michael Page	40 years old	<b>Shot by police; committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Page opened fire at a Sikh temple, killing four people inside and two outside with a 9-mm semi-automatic pistol. After responding police shot him, Page committed suicide. An Army veteran, Page had ties to White supremacy and neo-Nazi groups.		

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## 2012 July 20

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Century movie theater, Aurora, CO</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	12 fatalities	58 injured	<b>70 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	James Eagan Holmes	24 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	During a midnight screening of the Batman film <i>The Dark Knight Rises</i> , Holmes, dressed in tactical clothing, set off teargas grenades and shot into the audience with multiple firearms. Minutes later, responding police arrested Holmes outside the theater.		

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## 2012 May 30

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Café Racer, Seattle, WA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	5 fatalities	1 injured	<b>6 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Ian Stawicki	40 years old	<b>Committed suicide later</b>
<b>Description</b>	Stawicki shot and killed four patrons and wounded the chef at Café Racer in Seattle, Washington. He then killed another woman next to Town Hall, Seattle's community cultural center. He later committed suicide when police found him following a citywide manhunt.		

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## 2012 April 2

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Oikos University, Oakland, CA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	7 fatalities	3 injured	<b>10 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	One L. Goh	43 years old	<b>Arrested soon afterward</b>
<b>Description</b>	Goh went to Oikos to find the administrator who had denied him a prorated \$6,000 tuition fee reversal after he decided to leave the nursing program. Unable to find her, Goh opened fire at random, killing six students and a receptionist with a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol. He surrendered an hour later at a nearby supermarket.		

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## 2011 October 12

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Salon Meritage, Seal Beach, CA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	8 fatalities	1 injured	<b>9 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Scott Evans Dekraai	41 years old	<b>Arrested a few blocks away</b>
<b>Description</b>	Dekraai sought to kill his ex-wife, with whom he was fighting a custody battle, when he entered a hair salon and began shooting, killing her and seven others at random and injuring one. This incident is also referred to as the Seal Beach shooting.		

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## 2012 September 6

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<b>Location</b>	<b>IHOP, Carson City, NV</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	4 fatalities	7 injured	<b>11 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Eduardo Sencion	32 years old	<b>Attempted suicide at the scene; died in a hospital</b>
<b>Description</b>	Sencion, using a weapon similar to an AK-47, opened fire inside an IHOP, shooting 11 people, including five National Guardsmen. Of the four killed, three were uniformed National Guardsmen and one a civilian woman. When Sencion was a teenager, doctors diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia.		

## 2011 January 8

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Constituents meeting at Safeway, Tucson, AZ</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	6 fatalities	13 injured	<b>19 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Jared Lee Loughner	22 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Prior to the shooting, an Arizona Game and Fish Department officer stopped Loughner for running a red light but let him go with a warning to drive carefully. Loughner then took a taxi to a supermarket where U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords was holding a constituents meeting. Loughner, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia, opened fire on Giffords and numerous bystanders, killing six people and injuring 13 others.		

## 2009 November 5

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	13 fatalities	32 injured	<b>45 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Nidal Hasan	39 years old	<b>Shot and arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, began shooting people at random at Fort Hood with two handguns, killing 13 and wounding 32 more, less than a month before he would have deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.		

## 2009 August 4

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<b>Location</b>	<b>LA Fitness, Collier Township, Bridgeville, PA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	3 fatalities	9 injured	<b>12 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	George A. Sodini	48 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	The 2009 Collier Township shooting, also known as the 2009 Bridgeville LA Fitness shooting, took place in a fitness health club. After turning off the lights in a dance class, Sodini killed three and wounded nine other people before taking his own life. Over a nine-month period, Sodini had chronicled his rejections by women in an online diary, his severe sexual frustration, and his plans to carry out the attack.		

## 2009 April 3

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<b>Location</b>	<b>American Civic Association, Binghamton, NY</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	13 fatalities	4 injured	<b>17 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Jiverly Antares Wong (aka Jiverly Voong)	41 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Wong, a naturalized immigrant, walked into the American Civic Association immigration center and began shooting with a 9-mm Beretta and .45-caliber Springfield, beginning with two receptionists and then firing on an English as a Second Language class. A day after the incident, a package containing photos of Wong and a rambling note arrived at a news station, sent by Wong. This incident is also referred to as the Binghamton shootings.		

## 2009 March 29

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Pinelake Health and Rehab, Carthage, NC</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	8 fatalities	2 injured	<b>10 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Robert Kenneth Wayne Stewart	45 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Just before 10:00 AM, Stewart arrived at the nursing home where his estranged ex-wife, his apparent main target, worked. He began firing randomly at people, killing eight and wounding two before a responding police officer shot and apprehended him. Stewart's ex-wife survived the shooting by hiding in a passcode-protected location. This incident is also referred to as the Carthage nursing home shooting.		

## 2009 March 10

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Geneva County (Kinston, Samson, and Geneva), AL</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	10 fatalities	6 injured	<b>16 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Michael Kenneth McLendon	28 years old	<b>Committed suicide</b>
<b>Description</b>	McLendon killed his mother, set the house on fire, and then went to a relative's trailer where he killed four more family members. He also killed the wife and child of the sheriff's deputy who lived nearby. He then killed a pedestrian alongside the road and a customer inside a local gas station. McLendon drove away from the gas station, firing at cars while driving on a highway. He then killed a man who was attempting to subdue him and fired at officers in front of a Geneva metal products plant in which he previously worked. He then went inside and killed himself.		

## 2008 February 14

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<b>Location</b>	<b>North Illinois University, DeKalb, IL</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	5 fatalities	21 injured	<b>26 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Steven Kazmierczak	27 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Kazmierczak, who had been treated for mental health problems, entered an auditorium and opened fire at students and the instructor from the stage. He then proceeded to walk up the aisle, shooting students who were hiding and unable to escape. He killed five people and injured 21 before committing suicide.		

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## 2008 February 7

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Kirkwood City Hall, Kirkwood, MO</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	6 fatalities	1 injured	<b>7 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Charles Lee Thornton	52 years old	<b>Killed by police at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Thornton shot a police officer with a revolver and took the officer's handgun before entering City Hall located across the street. Thornton reached council chambers with these two weapons shortly after a meeting began. There he shot a police officer, the public works director, two council members, the mayor, and a reporter. In total, he killed five people and wounded two others. The mayor died months later from the injuries he received during the shooting. This incident is also referred to as the Kirkwood City Council shooting.		

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## 2007 December 5

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Westroads Mall, Omaha, NE</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	8 fatalities	6 injured	<b>14 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Robert A. Hawkins	19 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	After leaving a suicide note, Hawkins entered a mall in Omaha, Nebraska, and shot and killed eight people, injured six others, and then killed himself within six minutes. He had been hospitalized twice at psychiatric institutions and diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder and had parent-child relationship problems.		

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## 2007 April 16

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	32 fatalities	23 injured	<b>55 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Seung-Hui Cho	23 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	On the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Cho killed two students in a dormitory and then crossed campus to an academic building where he opened fire on students and faculty, killing 30 more people and wounding many others. He committed suicide when police officers entered the part of the building where Cho was located. Cho had been treated as an outpatient for mental illness.		

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## 2007 February 12

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Trolley Square, Salt Lake City, UT</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	5 fatalities	4 injured	<b>9 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Sulejman Talović	18 years old	<b>Killed by police at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Talović, an 18-year-old with a history of minor juvenile incidents, dropped out of high school and had been living with his mother. Talović began shooting people with a shotgun and handgun in a shopping area, killing five people and wounding four others. An off-duty police officer killed Talović in a store, preventing further bloodshed.		

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## 2006 October 2

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<b>Location</b>	<b>West Nickel Mines School, Lancaster County, PA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	5 fatalities	5 injured	<b>10 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Charles Carl Roberts IV	32 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Roberts entered the one-room Amish school with a Springfield XD 9-mm handgun, 12-gauge shotgun, .30-06 bolt-action rifle, 600 rounds of ammunition, a stun gun, two knives, and a box containing household tools. He barricaded the doors, bound the hostages, and then lined them against a chalkboard. He released all of the male students and adults but not the 10 female students, killing five of them and wounding the remaining five before killing himself.		

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## 2006 March 25

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Capitol Hill neighborhood, Seattle, WA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	6 fatalities	2 injured	<b>8 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Kyle Aaron Huff	28 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Huff attended a quiet, after-rave house party that lasted throughout the night. He then opened fire at 7:00 the following morning, killing six and wounding 2 of the 30 people in the house. Huff then turned the gun on himself after police confronted him on the front porch. This incident is also referred to as the Capitol Hill massacre.		

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## 2005 March 21

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Red Lake, MN</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	9 fatalities	5 injured	<b>14 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Jeff Weise	16 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Weise killed his grandfather and grandfather's girlfriend before going to his high school and killing a security guard, a teacher, and five students and injuring five others. He then committed suicide. Another student, Louis Jourdain, was arrested one week after the shootings and charged with conspiracy to commit murder based on several e-mail messages he exchanged with Weise. The charges were dropped, but Jourdain pleaded guilty to sending threatening messages via the Internet; however, because he was a juvenile, Jourdain's sentence was not disclosed.		

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## 2005 March 12

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Living Church of God, Brookfield, WI</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	7 fatalities	4 injured	<b>11 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Terry Michael Ratzmann	44 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	After Ratzmann left the Sheraton Hotel in which a minister of the Living Church of God was giving a sermon, he returned 20 minutes later carrying a 9-mm handgun. He opened fire on the congregation, killing the minister and six others and wounding four more before he killed himself. The minister reportedly had given a sermon two weeks earlier that infuriated Ratzmann, who had suffered from depression. However, police have not determined whether these factors contributed to the murders.		

## 2002 February 10

<b>Location</b>	<b>Midtown Manhattan, New York, NY, and Garfield, NJ</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	2 fatality	25 injured	<b>27 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Ronald J. Popadich	39 years old	<b>Arrested later</b>
<b>Description</b>	Popadich shot a woman who had rejected his sexual advances and later died from her wound. Two days afterward, he injured 18 people, one of whom also died later, in a hit-and-run spree in Midtown Manhattan. The next day, Popadich shot and injured a cabdriver. On the third day, he hijacked a car from a woman at gunpoint and returned to Manhattan, injuring seven more people in another hit-and-run spree. Bergen County authorities arrested Popadich at his Garfield, NJ, home less than two hours later. He lived with his widowed mother and was unemployed. Neighbors recalled typically seeing him alone.		

## 2001 April 14

<b>Location</b>	<b>JB's Pub, Elgin, IL</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	2 fatalities	16 injured	<b>18 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Luther V. Casteel	42 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Removed from a bar for harassing female customers, Casteel shaved his hair into a Mohawk, changed into fatigues, and returned to the bar, opening fire on a crowd of 200 and killing two before customers subdued him until the police arrived. He was carrying two handguns, two shotguns, and 200 rounds of ammunition. Casteel had previously served 13 years in prison for armed robbery.		

## 1999 September 15

<b>Location</b>	<b>Wedgewood Baptist Church, Forth Worth, TX</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	7 fatalities	7 injured	<b>14 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Larry Gene Ashbrook	47 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Ashbrook, whom his family described as a paranoid schizophrenic, interrupted a teen prayer rally at a church and spouted anti-Baptist rhetoric before opening fire with a 9-mm semi-automatic and .380-caliber handgun. Ashbrook killed seven people, four of whom were teenagers, and wounded seven others.		

## 1999 April 20

<b>Location</b>	<b>Columbine High School, Columbine, CO</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	13 fatalities	24 injured	<b>37 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Eric Harris	18 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
	Dylan Klebold	17 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Harris and Klebold had been arrested for theft and trespassing, and Harris had received anger management treatment. Although they appeared apologetic, the two were enraged, created a hit list, and collected guns. Armed with shotguns, semi-automatic weapons, and bombs, they arrived at their high school and fatally shot 12 classmates and one teacher before both committed suicide. Most of their bombs placed in the cafeteria and other locations failed to detonate.		

## 1998 March 24

<b>Location</b>	<b>Westside Middle School, Jonesboro, AR</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	5 fatalities	10 injured	<b>15 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Andrew Golden	11 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
	Mitchell Johnson	13 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Golden and Johnson loaded Golden's mother's van with camping gear and weapons, including semi-automatic rifles they stole from his grandfather the night before, and drove to Westside Middle School. Golden pulled the fire alarm and then joined Johnson in the woods outside of the school. When children and teachers filed out of the building, the boys opened fire, killing four female students and one teacher and wounding 10 others. Golden and Johnson attempted to run back to the van and escape, but police captured them. Each was released from prison when he turned 21 years old.		

## 1994 June 20

<b>Location</b>	<b>Fairchild Air Force Base, Fairchild, WA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	4 fatalities	23 injured	<b>27 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Dean Mellberg	20 years old	<b>Killed by police at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Using an MAK-90 assault rifle, Mellberg sought out, shot, and killed his psychiatrist and a psychologist whose observations caused Mellberg to be discharged from the Air Force. He then proceeded to walk through the hallways and cafeteria of the hospital, shooting adults and children alike and killing an 8-year-old girl. He then went to the parking lot where he killed a woman. While Mellberg chased another potential victim around the parking lot, a military police officer shot and killed him.		

## 1993 December 7

<b>Location</b>	<b>Long Island Rail Road, Garden City, NY</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	6 fatalities	19 injured	<b>25 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Colin Ferguson	35 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Ferguson, whom doctors diagnosed as paranoid and delusional, opened fire on a Long Island commuter train in Garden City, New York, killing six people and injuring 19 others. While he was reloading his gun for the third time, passengers tackled Ferguson and held him down until the police arrived.		

## 1993 August 6

<b>Location</b>	<b>Luigi's restaurant, Fayetteville, NC</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	4 fatalities	6 injured	<b>10 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Kenneth Junior French	22 years old	<b>Shot by police; arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	French, armed with two shotguns and a .22-caliber rifle, entered Luigi's restaurant at approximately 10:00 PM and opened fire, killing the restaurant's two elderly owners and two patrons and injuring six others. Witness stated that French was ranting about President Clinton and "gays in the military" during the shooting, but the location and victims of French's attack seem to have been randomly chosen. An off-duty police officer who was working nearby stopped French by shooting him. Other officers who arrived on the scene were able to arrest French.		

## 1991 October 16

<b>Location</b>	<b>Luby's Cafeteria, Killeen, TX</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	23 fatalities	20 injured	<b>43 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	George Pierre Hennard	35 years old	<b>Shot by police; committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Hennard, an unemployed former merchant seaman, drove his pickup truck through the front window of Luby's Cafeteria and then opened fire with a Glock 17 pistol and a Ruger P89. Of the 80 patrons in the restaurant, Hennard killed 23 people and wounded 20 others before responding officers shot Hennard and he committed suicide.		

## 1989 January 17

<b>Location</b>	<b>Cleveland Elementary School, Stockton, CA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	5 fatalities	30 injured	<b>35 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Patrick Purdy	24 years old	<b>Committed suicide at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Purdy, who had a long criminal history, opened fire on the playground of a school he attended as a child, killing five schoolchildren and wounding 29 others and one teacher with an AK-47 rifle before committing suicide. Purdy was described in a police report two years earlier as having a mild intellectual disability.		

## 1987 April 23

<b>Location</b>	<b>Palm Bay, FL</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	6 fatalities	14 injured	<b>20 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	William Bryan Cruse Jr.	60 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	The shooting spree began at 6:00 PM in front of Cruse's home when he ran after two teenagers who had cut through his yard. He shot a kid across the street, wounding him, before driving to two shopping centers where he fired into various stores, killing four people and two responding officers. More people were wounded from gunfire as well as from the panic and confusion of events. Cruse took three hostages at the Winn-Dixie supermarket but let the two women go. The remaining hostage, a man, either escaped or Cruse let him go. The police forced Cruse out with tear gas and a flash device and arrested him.		

## 1985 October 30

<b>Location</b>	<b>Springfield Mall, Springfield, PA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	3 fatalities	7 injured	<b>10 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Sylvia Seegrist	25 years old	<b>Arrested at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Diagnosed 10 years earlier with paranoid schizophrenia, Seegrist opened fire in the parking lot of a Springfield shopping mall and then went inside to continue, killing a two-year-old child and two men and wounding seven others. A shopper managed to disarm and subdue Seegrist who was then handcuffed by a security guard. She is currently incarcerated. Prior to the event, Seegrist's parents had tried to find a residential mental health program because they believed she was dangerous and needed to remain in treatment.		

## 1984 July 18

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<b>Location</b>	<b>McDonald's, San Ysidro, CA</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	21 fatalities	19 injured	<b>40 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	James Oliver Huberty	41 years old	<b>Killed by police at the scene</b>
<b>Description</b>	Huberty, an unemployed former security guard, began firing his guns in a McDonald's parking lot where he shot three children. He then entered the restaurant, told everyone to get down, and proceeded to kill customers and employees. Within an hour, he had killed 21 people and wounded 19 others with a 9-mm Uzi semi-automatic rifle, a Winchester 12-gauge shotgun, and a 9-mm Browning HP handgun. His assault ended when a SWAT team sniper shot and killed Huberty.		

## 1949 September 6

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<b>Location</b>	<b>Camden, NJ</b>		
<b>Casualties</b>	13 fatalities	3 injured	<b>16 total</b>
<b>Perpetrator</b>	Howard Unruh	28 years old	<b>Arrested soon afterward</b>
<b>Description</b>	After spending an evening at the movies, Unruh, who would later be diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic, came home to find his gate was stolen. He awoke the next morning, put on his best suit, and began walking through his neighborhood intent on killing as many people as he could with a 9-mm German Luger pistol. Within 20 minutes, he killed 13 people whose ages ranged from 2 to 68 and wounded 3 others. When he heard police sirens, he returned home where police arrested him. Found insane, Unruh was detained without trial. After 60 years of confinement at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital, Unruh died in 2009. This incident came to be known as "The Walk of Death."		



# Appendix B:

## Pre-Event Survey

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings, co-sponsored by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and Johns Hopkins University. This survey will serve as a mechanism to query participants' perceptions of the current state of capabilities and competencies, across multiple domains within a community, to identify and interrupt a potential multiple casualty shooting event.

Results of the survey will be used during the meeting to facilitate dialogue among the working groups and will not be used outside of the summit. Your participation is voluntary, and you can skip any question that you do not wish to answer. Please return your completed survey in the self-addressed envelope by December 1, 2012.

Instructions: Please circle your level of agreement to each of the following questions:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
1. The possibility of a multiple casualty shooting is a significant threat to any community.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Current efforts to identify individuals who present a credible threat of violence are effective.	1	2	3	4	5
3. Efforts should be made to develop a uniform method of documenting the interruption of a potential act of violence.	1	2	3	4	5
4. There are recognizable characteristics of an actor that indicate a potential threat of violence.	1	2	3	4	5
5. There are adequate processes in place for reporting and/or evaluating behavioral change in:					
a. Public schools (K–12)	1	2	3	4	5
b. Private schools (K–12)	1	2	3	4	5
c. Colleges and universities	1	2	3	4	5
d. The workplace	1	2	3	4	5
e. The community	1	2	3	4	5
6. Current privacy protections deter the reporting of suspicious activity.	1	2	3	4	5
7. Concerns over potential lawsuits deter individuals from reporting an aberrant change in behavior in others.	1	2	3	4	5
8. Social media is a useful tool for identifying potential threats to an individual or community.	1	2	3	4	5
9. There should be a queriable, national repository for documentation related to threats of violence.	1	2	3	4	5
10. There is a value to multidisciplinary collaboration in the disruption of a potential violent act.	1	2	3	4	5

	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>
11. The following authorities have a responsibility to evaluate and intervene when notified of a possible threat:					
a. School principal	1	2	3	4	5
b. University administrator	1	2	3	4	5
c. Teacher	1	2	3	4	5
d. Mental health provider	1	2	3	4	5
e. Medical professional	1	2	3	4	5
f. Law enforcement	1	2	3	4	5
g. Facility security at workplace	1	2	3	4	5
h. Supervisor/human resources	1	2	3	4	5
i. Community leader	1	2	3	4	5
j. Legal professional	1	2	3	4	5
k. Clergy/religious leader	1	2	3	4	5

# Appendix C:

## Young Adult Panel Summary

At the opening session of the summit, a panel of 10 young adults from between the ages of 16 and 21 assembled to take part in a facilitated discussion on the topic of multiple casualty violence and the impact of social media. The comments and responses from these young adults helped to inform the summit participants' discussions, particularly as they related to this generation's willingness to report information on potentially violent behavior.

These young adults were asked a series of questions and had opportunities to comment on others' opinions. The following are the questions and synopses of the responses:

### Q. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think of a mass casualty event?

Most of the young adults agreed that their first thoughts were of people who have problems and don't tell anyone about them.

### Q. How would you like to get information about this issue out to people in your age group?

All of the students agreed that social networking sites would be the most expedient method to disseminate information to people in their age group. They also believe that a young person persistently posting about guns would be a sign for concern. There was also agreement that people rarely see posts about guns; more often they see depression posts (posting emotions is popular), which should be taken as a sign. Finally, they feel that social networking gets the word out quickly because it spreads through word of mouth once one person sees it.

### Q. If social networking can be effective at identifying patterns of behavior, should the person who recognized the concerning behavior provide or seek help?

The students believe that subjects exhibiting concerning behavior will not necessarily be truthful in the public arena once they have gained attention. A person who identified concerning behavior has to take action in private if he or she has a personal relationship with that subject.

### Q. Can you identify behaviors that would make you nervous enough to report it?

The observations of the students were that they could always tell who was emotionally unstable; that individual always went to the school counselor. These firsthand observations in school settings provided the impression of concern; however, there was a reluctance to call the police unless the scale of depression was sufficiently high.

### Q. How would you best make that call?

Some students stated they would get in touch with the individual's friends because they have the relationship with the person; however, if the individual was their friend, they would address the issue head-on. There was also a sentiment that people who did see something on Facebook wouldn't call the police. However, every school has police on campus (colleges/universities), and people can stop by their office to report the suspicion without blowing it out of proportion. In all cases, the students indicated they would want to remain anonymous if they contacted the authorities. The students also believed that many people sending a message to authorities about an individual's behavior would have greater credibility and thus greater impact.

### Q. What would make a number of people contact the authorities?

There needs to be a program in place that would alert the professionals; certain trigger words would cause the alert. Whatever system is used, it must be easy. There also needs to be guidelines for reporting so the system is not abused. An important factor is that the message gets to a person of trust and authority.

### Q. If there were an interactive system in place to report/receive information, how should it be presented to you?

There needs to be an app for smartphones that is a mandatory installation, and free, so everyone will have access to it. A similar system should be in place that interfaces with all social networking sites.

### Q. What would cause you to report a family member?

Most of the students responded that they would not report a family member to the police. One student did state that people reach a point where they feel they can't help anymore, so they report the family member in an effort to get him or her help.

# Appendix D:

## Research Questions Posed to Summit Participants

### Day One – Session I

Session Goal: To gain a better understanding of the definitions outlined for this summit from the position of experts

Groups were provided the following definitions:

**Identification.** The process of recognizing that an actor poses a possible threat of violent conduct.

**Notification.** Providing information to an appropriate authority regarding a possible threat.

**Evaluation.** The analysis and determination of threat credibility.

**Intervention.** The deliberate interruption of the planning phase of a multiple casualty shooting event.

**Documentation and Dissemination.** *Documentation* is the written record of all activities involved in the intervention; *dissemination* is the sharing of documentation and all relevant information across multidisciplinary and jurisdictional boundaries in accordance with applicable laws.

A term was assigned to each of the four groups, so that each term received sufficient coverage. If time permitted, the other terms were to be discussed as well. The groups were asked to address the following questions in reference to their specific terms:

1. Can/should this definition be broadened?
2. What is being done in our respective professions with regard to identification?
3. How does the process of identifying a possible threat of violent conduct occur in our respective professions?
  - a. Moderator Probe: Is there a difference in the identification process when a person is in a profession that requires mandatory reporting of a potential threat?
4. Is formal training provided on the topic of identifying an actor who poses such a threat?
  - a. Moderator Probes: How frequently is this training provided? Should other members of an organization (e.g., school, workplace, or hospital) receive similar training?

### Day One – Session II

Session Goal: To reach consensus on common themes and definitions associated with the prevention of multiple casualty shootings

Groups were provided lists of the terms covered during Session 1 in different orders and were asked to discuss the following questions for each term in the order provided, ensuring sufficient coverage of each term among summit participants collectively:

1. Can/should any of these definitions be broadened?
  - a. Moderator Note: The group should have clear direction that this discussion should go beyond the report out for the morning session.
2. What is being done in our respective professions with regard to these elements of prevention?

### Day Two – Session I

Session Goal: To understand existing capabilities for interrupting a potential violent threat within a community

Groups were provided lists of the terms covered during previous sessions in different orders and were asked to discuss the following questions for each term in the order provided, ensuring sufficient coverage of each term among summit participants collectively:

1. Based on the conversation yesterday, what is currently done with regard to these elements of prevention?
2. What can be done to strengthen these capabilities?
3. What are the impediments to these elements of prevention?

# Appendix E: Attendees and Support Personnel

## Day Two – Session II

Session Goal: To establish a baseline understanding of competencies regarding violence prevention, and to identify knowledge gaps regarding the identification, notification, evaluation, intervention, documentation, and dissemination of information for addressing threats of violence

Groups were provided lists of the terms covered during previous sessions in different orders and were asked to discuss the following questions for each term in the order provided, ensuring sufficient coverage of each term among summit participants collectively:

1. What best practices exist within your profession with regard to these elements of prevention?
  - a. Moderator Probes: Focus group discussion on competencies within each profession. For example, how are “best practices” determined within each profession? Where do you look to identify “best practices”?
2. Can/should these best practices serve to inform other disciplines (e.g., law enforcement, education, and mental health professionals)?

## Participants

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### **Jay Corzine, Ph.D.**

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and Director, Threat Management Services,  
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### **John Edwards<sup>ii</sup>**

Chief of Police, Oak Creek (Wisconsin) Police Department

### **Rod Ellis**

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(Summit K-12 School Resource Officer representative)

### **Anastasia Ford, M.S.**

Manager, Corporate Security, The Home Depot RDC

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**Steven McDonald, J.D.**

General Counsel, Rhode Island School of Design (FERPA subject-matter expert)

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Executive Director, Nevada Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training;

& First Immediate Past-President, International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST)

**Ron Dionne**

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### **Jennifer Tocco, MPA, M.Ed.**

Management and Program Analyst, Office of the Director,  
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

- 
- i. Experience with multiple shooting incident at Virginia Tech
  - ii. Experience with multiple shootings incident at Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin
  - iii. Experience with multiple shootings incident at IHOP in Carson City, Nevada
  - iv. Experience with multiple shootings incident in St. Petersburg, Florida

# Appendix F:

## Technical Advisors' Briefing

During the summit, a number of technical advisors attended, who represented areas of expertise that could help inform the participants on matters such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act. The following is a synopsis of the presentation they provided.

### FERPA

FERPA is a federal statute that protects student “education records,” broadly defined to include almost any record that an educational institution maintains that contains personally identifiable information about one or more of its current or former students. The basic rule of FERPA is also quite broad: In general, an institution may not disclose an education record, or information from an education record, to anyone other than the student him- or herself without the student’s written consent. Nevertheless, FERPA is not a significant impediment in this context because of a number of limitations and exceptions it contains:

- FERPA is a records statute. It applies only to records and information from records, not to information generally. Thus, at least as far as FERPA is concerned, there is no restriction on the disclosure of personal, eyewitness knowledge.
- FERPA also does not apply to records that do not fall within its definition. Thus, records that do not contain personally identifiable information about students, or from which such information has been redacted, may be shared freely. In addition, the definition of “education records” contains a specific carve-out for “law enforcement unit records,” which therefore also may be shared freely even if they do contain personally identifiable information about students. For purposes of FERPA, “law enforcement unit records” are records that are created by an institution’s law enforcement unit (whether commissioned police or noncommissioned security), created at least in part for a law enforcement purpose (even if also created in part for internal discipline or other purposes), and maintained by that unit (copies shared with other offices are considered “education records,” but the law enforcement unit’s copies remain free of FERPA’s nondisclosure restriction).



- Finally, FERPA contains a number of policy-based exceptions to the nondisclosure requirement, several of which are particularly important and useful in this context:
  - An institution is free to share with its own law enforcement unit, its behavioral intervention team, its counseling office, and any other unit or employee any education records that will help that unit or employee to perform its institutional function.
  - When an institution has a good faith reason to believe (measured against whatever information is available to it at the time, not what is available in hindsight) that there is a significant threat to the health or safety of a student or others, it may share “appropriate” information with “appropriate” parties (defined as what and who reasonably appear to be necessary to help deal with the perceived threat). In guidance, the Family Policy Compliance Office, the office with the Department of Education that oversees and enforces FERPA, has specifically stated that external law enforcement, mental health professionals, parents, and potential victims, among others, generally will qualify as “appropriate” parties, and that “FERPA is not intended to be an obstacle in addressing emergencies and protecting the safety of students.”
  - Institutions may share any and all education records and information from them with the parents of “dependent” students (as measured by federal tax law).
  - Institutions may share relevant records and information about their students, including disciplinary records, with other institutions to which the students are seeking to transfer or in which they are now enrolled.
  - Institutions may disclose to anyone the “final results” of a disciplinary hearing in which it finds a student in violation of an institutional rule for conduct that would constitute a crime of violence. “Final results” is defined to include the name of the student found in violation, the violation that was found to have occurred, and the sanction imposed.
  - FERPA does not protect education records from disclosure pursuant to a court order or lawfully issued judicial or administrative subpoena. In general, the institution must first give the student reasonable advance notice before complying, so that the student may object, but FERPA does not provide a substantive basis for objection. However, in the case of grand jury or other law enforcement subpoenas, an institution is not required to give such notice if the subpoena instructs the institution not to do so.

Note, however, that all of these disclosures are optional under FERPA; they give institutions the right, but not the obligation, to disclose in the specified circumstances. While institutions generally want to do the right thing, they are by their nature skeptical and so will not necessarily accept an unexplained and unsupported assertion of an emergency uncritically. Those seeking information under any of these exceptions will likely need to make their case. Perhaps the best way to smooth the path is to reach out to relevant campus officials, discuss your respective interests and needs, and work on building trust and relationships before any emergency arises.

## Civil Rights/Civil Liberties

Balancing civil rights with security can be difficult during hard times. But the protection of civil rights always needs to be considered—doing so in difficult times is what makes the United States the great country that it is. We always need to consider how we communicate with the public when seeking information and should not stereotype or profile in relation to beliefs, ideologies, religion, or ethnicity. Rather, we should look for indicators of violence. Civil rights should always be stressed during any situation when asking the public to provide information about a threat. Whether the information coming in is factual always needs to be considered, as well as how it could affect the person identified as a potential threat.

# HIPAA

The privacy regulations promulgated pursuant to the HIPAA Privacy Rule set national standards for the protection of certain health information. The current Privacy Rule is in its second iteration, dated 2002; a new final rule published on January 25, 2013, becomes effective on March 26, 2013.

The Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities,” which include health care clearing houses, health plans, and health care providers who transmit health information in an electronic fashion in connection with certain transactions. The Privacy Rule governs protected health information (PHI), which comprises individually identifiable health information held or transmitted in any form by a covered entity or its business associate.

As a general rule, covered entities may not use or disclose PHI except for specifically permitted purposes. Covered entities may generally use or disclose PHI for treatment, payment, or health care operations. The Privacy Rule lists 12 purposes for which covered entities may use or disclose PHI without an individual’s authorization or permission. Among those purposes are (1) law enforcement under specified conditions, including in response to a law enforcement official’s request for information about a victim or suspected victim of a crime, and (2) a serious threat to health or safety, as when the covered entity believes the disclosure of PHI is necessary to mitigate a serious and imminent threat to a person or the public.

Disclosures made without an individual’s authorization or permission must be accounted for by the covered entity for six years; however, law enforcement may request that accounting be temporarily suspended if it would likely impede an investigation. Such disclosures are also subject to the “minimum necessary” rule, which requires covered entities to endeavor to disclose only the minimum amount of PHI needed to accomplish the specific purpose of the disclosure.

Pointers and takeaways include the following:

1. The Privacy Rule excludes from its coverage education records or treatment records covered by FERPA.
2. The Privacy Rule establishes a ceiling, not a floor; more restrictive state laws may still apply.
3. When law enforcement requests PHI under the specified provision, the best practice is to ask for the entire health record only if that is actually the “minimum necessary” amount of PHI required for the investigation or other legitimate purpose.
4. Law enforcement can help build rapport with covered entities by establishing a relationship and protocols in advance, and by seeking a medical expert/provider to walk them through only what they need to know, rather than making massive document requests as a matter of course.
5. Keep in mind that the Privacy Rule puts the entire onus of compliance on the covered entity, which explains why there is so much fear and misconceptions associated with it.
6. When approached in the right way, the Privacy Rule does not need to be an impediment to effective information sharing to protect the public’s safety.

# Appendix G: Definitional Framework and Summary of Current Practices

Below is a summary of the participants' refinement of the definitional framework provided by the summit planners, as well as a brief summary of their beliefs regarding current practices related to these terms:

## Summary of definitional framework discussion

**Identification.** The process of recognizing that an actor poses a possible threat of violent conduct.

The identification aspect of prevention has many possible factors. The recognition of a change in behavior or character may be observed by any number of contacts. These contacts may range from family members, co-workers, fellow students, friends, neighbors, counselors, mental health professionals, or law enforcement personnel. Each, and all, is based on the level of interaction with the actor(s). Another aspect of these observations must be the recognition that being "different" or "quirky" is not a crime and alone may not be enough to cause alarm. A combination of factors should lead an observer to have concern and take the next step: i.e., notifying an appropriate authority.

**Notification.** Providing information to an appropriate authority (someone with actionable responsibility) regarding a possible threat.

Once observers identify what they believe is a reason for worry, they must take the next step and notify an appropriate authority about their concerns. Based on the connection between the observer and the actor, the appropriate authority can be different people. For example, in a school setting, the appropriate authority could be a counselor, principal, or other person in a position of responsibility. In the workplace, the appropriate authority could be a supervisor, a manager, a human resources person, or, based on the level of concern, a security person. In many instances, the appropriate authority may be the police. In situations where the actor is a family member, friend, or neighbor, the police are the likely first line of responsibility to deal with the situation. In many cases, the police will be notified by an appropriate authority to interact with an actor.

In all cases, the most important factor in reporting the concern is that the authority figure has actionable responsibility to reply to the situation. This greater level of responsibility ensures that the concern is acted upon and not simply noted.

**Evaluation.** The analysis and determination of threat credibility (this includes the capacity and capability to conduct an act of violence).

Many threat assessment models are successfully utilized by law enforcement, schools of higher education, mental health professionals, and the workplace. Each of these models takes into account a number of factors: what is the capability of an actor to carry out an act of violence; what is the capacity of an actor to carry out an act of violence; what if any communication has been received from the actor; what is the actor's motivation to commit an act of violence; and what is the overall context of the threat? Numerous other factors are included in these assessments that are based on the intended target (if known) and method of violence, etc.

The goal of any assessment is to determine if the actor does or does not pose a threat. If a level of threat is determined, then the next step must be some form of intervention or interruption of escalation toward an act of violence.

**Intervention.** The deliberate interruption of the planning phase of a multiple casualty shooting event (the planning phase is comprised of the stages of escalation toward a violent act).

Determining when the planning phase ends caused much dialog among the participants. They finally agreed that the planning phase continues until the point of execution. At the execution phase, the actor is carrying out the act of violence.

During the planning phase, the actor is completing the physical elements (gathering weapons, ammunition, etc.), as well as the cognitive and emotional elements. The intervention must occur before the move from ideation to action.

There are many methods of intervention, each based on the type of professional interaction. In the medical/mental health profession, intervention may be diagnostic, medication, psychological evaluation (voluntary and involuntary), and long-term treatment. In school settings, the intervention may include school sanctions, as well as a referral to a law enforcement agency for assistance. Based on when and where the intervention occurs during the planning phase, mental health professionals will be involved, as may the police. This can be due to an emergency petition for psychological evaluation or crisis counseling.

**Documentation and Dissemination.** *Documentation* is the written record of all activities involved in the intervention, including related activities that preceded or followed the intervention; *dissemination* is the sharing of documentation and all relevant information across multidisciplinary and jurisdictional boundaries in accordance with applicable laws.

While the law enforcement profession documents potential incidents that have been prevented, other professions involved in the prevention do not typically contribute information that becomes part of this documentation. Comprehensive information from all involved professions could be used for future deterrence of multiple casualty acts of violence, particularly if it is disseminated across professions. A repository should be created for accumulating reports from all pertinent professions on the indicators of potential violence that helped prevent violent incidents with the intent of providing information on events, subjects, and methods that any jurisdiction could use to prevent a future event.

## Summary of beliefs regarding practices

By and large, the summit participants agreed that the elements of the definitions were not necessarily individual actions or components to the prevention of an act of violence. Rather, they work in concert and are more of a fluid response to individual characteristics.

### What is being done in the represented professions with regard to these elements?

Most of the represented professions believe there is some consistency with regard to identifying the characteristics of a potential multiple casualty shooter. These characteristics usually involve a change in personality or character that is observable and, therefore, actionable (from a treatment perspective). In law enforcement, these characteristics usually manifest themselves in an action that causes an intervention. Such actions may be threats, weapons violations, etc. In a school setting, the actions may be more subtle, such as disassociated behavior, isolation, outbursts, etc.

With regard to reporting an individual, schools seem to have the most consistent policies. If a student is causing concern over his or her behavior, counseling and/or forms of school sanctions are readily used. The actual interventions, in most cases, are left to the law enforcement professionals. In workplace, school, and college/university settings, the actual interventions are conducted by law enforcement personnel. There may be earlier forms of intervention, such as behavioral intervention teams at a university or peer support programs in the workplace, but most of these are intermediary steps.

### Is training provided in the represented professions to address the elements?

All of the represented professions mentioned they receive some form of behavioral assessment training. Obviously, some of the mental health professions have a greater level of training than other participants, but all claimed a level of comfort in recognizing behavioral change. Some professions, such as school resource officers, receive training in mentoring and mediating student disputes; this places them in a unique position to observe student behavior and determine changes that are unhealthy and potentially dangerous.

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# About the COPS Office

**The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office)** is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation's state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.

Rather than simply responding to crimes once they have been committed, community policing concentrates on preventing crime and eliminating the atmosphere of fear it creates. Earning the trust of the community and making those individuals stakeholders in their own safety enables law enforcement to better understand and address both the needs of the community and the factors that contribute to crime.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy cutting-edge crime fighting technologies, and develop and test innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders and all levels of law enforcement. The COPS Office has produced and compiled a broad range of information resources that can help law enforcement better address specific crime and operational issues, and help community leaders better understand how to work cooperatively with their law enforcement agency to reduce crime.

- Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested nearly \$14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation's streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing.
- By the end of FY2011, the COPS Office has funded approximately 123,000 additional officers to more than 13,000 of the nation's 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country in small and large jurisdictions alike.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- As of 2011, the COPS Office has distributed more than 6.6 million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs.

COPS Office resources, covering a wide breadth of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—are available, at no cost, through its online Resource Information Center at [www.cops.usdoj.gov](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov). This easy-to-navigate website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.



# About the FLETC

**The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)**, a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for 91 federal partner agencies and also provides training to state, local, rural, tribal, territorial, and international law enforcement agencies. During FY2012, the FLETC trained over 69,000 students, and it has trained over 1,000,000 law enforcement officers and agents since its establishment in 1970. Its mission statement is: “We train those who protect our homeland.”

The FLETC is headquartered at Glynco, Georgia, near the port city of Brunswick, halfway between Savannah, Georgia, and Jacksonville, Florida. In addition to Glynco, the FLETC operates two other residential training centers in Artesia, New Mexico, and Charleston, South Carolina, as well as a non-residential facility in Cheltenham, Maryland. The FLETC also maintains an office in Orlando, Florida, which provides a gateway to technology and training expertise within a nationally recognized hub for simulation and training. Since 1995, the FLETC has participated in the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Program. In addition to providing instructors for the core and specialized programs at the ILEAs located in Hungary, Thailand, Botswana, and El Salvador, the FLETC has personnel assigned as the director of the ILEA in Botswana and deputy director of the ILEA in Thailand.

As an interagency training organization, the FLETC’s staff comprises professionals from diverse backgrounds. Approximately half of its instructors are permanent FLETC employees, and the remaining half are federal officers and investigators on assignment from their parent organizations or recently retired from the field. The mix provides a balance of instructional experience and fresh insight.

Consolidation of law enforcement training permits the Federal Government to emphasize training excellence and cost-effectiveness. Through professional instruction and practical exercises, the FLETC not only prepares students for their law enforcement responsibilities but also affords opportunities to interact with students from many other agencies. Students become acquainted with the missions and duties of their colleagues, forming the foundation for a more cooperative law enforcement effort. Partner Organizations provide input regarding training issues and functional aspects of the FLETC, taking part in curriculum development and review conferences and helping to formulate policies and directives. Through this collaboration, the FLETC remains responsive to the training mission.

As the trainer of choice for federal, state, local, rural, tribal, territorial, and international law enforcement agencies, the FLETC is committed to continuously modernizing its training programs and facilities. Through partnerships with the military and cooperative agreements with the entertainment industry, leading technology companies, and academic institutions, the FLETC has become an innovator in the use of modeling and simulation to support law enforcement training. Both independently and through cooperative research and development agreements, the FLETC conducts original research to identify methods for offering more effective and efficient training. To support the training needs of today and tomorrow, the FLETC has recently added state-of-the-art training facilities such as the Counterterrorism Operations Training Facility (a network of various urban, suburban, rural, and intermodal training venues), the Simulations Laboratory, and the Cyber Forensics Building to support the training needs of today and tomorrow. The FLETC continues to invest strategically to meet the evolving training requirements of an increasingly complex law enforcement landscape.

# About JHU-PSL

**The Division of Public Safety Leadership (PSL)** began in 1994 as the Police Executive Leadership Program (PELP). Dean Emeritus Stanley C. Gabor, who at the time led the Johns Hopkins University School of Continuing Studies, began this unique program, built on a demanding leadership, liberal arts, and humanities curriculum. Beginning with a single cohort of 24 police executives, PSL currently sponsors 15 cohort classes in multiple locations with a student population representing law enforcement, fire/EMS, emergency management, public health, transit, campus safety, private security, the intelligence community, and the military. Presently, PSL is within the **Johns Hopkins University, School of Education**, under the leadership of Dean David Andrews.

From its inception, PSL has been at the forefront of preparing current and future executives to deal successfully with the routine and complex issues associated with public safety and sustaining community well-being. To this end, the division provides graduate, undergraduate, and noncredit education designed to advance excellence in leadership. The division has won national awards and recognition for its academic programs, which include the Master of Science and Bachelor of Science in Management and Master of Science in Intelligence Analysis. The division's faculty is highly diverse, with academic and professional backgrounds in business, philosophy, education, law enforcement, law, psychology, intelligence analysis, physics, and medicine.

Today, over 1,000 students representing over 50 agencies have graduated from these programs. PSL alumni have advanced to head law enforcement agencies in over 70 jurisdictions throughout the United States. Other graduates have led major fire departments and become leaders in federal agencies, intelligence organizations, and the military.

PSL provides support and technical assistance to organizations nationwide, conducts research, and plays a key role in centers of excellence, work groups, and boards and commissions on behalf of federal, state, and local agencies. The division is home to two prestigious organizations, the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) and the Maryland Chiefs of Police Association (MCPA).

The American public has expressed increasing alarm over incidents of multiple casualty violence. While the law enforcement community has progressed in advancing training in the tactical response to incidents, there are significant gaps in strategies aimed at preventing multiple casualty violence. To address this need, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center collaborated with the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Johns Hopkins University's School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership, to facilitate the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. The summit planners invited subject-matters experts from a wide range of disciplines, such as law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, education, and academia, to help improve the nation's ability to prevent multiple casualty violence. The participants developed eight recommendations, all centered on the need to create a strategic approach to information sharing in the prevention of multiple casualty violence.



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*U.S. Department of Justice*

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To obtain details on COPS Office programs,  
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Visit COPS Online at [www.cops.usdoj.gov](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov).