Lessons Learned in Police-Community Partnerships and Use of the Incident Command System

By
James K. Stewart, Denise Rodriguez King, and Ron Lafond
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Contents

Letter from the Director ........................................ iv
Foreword ......................................................... v
COPS Office Sponsorship ..................................... vi
Executive Summary ............................................. 1
  Methodology .................................................. 2
  Summary of Findings ........................................ 2
  Incident Command System (ICS) ......................... 2
  Community Policing ........................................ 3
Introduction ................................................... 5
  Purpose ....................................................... 5
  Methodology ................................................ 5
  Organization of the Report ............................... 6
Incident Reconstruction ...................................... 7
Implementation of the Incident
  Command System ............................................ 23
  What is ICS? ................................................ 23
  Background ............................................... 23
  Summary of Lessons Learned ........................... 24
    ICS: Command ........................................... 26
    ICS: Operations ......................................... 33
    ICS: Planning ............................................ 34
    ICS: Logistics and Finance ............................ 36
    ICS: Intelligence and Investigations ............... 38
  Background ............................................... 39
Community Policing .......................................... 39
  Summary of Lessons Learned ........................... 40
Conclusion .................................................... 43
References ..................................................... 45
Abbreviations .................................................. 47

Appendix A:
  Departments and Agencies Interviewed ............... 48
Appendix B:
  Departments, Agencies, and Organizations Involved 48
Appendix C:
  ICS, as Defined by NIMS ................................. 49
Appendix D:
  List of Departments and Agencies According to Role 53
Appendix E:
  Deployment Templates .................................. 54
Appendix F:
  Tampa Region Interoperable Communications: A UASI Investment 56
Appendix G:
  Spending Plan Template ................................. 57
About the COPS Office ...................................... 58
Letter from the Director

Dear Colleagues,

As a component of the U.S. Department of Justice that is responsible for advancing public safety through community policing, the COPS Office seized the opportunity to support the Tampa Police Department’s study of their response to the tragic loss of two officers. If something positive can result from this tragedy, it is that other law enforcement agencies can learn from Tampa’s experiences. We hope you will use this report to understand the benefits of engaging the community, how that engagement creates supportive police-community relationships and perceptions, and how that translates into effective investigations, increased officer safety, and ultimately safer communities.

The Tampa Police Department’s proactive measures to implement and sustain police-community partnerships contributed to the apprehension of an armed and dangerous suspect. The systematic and committed efforts to increase communication between police and citizens paid dividends during the manhunt and investigation. The high level of mutual trust and respect that has been established between the police and citizens of Tampa over the past several years aided in bringing closure to a terrible incident that placed the entire community at risk and resulted in the loss of two courageous and committed public servants.

I would like to thank Tampa Police Chief Jane Castor and her staff for their willingness to work with both the COPS Office and CNA Analysis & Solutions to develop this after-action report, which includes best practices and lessons learned that the COPS Office is proud to share with the American law enforcement community.

Sincerely,

Bernard K. Melekian
Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
U.S. Department of Justice
Foreword

Critical, real-world events provide a unique opportunity to assess real-time decision making and community policing practices unhindered by exercise artificialities. When tragic events do occur, care needs to be taken to capture data for subsequent reconstruction and analysis. All too often, after-action discussions that could potentially be beneficial may instead be overly influenced by emotions and personalities, distorting the actual event, or may lack in-depth review and analysis.

CNA Analysis & Solutions conducted an objective, independent review of Tampa’s Incident Command System (ICS) operations to identify strengths and areas for improvement. Using event data, media reports, and interviews with personnel from the Tampa Police Department, the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and other local and federal agencies, CNA identified lessons learned that have applicability for law enforcement professionals nationwide.

CNA convened an expert review panel to assess the findings and recommendations. This panel appreciates the professional leadership, cooperation, and honesty of the Tampa police in sharing their internal information with CNA analysts for the reconstruction and analysis process. We especially wish to acknowledge the leadership of Tampa Police Chief Jane Castor and Tampa Mayor Pam Iorio in keeping the focus of the response on community safety and the successful apprehension of a dangerous suspect and for their participation in this after-action review. The lessons learned and presented in this report will assist communities in planning for a similar, large-scale, multi-agency response to an incident of indeterminate duration.

Thomas Frazier
Former COPS Office Director
Former Police Commissioner,
Baltimore, Maryland

Carl Peed
Former COPS Office Director
Former Sheriff, Fairfax County, Virginia

Louis Quijas
Former FBI Assistant Director
Former Chief of Police,
High Point, North Carolina
COPS Office Sponsorship

The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) advances the practice of community policing in America’s local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies. The COPS Office does its work principally by sharing information and making grants to police departments around the United States.

In 2010, leadership from the Tampa Police Department approached the COPS Office at the conclusion of a large-scale manhunt that used the Incident Command System (ICS) and involved 22 law enforcement agencies and numerous community partners. Tampa police leaders had selected an independent, non-profit operations analysis organization—CNA Analysis & Solutions—to conduct an after-action report of the Tampa Bay manhunt, but, like most municipal police agencies, they were without any discretionary budget to contract with CNA. The COPS Office was interested in capturing the data and lessons learned from this real-world incident before memories began to fade and data deteriorated, and it had the flexibility to approve the Tampa police request for support within a short timeframe.

Lessons learned from community partnerships can sustain law enforcement operations during a large-scale emergency response and help fulfill the COPS Office mission. As a result, the reconstruction and analysis that comprises the Tampa Bay Manhunt After-Action Report documents for law enforcement both what worked well and the areas that need improvement. The COPS Office will use this example of a critical response to share new, analysis-driven insights with law enforcement agencies that are seeking innovative ways to use strategic partnerships in community policing, share capabilities under constrained resources, and better serve their communities.
Executive Summary

On June 29, 2010, at 2:15 AM, the Tampa Police Department (TPD) suffered a tragic loss when two officers were shot and killed during a traffic stop. The suspect fled the scene on foot and evaded immediate arrest. The subsequent law enforcement response and multi-jurisdictional manhunt involved 22 law enforcement agencies and more than 1,000 personnel during a 96-hour deployment that culminated in the arrest of the suspect. TPD established a multi-agency unified command using the Incident Command System (ICS) to plan, coordinate, and manage the complex response, which included volunteers and donations from the community.

TPD reported that few complaints were received, despite frequent special weapons and tactics (SWAT) deployments, numerous residential searches, significant police presence in local neighborhoods, traffic disruptions, staging operations, and extensive media activities. This report demonstrates how building relations before a crisis impacts local community acceptance of extraordinary police presence or measures for extended periods.1

Tampa’s unexpected incident provides a rare opportunity to analyze an actual law enforcement response and capture the lessons learned. This analysis can be of significant use to all local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies that need to be capable of coordinating an extended, multi-jurisdictional law enforcement response within their communities.

TPD asked CNA Analysis & Solutions to analyze this event with a focus on the implementation of ICS and incorporation of community policing. The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) supported this analysis with specific interest in the role community partnerships played. Conducting after-action analyses by independent observers and making results widely available to other law enforcement agencies also enables a reassessment of strategies, policies, and procedures, which can further lead to enhanced officer safety and the prevention of lives lost.

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1. Community disruptions are a common problem for law enforcement agencies elsewhere.
CNA reconstructed and analyzed the Tampa manhunt by focusing on ICS operations, interviewing personnel involved in the incident, and using media reports. CNA used this data to identify lessons learned, including both areas that went well and those that need further improvement. Due to the pending criminal trial of the suspect, CNA was unable to access many official police records.

**Summary of Findings**

CNA identified lessons learned in two broad areas (summaries for which are provided in the next section):

- The implementation of ICS
- The innovative use of community policing that builds relationships through strategic partnerships

**Methodology**

The response of TPD and the Hillsborough County Sherriff's Office (HCSO)—and the contributions of other regional, state, and federal law enforcement agencies—is a unique example of how ICS was implemented during a large-scale incident. This event shows the flexibility of ICS that allowed the efficient integration of a large number of agencies into a single organizational structure that prevents duplicated efforts and ensures that all tactical operations are properly and safely coordinated. Figure 1 shows the ICS structure TPD employed during the incident.

The lessons learned specific to ICS are not listed by priority; instead, they follow CNA's analysis of the ICS structure TPD implemented during the incident. The lessons learned include the following:

- TPD responded and implemented the initial stages of ICS within minutes of their arrival to the crime scene.
- The quick arrival of HCSO leadership at the crime scene allowed a seamless transition into a unified command.
The ICS structure employed for this incident was both adaptable and responsive to the changing needs of the incident.

Pre-existing relationships with local and federal agencies facilitated their quick response and efficient integration into the ICS structure.

The Critical Incident Stress Management unit provided vital mental health services to the officers in need.

TPD quickly determined who should report to the hospital, facilitating continuity of leadership during the subsequent response.

TPD kept command leadership informed by providing incident information in periodic situational briefs.

The command of the incident naturally migrated into a unified command structure between TPD and HCSO, which previous joint training and exercises aided.

Balancing the search and investigation operations with the on-going, day-to-day police operations was difficult because all officers wished to be part of the manhunt operations.

The first 12 hours were the most taxing and dynamic, making it essential to stabilize ICS and establish and maintain an operational tempo.

The recently purchased UASI 800-MHz radio communications system provided critical interoperable communications among all agencies present throughout the incident.

TPD quickly established a perimeter and conducted search operations.

Officers were not always aware of the operations being undertaken; as a result, downward and horizontal situational awareness among all responders needs to be improved.

The TPD public information officer’s (PIO) strategy of humanizing the officers killed and making the community aware of the suspect’s past criminal history helped gain community support in the search for the suspect.

Locating the media too close to the command post can often compromise the integrity of sensitive operational information.

The SWAT teams blended quickly and conducted successful, highly coordinated operations, building on previous joint training.

Electronically documenting SWAT team deployments made tracking the location of and gaps in tactical resources easier.

The use of a separate location for the media during the funeral provided both the families and colleagues of the fallen officers with privacy and respect while satisfying the needs of the media at the same time.

TPD needed to support simultaneously the manhunt investigation and the families’ funeral-planning activities while publicly honoring the fallen officers.

E-Sponder could have been implemented earlier to ensure timely tracking and sharing of all information pertaining to the incident.

Because this event was of unknown duration and not pre-planned, TPD did not use distinct logistics and finance/administration branches.

Responding law enforcement agencies were quick to offer additional resources.

The ICS’s forward planning for tactical assets, technical support, and personnel in an incident of extended duration is important to ensure that the level of effort can be sustained throughout the operational response.

TPD effectively adapted the intelligence and investigations branches into its ICS structure to meet the need for separate but unified information sharing.

Community Policing

Since 2003, Tampa has taken on a more proactive approach to reducing crime, establishing and enhancing its community partnerships, particularly by increasing communication between officers and citizens. Examples of this include providing the officers with city cell phones and establishing a protocol that calls for TPD officers to explain their
actions personally to neighborhood residents after the officers have executed a search warrant, arrested a suspect, and/or made a seizure (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010).

In addition, the TPD chief has taken a hands-on approach to keeping the community aware of ongoing police operations. For example, during the June 29, 2010 incident, the TPD chief spoke directly to the community via radio shows, TV news, and civic meetings about the threat the suspect posed to the community and the importance of the police operations in the search for the suspect. The chief even distributed her cell phone number to the public, so that if anyone had complaints about the manner in which her officers were handling the search, they could contact her directly. Efforts like these have ultimately led to a decrease in crime by 61 percent since 2003. (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010)

The relationship that TPD has built with the community for the past several years aided the response throughout the incident. Community members were essential to the successful arrest of the suspect. Community members not only provided critical resources (e.g., volunteers, water, and food) needed throughout the four-day manhunt but also played a large role in the search for, and eventual arrest of, the suspect. Key lessons learned include the following:

- Extensive donations were made throughout the response, arriving from members of the public and non-governmental and private-sector organizations.

- Managing donations and volunteers in an incident of extended duration is important for ensuring the sustainability of these operations.

- Community mobilization was reinforced through transparency in media releases.

- Tampa community leaders shared responsibility with the police and contributed to the outcome of arresting the suspect without any additional loss of life.

- Both TPD’s relationship with the community and the community’s constant vigilance ultimately led to the successful arrest of the suspect.
**Introduction**

On June 29, 2010, two Tampa police officers were killed during a traffic stop. The suspect fled on foot, and response decisions from law enforcement reflected the initial optimism that the suspect would be apprehended quickly—if not immediately—after the incident. However, the suspect evaded arrest for 96 hours.

The unique manhunt, which occurred from June 29 to July 2, 2010, and the Tampa Police Department’s (TPD) response to the prolonged incident provided an opportunity for analysis to understand the lessons learned. Although implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) is approached at times with hesitation by many law enforcement leaders across the nation, Tampa’s response to the manhunt demonstrates the flexibility of ICS and the potential for successful implementation across all aspects of law enforcement operations. In addition, TPD used strategic public messaging and the local community throughout the incident to assist law enforcement officials in their search for the suspect.

Three major components make the TPD response to this incident unique:

1. Departments and agencies involved in this incident had existing relationships, which were built through extensive training, exercises, and joint involvement in other incidents (e.g., Super Bowl XLIII, the Gasparilla Parade and regional joint exercises).

2. Law enforcement’s extensive actions did not alienate the community throughout the incident. Instead, the community responded positively, and any emotions on the public’s part were controlled in constructive ways.

3. The response to this incident serves as a textbook example of how law enforcement responses should unfold with the assistance of the community.

**Purpose**

This report, conducted by CNA Analysis & Solutions, examines TPD’s implementation of ICS and the use of community partnerships throughout the large-scale, multi-jurisdictional incident. It identifies the lessons learned and, as a result, enables law enforcement agencies and departments across the nation to review how ICS could be similarly implemented in their respective departments and agencies. In addition, the importance of community policing is highlighted, in both day-to-day police operations and in incidents like the one reviewed in this report.

**Methodology**

To gather and analyze data for this report, CNA used the following methods:

1. CNA gathered data through more than 30 interviews with individuals who had a role throughout the incident, specifically with those who used ICS in some form or another (see Appendix A).

2. CNA incorporated secondary, open-source data, notably press releases and news reports (see References).

3. CNA then cross-referenced the information gathered through the media and open sources against statements made in interviews. Information obtained from these sources assisted in a near-complete comprehension of the activities undertaken by the responders and assisted in the reconstruction of the incident.

4. After de-conflicting the data, CNA was able to develop an accurate reconstruction of events. This timeline of events can be found in Figures 2 and 3 on pages 7 and 17.

5. After compiling the information into a timeline, CNA identified a number of key themes.

6. CNA then identified and analyzed lessons learned from these common themes.4

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2. The Gasparilla Parade, conducted annually, is the third-largest parade in the United States and requires multi-jurisdictional planning.

3. Although the interviews were essential to identify lessons learned, they did not always yield accurate times in which events occurred.

4. The intelligence and investigations branches were not extensively reviewed and analyzed in this report due to the pending capital trial.
Organization of the Report

This report first reconstructs the Tampa incident. It then reviews ICS and examines the ways in which TPD implemented and executed ICS during the manhunt (see Figure 1 on page 2). The report then details a number of lessons learned that are organized by TPD’s ICS branches and the relevant function area within the branches. Last, the report culminates with lessons learned from TPD’s effective use of community policing during the incident.
Tuesday, June 29, 2010

2:13 AM

Tampa Police Department (TPD) Patrol Officer Dave Curtis was assigned to District 3 of East Tampa, an area with active criminal activity. The area of patrol borders the Hillsborough county line and is a busy thoroughfare. Officer Curtis was driving north along 50th Street on a routine patrol, and he sent a message to dispatch that he was stopping a car with no rear license plate displayed. The vehicle contained a female driver and a male passenger. Officer Curtis’s vehicle was equipped with a dashboard camera (dash cam), which recorded the incident.

2:15 AM

Officer Curtis checked the driver’s license for wants and warrants, which came out clear. The passenger did not have identification but stated his name and date of birth. The officer checked a regional database for wants, alerts, and warrants for the name the passenger provided. A few minutes later, Officer Curtis was notified that an active arrest warrant from Jacksonville for worthless checks was reported for the vehicle passenger.

2:18 AM

A cover car arrived on scene, and Officer Kocab stood behind Officer Curtis on the passenger side of the vehicle.

As the officers attempted to take the suspect into custody, the suspect unexpectedly turned and fired rounds at the officers. Both officers were struck and immediately fell to the grassy area close to the passenger door of the stopped vehicle.
The suspect fled on foot, abandoning the vehicle by running in a southerly direction and tripping over the fallen officers as they each lay unconscious with head wounds on the ground. The suspect then ran from the dash cam’s field of view.

The driver, still sitting in the vehicle, then sped off into the darkness, heading north-bound on 50th Street. The critically wounded officers were unconscious and, therefore, unable to call for help.

2:20 AM

Nearby, in a cluster of two-story duplexes, three women heard some commotion (Altman 2010)—possible gunshots near the roadway about 200 feet away. The women walked over to the parked patrol vehicles that still had their emergency lights flashing and into the view of Officer Curtis’s dash cam, which recorded their surprise at the two prone officers’ obvious head wounds. They immediately called 911 on their cell phone (ibid.).

_Hillsborough County Sherriff Office (HCSO) Emergency Call Center_. The closest cell tower sent the call to the HCSO emergency call center. Once the dispatcher understood the message, he immediately transferred the call to the Tampa Police 911 center. The HCSO dispatcher also alerted the HCSO watch commander who ordered an immediate response into the neighboring Tampa jurisdiction to render aid in locating and arresting the suspect.

2:21 AM

_Tampa Emergency Call Center_. The Tampa emergency call center ordered emergency medical support and issued an “officers need help” broadcast, calling on all available units to respond.

2:23–2:40 AM

_TPD Response_. Two sergeants from the Tampa area team—one of whom was Officers Curtis and Kocab’s supervisor—immediately responded, as did the entire area squad of approximately seven officers. The arriving officers rushed to give emergency life support and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to the critically wounded Tampa patrol officers. The TPD assumed crime scene command and arranged emergency aid and medical transport for the officers. One of the sergeants and a Rapid Offender Control (ROC) sergeant reviewed the dash cam and confirmed the suspect’s actions, physical description, and direction of flight. Then, one of the sergeants from the TPD area team directed officers to pursue the suspect south-bound along the path of escape, called for K-9 support, and set up a containment perimeter for traffic control.

TPD policy calls for communications supervisors to make phone contact with all staff members, including the chief, assistant chiefs, majors, public information officer (PIO), and legal advisor. In this incident, the communications supervisor advised the command staff of the shooting and the suspect at large. The TPD chief then called the supervisory communications lieutenant to get the facts on the incident.

The police communications supervisor also called the media director at home. While responding to the scene, she conferred with the chief to plan the initial release of information.

The chief directed the assistant chief of field operations to respond to the scene and take command. The assistant chief of administration and investigation was instructed to respond to the hospital where the chief would meet him.

Back at the crime scene, the lieutenant district commander arrived, received an instant briefing from the TPD area team sergeant in command, and assumed incident command, freeing the sergeant to supervise his squad activities. The TPD district commander established an operational command post on the broad median that separates traffic lanes on 50th Street. He also asked HCSO deputies and Florida Highway Patrol personnel to relieve TPD and provided traffic control, closing the throughway on 50th Street.

The TPD district commander oversaw the medical transport of the officers to Tampa General Hospital’s level-one trauma center.

Many additional responding officers from nearby TPD districts assigned themselves to perimeter intersections to divert traffic and check vehicle occupants for the suspect or witnesses. Others began roving patrols to try to spot the fleeing suspect or any suspicious activities that could be related to the crime.
2:40–3:00 AM

**TPD Response.** The TPD sector commander arrived, joined the briefings, and assumed the role and responsibilities of incident commander.

At the scene, the TPD sector commander met with the patrol squad sergeant whose officers were first responders and who had provided emergency medical support to their wounded team members, secured the crime scene, set up an initial perimeter, started searching for the suspect, and orchestrated outside jurisdictions that were filling-in and supporting TPD. The TPD squad who suffered casualties now needed to be relieved with fresh personnel.

The commanders and officers at the crime scene command post believed that the suspect would be located and arrested in a short time. The command post planned to support the K-9 teams and prepared for quick response when the suspect's location was identified. All the focus was on the K-9 tracking, which was closing in on the suspect. The TPD's helicopter provided security for the K-9 team, and used active tracking with infrared sensor technology to locate suspicious heat signatures. This was the most productive, promising, and rapid means of capturing the dangerous suspect (HCSO 2010).

The assistant chief of field operations also arrived on scene, and key briefing elements included the following information:

- After the dash cam from the patrol vehicle was reviewed, the suspect (a black male wearing a white T-shirt) appeared to flee on foot southwest on 50th Street; the driver and vehicle drove in the opposite direction.

- Upon reviewing the dash cam, as well as the dispatch calls for additional information from Officer Curtis, both the suspect and the driver were identified as Dontae Morris and Cortnee Brantley.

- The K-9 teams had a high-confidence track leading through the nearby two-story duplexes, into a residential community, and then into a large cemetery.

The assistant chief kept the TPD sector commander in charge of managing immediate crime-scene and manhunt operations.

**Hospital.** At Tampa General Hospital (TGH), the assistant chief of administration and investigation arrived at 2:45 AM and was greeted by a TPD sergeant (TPD 2010b). The assistant chief briefly met with the attending trauma physician who informed the assistant chief that one officer was dead and the other officer was likely to die. The assistant chief notified the TPD chief who indicated she was en route to TGH. The assistant chief recalled that there is no special training regarding the appropriate ways to support the grieving families and friends when a member was listed as critical or pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) (TPD 2010b). However, the assistant chief's priorities were to notify the families and provide transportation to TGH. He realized that someone who knows the families should be involved in the notification process, so he reached out to the officer's lieutenants and sergeants to identify those closest to the families.\(^5\)

The assistant chief discovered that the families of both officers lived 70 miles away in opposite directions from TGH, which was a complication that needed to be addressed.

The next priority was to secure TPD officers to stand guard with the fallen men as an honor and to provide security for the criminal investigation (e.g., officers' clothes and evidence) and chain of custody. The chief also needed to plan for family arrivals, work with the hospital to provide chaplains, advise families of the situation, contact the TPD media director, and prepare for an initial press conference (estimated to be around 6:00 AM, depending on notification and family arrival times at TGH).

Please note steps that the TPD chief took in this situation:

1. The chief had a room set up for officers.
2. The chief had a small private room available for families.
3. The chief had the fallen officers prepared for viewing.

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5. TPD’s personnel database contains emergency notification information but does not list the names of the TPD personnel that the officers would prefer to make the emergency notification to their next of kin.
4. The chief sent an officer that each family knew to pick them up. (The TPD chief spoke with those officers prior to this task and advised them to tell the families that the officers had been injured and that they were unsure of their condition.)

5. The chief and the mayor notified the families of the officers’ condition. They also had a doctor present in case the family members had medical questions.

6. The chief and the mayor escorted the families to see the fallen officers.

7. The chief addressed the officers at the hospital and provided guidance and comfort.

8. The squad mates of the fallen officers were allowed to say private goodbyes.

9. The media brief was conducted only after the families and fellow officers had been advised and taken care of at the hospital.

Public Message. The TPD media director was notified at home of the incident, and she quickly contacted the Tampa General Hospital PIO to give notice of the situation and to request media areas be set aside for a news conference later in the morning.

3:00–3:30 AM

TPD Response. Fifteen minutes after arrival at the temporary command post, the assistant chief of field operations received news that the K-9 team had lost the suspect’s scent around 49th Avenue (about 10 blocks away from the crime scene) and that the K-9 officers believed the suspect was picked up in an unknown vehicle, continuing his escape out of the immediate area. The TPD helicopter was reporting negative for suspicious heat signatures, confirming the K-9 officers’ conclusions.

The assistant chief of field operations learned from the TPD sector commander that the initial containment perimeter was narrowly defined because everyone had focused mostly on K-9 tracking that would lead to the suspect’s location and immediate arrest. Now it was time to reassess the immediate situation and address other capture options. The remedial action was to set up an expanded perimeter. The TPD district commander was in charge of directing air support with heat-seeking technology to systematically search the newly widened perimeter.

At this point, the assistant chief of field operations realized that the expected quick arrest and apprehension of the suspect was probably not going to happen as anticipated. Accordingly, a decision had to be made whether to continue the manhunt with assistance from law enforcement throughout the Tampa region or to shut down and follow routine investigative options, which are less labor-intensive. The assistant chief of field operations briefed the TPD chief who was adamant that all resources must be used to find and arrest the fleeing suspect quickly before others in the community could be injured or killed.

The situation no longer stood as a hot pursuit and rapid apprehension. It changed into a more complex and multi-jurisdictional operation requiring careful planning for developing leads, intelligence, and strategies to locate and arrest a suspect who slipped through the TPD perimeter and was now mobile.

The preliminary “officers down” response included the TPD, the HCSO, and the Temple Terrace Police Department (TTPD) special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team, many of whom were familiar with the Tampa area and police operations. These units could temporarily team with TPD, providing continuity of command and increased operational effectiveness. However, a full-scale manhunt expanding well beyond Tampa’s jurisdiction required significant new resources, assets, and personnel for a potentially long-term situation. The TPD could sustain a brief surge of intense focus, but over many days, it would become exhausted and unable to handle additional calls for service and crime prevention throughout the jurisdiction. TPD needed a command structure to manage the manhunt that could both reflect Tampa’s priorities and accept outside agency assistance in a seamless ICS model. The assistant chief of field operations called for a seasoned ICS captain to begin planning and organizing a sustainable organizational structure.

At 3:00 AM, HCSO’s colonel arrived on scene (HCSO 2010). The assistant chief and colonel had worked...

6. The TPD media director, a former news reporter from the Tampa region, knew from the first notification that the shooting incident and a large-scale, multi-jurisdictional manhunt would be a front-page (and likely state-wide) story for several days, so a media plan needed to be developed with a strategy, objectives, division of roles, and a strong public message that reached into the community to build support for the disruptions that would be inevitable during an operation of this magnitude.
together using ICS in several hurricanes and during Super Bowl XLIII. After a situational briefing, the colonel asked the assistant chief of field operations if the HCSO mobile command vehicle, which was close by, should be brought in as a more methodological capability to manage expanding operations and to allow more sustainable extended search operations. The assistant chief of field operations agreed to accept the mobile command vehicle as command center, which until now consisted of a cluster of TPD patrol vehicles parked on the median of 50th Street. In addition to the mobile command vehicle, the colonel called up the HCSO SWAT as a resource in the event that the suspect was located in HCSO jurisdiction or in case TPD needed resources to cover multiple deployments.

The assistant chief of field operations also requested HCSO’s colonel to provide resources to deal with the traffic during rush hour because TPD had exhausted all reserves on the initial response phase. A further request was made to the HCSO colonel for evidence search-and-collection teams to handle the crime scene and other locations of interest (e.g., a fence along the fleeing suspect’s escape route where a bloody piece of torn cloth was found).

**TPD and HCSO** 

**Response.** The assistant chief of field operations, the sector commander, and the colonel began transitioning into a unified command structure. The first step was to share situational awareness and jointly decide next steps and manpower requirements.

Unified command developed four lines of pursuit to locate and arrest the suspect:

1. **Suspect’s known home address**
   
   Upon reviewing the information received when searching for the suspect’s name, Dontae Morris, Kenneth Court Apartments came up as his last known place of residence. SWAT would begin conducting searches at this location.

2. **Female associate / driver of suspect vehicle**
   
   The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) identified the current residence of the driver, Cortnee Brantley, several miles away in HCSO jurisdiction. HCSO sent deputies to the location and alerted police and Florida highway patrol to be on the lookout for the vehicle, stop the driver, and question any passengers.

3. **Analysis of criminal records databases**

   Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) analysts developed an extensive profile from regional, state, and national records to gather Dontae Morris’s criminal history and network of potential associates, family, and friends. This information would help develop leads as to where he might have been or was planning to travel to reach a safe location.

4. **Regional alert for suspect**

   The TPD sector commander and HCSO initiated a search of surrounding areas, residences, and motels for the suspect vehicle.

At least two of these pursuit hypotheses involved outside jurisdictions; unified command was the best means of coordinating the complex actions of multiple jurisdictions. Initial information suggested that the driver’s or the suspect’s residence was a probable destination.

The decision to transition into a unified command structure was a natural evolution.

**3:30-5:00 AM**

The unified command decided to relocate the command post from the median along 50th Street to a vehicle auction lot located directly across the street from the crime scene and the temporary command post. The vehicle auction lot was a large, paved area with a chain link fence for security that had a single gate for controlled ingress and egress. **Unified Command Response.** The TPD sector commander designed and implemented a perimeter with air support, anticipating daylight to help with the area search for the suspect. The HCSO K-9 team arrived and was fully integrated with TPD teams. The TPD helicopter needed to refuel, and the HCSO airship (helicopter) assumed the systematic search while TPD refueled and conducted brief maintenance.

When the HCSO mobile command vehicle arrived and was set up in the automobile auction lot, it had significant technology and communications connectivity that made possible situational awareness, planning, resource tracking, and mapping. The assistant chief of field operations worked with the HCSO colonel and shared incident command decision making. The TPD
deputy operations commander became the deputy ICS branch officer for operations and handled all the tips and leads, conducting triage, assessment, and prioritization. Also, the HCSO colonel for investigation and special operations arrived and became the ICS branch overall tactical team commander and deputy incident commander. Now, the ICS command post management structure began to emerge as a unified command, with on-site command and control and public messaging integrated. The command structure was still informal but clearly taking shape in the minds of all on-site.

**Public Message.** At 3:30 AM, the TPD media director arrived at the crime scene and met with the assistant chief of field operations and the lieutenant district commander to confirm specifics that were appropriate to release to the media (TPD PIO 2010). It was imperative that the media director get the facts of the incident correct before advising the media. At 3:15 AM, while en-route to the scene, the media director had conferred with the TPD chief. Many media representatives were already on-scene, attempting to cover the developing story by collecting background information and crime-scene footage for early morning broadcasts. They approached the media director, needing some solid information for the 5:00 and 6:00 AM newscasts. The media director knew this story was big and would command the leads in all media throughout the region. She did not want to detract from the chief’s press conference at Tampa General Hospital regarding the condition of the officers and manhunt, but she understood the media’s need for basic information until the more comprehensive briefing by the TPD chief. The media director decided to give a brief, on-camera statement to accompany the footage of the crime scene for the early morning shows: 7

“Two TPD officers were wounded during a traffic stop at 50th Street and 23rd Avenue by a suspect who fled on foot (described as male, Black, slender, and wearing a white T-shirt). The injured officers were transported to Tampa General Hospital for medical treatment. The nature of their injuries and the officers’ conditions are unknown at this time. The TPD chief of police and mayor will have an update from Tampa General Hospital later this morning” (TPD PIO 2010).

This was just a quick media gap-filler and not an official police statement from the TPD chief or an assistant chief. It prevented the media from becoming aggressive in their quest for information, and it minimized inaccuracies that would scare or incite panic with the public. The brief factual statement built more anticipation for the TPD chief and mayor’s first press conference to the community from the hospital, as soon as they completed notifying the officers’ families. The media director departed for Tampa General Hospital but assigned her assistant PIO to stay at the scene for coordination. There was much to prepare for the first statement to the media, and the media director was planning the information and anticipating questions and issues as she drove to the hospital.

**Unified Command Response.** At approximately 3:30 AM, The TPD lieutenant commander of Specialty Teams self-assigned and arrived at the crime scene. He observed the command post setup in the auction parking lot and proactively activated the TPD SWAT team by contacting the communications supervisor to page all SWAT, staff support, hostage negotiators, and tactical response team medics. 9 By 3:45 AM, the SWAT tactical commander arrived, and the SWAT units were slowly forming a full team. The lieutenant commander of Specialty Teams reported to the assistant chief of field operations that the TPD SWAT team was available for full response to high-value leads and tips. One of the SWAT sergeants observed that the TTPD SWAT team was already on scene. The TTPD SWAT was seamlessly integrated into the TPD SWAT, providing additional resources in case of multiple callouts.

HCSO assigned a deputy at the auto auction lot gate of the command post to direct arriving personnel. Informally, the news of the manhunt was moving fast among law enforcement. Off-duty law enforcement volunteers 11 started arriving around 4:15 AM to assist.

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7. According to the interviewee (TPD PIO 2010), the initial account was intentionally vague. It was decided the only appropriate person to tell the community of TPD’s loss was the chief. Her position and leadership would also provide a sense of confidence to the public that TPD was in control and that the community was safe.

8. Specially Command consists of the Bomb Squad, K-9 teams, Mounted Patrol, DUI enforcement teams, Underwater SAR, traffic/motor officers, air service (four crafts), Marines (six officers), hostage negotiators, and SWAT teams (25 members).

9. EMTs are primarily fire personnel who volunteer and are assigned to SWAT callouts. When activated, they carry firearms for self-defense during tactical deployments.

10. SWAT is used to search and arrest suspects known to be armed and dangerous.

11. TPD operates a work cycle of 4-day, 12-hour shifts, with 4 days off in between. At any time, more than 50 percent of the TPD officers are in off-duty status.
Hospital. At Tampa General Hospital, the TPD captain of the Special Operations Bureau (TPD 2010b) arrived, self-assigned to be a liaison with TGH security staff and the TPD squad sergeant, and worked with Critical Incident Stress Management, which is facilitated by volunteers composed of law enforcement, fire personnel, and trained counsel support services professionals.

The captain of the Special Operations Bureau observed very few officers at the hospital because of the developing manhunt. She checked in with the assistant chief who briefed her that Officer Kocab was pronounced DOA and that Officer Curtis was expected to pass away. The captain of the Special Operations Bureau prepared TGH security for the arrival of media, the officers’ families, and dozens of police personnel and concerned friends, advising that special areas be set up for each group, as needed, for appropriate respect and privacy.

5:00–9:00 AM

Unified Command Response. As new resources began arriving and there was no direct path to the suspect, the operations shifted to a leads-driven operation that required careful planning, decisions on deployments, and prioritization of leads. This potentially long-term situation would best be handled with a systematic incident command structure and a well-managed system of resource allocations. The best way forward was to enlarge the search to a full-scale manhunt with an integrated unified command of local, state, and federal law enforcement personnel. A system was needed to manage leads that were flowing in as a result of law enforcement investigative work and of public calls reacting to the breaking media reports.

Accordingly, the incident commander decided, in consultation with the unified commanders, that SWAT teams would quickly become exhausted on callouts because several potential leads were being evaluated. Because TTPD SWAT was already blended with TPD SWAT, all SWAT units needed to be blended to ensure adequate resources. Twelve-hour shifts were designated as Alpha and Bravo. The blended SWAT team concept required the use of plain English for all communications (a requirement within ICS). Most of the SWAT teams had the same basic tactics and training, and, despite each team’s unique characteristics, could blend fast and well, significantly increasing the size and numbers of resources for a regional manhunt, if necessary. HCSO SWAT teams were blended with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) units from the East Coast, and others would be similarly assigned.

Primarily, the unified command agreed that TPD had the best knowledge of the Tampa community and would be the lead units, and outside deployments would be assigned to the agency with the best community knowledge. For example, all TPD jurisdictional calls would have split teams, with TPD acting as the lead.

Public Message. The TPD media director coordinated with the Tampa General Hospital PIO and delegated all logistics to the hospital PIO, who provided a media area, chairs, lights, a lectern for formal presentations, security, signage, parking, and separate rooms for grieving families and officers.

The TPD media director relied on her background as a former reporter and on current contacts within the media to gather all the potential difficult or uncomfortable questions that might be asked during the first press conference. The TPD media director conducted some rapid research on the anticipated issues and then developed a short, recommended initial statement and responses to the anticipated questions for the TPD chief and Tampa mayor to consider. The TPD chief and mayor had their own strong views, but this background and research proved helpful in providing a strong public message.

The first news conference was delayed until after the TPD chief and mayor had met privately with the wives and families of the officers and notified them about the death of Officer Kocab and the current state of Officer Curtis. The TPD chief expressed her personal sadness and offered the full services of the TPD to support the families with their loss.

The TPD chief then met with the gathered officers, including the sergeants for the TPD area team, the union representatives, and friends. She stated that all Tampa leaders were engaged, including the mayor, and that this incident couldn’t be delegated but must be strong and compassionate. The chief stated that law enforcement throughout the region would not rest until the suspect was arrested and brought to justice. The chief then offered fellow officers an opportunity
to visit the deceased if they chose to. Chaplains and critical incident teams were standing by to help the officers in the grieving process.

The TPD chief briefed the assistant chief of field operations and asked that all on-coming personnel be briefed to receive the current information on the manhunt and growing law enforcement agencies participating.

Press Conference: TGH. At 6:30 AM, the chief and the Tampa mayor held the news conference at TGH announcing the death of Officer Kocab, providing the briefing information, as planned. The mayor and TPD chief stated that this was a tragedy for the entire Tampa community who had suffered a great loss. The media rushed to get the information on the air and into print for the early morning news.

The primary focus of the first news conference was to announce the loss of Officer Kocab, set a tone of compassion, and establish a connection between his individual life and his membership in the greater Tampa family. The objective was to show the community that they ought to care about his loss of life. The chief offered a picture of Kocab’s life beyond his dedication in his 14-month role as a Tampa police officer. Kocab was also part of a larger police family, as he had been Officer of the Year in Plant City, where he had served for three years with distinction before accepting a career with the Tampa Police Department. Kocab was a family man who loved his wife, and she was expecting their first child within days.

The suspect was not named during the press conference; however, the chief looked right into the cameras and said firmly, “We will not rest until the suspect, who is a violent threat to our Tampa community, is arrested. I am calling law enforcement resources from the entire region to support TPD in this large-scale manhunt, and the resources are overwhelming. We know who you are, and we will find you. You need to be very scared, and the best action is for you to call and give yourself up immediately. Law enforcement throughout the state is searching for you, and we will find you” (TPD 2010c). Appeals were made for any information and for calls to TPD Crime Stoppers. Calls were already coming in from the community with information regarding Dontae Morris and his activities.

Unified Command Response. The suspect vehicle was on every patrol unit’s priority list, and a HCSO deputy spotted the maroon 1994 Toyota Camry without license plates parked in a cluster of apartments. The property management of Bristol Bay Apartments maintains a quiet residential community with very low crime reported. Incident command was notified, and detectives determined from the property manager that Cortnee Brantley (the suspect vehicle driver) could be in an apartment. The SWAT teams from HCSO, ATF, TPD, and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) were deployed.

The Bristol Bay Apartment complex consists of 300 units, which would have to be searched. Incident command devised a strategy of cooperatively working with the property manager's right to inspect.

After the 8:30 AM news conference, the chief and mayor went to the command post, where the sheriff also arrived. The media director received a call from a local billboard company, which had previously partnered with the agency, and offered to post the suspect’s photograph free of charge to generate leads. The media director asked the billboard company representative to stand by until after the chief released the suspect’s name and photo to the public.

9:00–3:00 PM

Press Conference: Command Post. At 9:40 AM, the objective of the third press conference was to announce the name and description of the suspect, Dontae Morris, and to assert that TPD would not rest until this double-homicide suspect—and current threat to the community—was arrested.

The TPD chief described Dontae Morris as a slender, 5’10”, 24-year-old male with medium hair and a white T-shirt. The chief also described Cortnee Brantley, the driver of a maroon 1994 Toyota Camry without license plates (the incident vehicle). The chief emphasized, “We know who you are, and we will find you. You need to be very scared, and the best action is for you to call and give yourself up immediately. Law enforcement throughout the state is searching for you, and we will find you” (TPD 2010c). Appeals were made for any information and for calls to TPD Crime Stoppers. Calls were already coming in from the community with information regarding Dontae Morris and his activities.
The property manager provided apartment keys in individual Styrofoam cups labeled with each apartment number. If the locks had been changed and management did not have a key, the manager would drill the locks to permit entry. Twenty locks didn’t open with the management’s keys, so they drilled the locks (as required in the property lease agreement). A large-scale search plan was readied, and dozens of units were deployed for traffic and perimeter security. Armored SWAT vehicles entered the parking areas while media crowded around, recording the massive search. A thorough search was conducted with careful discipline for safety and to ensure the capture of Cortnee Brantley and, possibly, Dontae Morris. The apartment residents were relatively cooperative, and most were aware that two officers had been shot and killed. The presence of Bristol Bay property managers also provided a sense of cooperation. The complex was sealed, and no one could enter or leave until the search was completed. Although the operation required three hours, disrupting the plans and activities of residents who were still in the apartments at 10:00 AM, there were only two complaints, which were expeditiously resolved by command officers.

By 12:00 PM, Crime Stoppers had announced a $5,000 reward for information on the location of the suspect Dontae Morris, and the next press conference planned to demonstrate how ICS was being used to coordinate the manhunt across jurisdictions in new ways to build the largest law enforcement manhunt operation in Tampa’s history. The presence of the Tampa mayor, the TPD chief, and the Hillsborough County sheriff reinforced the message that “all law enforcement [was] working together; resources from far and wide [were] being integrated into this manhunt” (TPD 2010a).

At 1:00 PM, suspect Cortnee Brantley was detained at Bristol Bay Apartments.

**Press Conference: Incident Command Post.** After meeting with the officers and commanders, many of whom had self-assigned and were committed to assisting until the suspect was arrested, the Tampa chief convened a 2:00 PM press briefing on-scene at the incident command post at 50th Street. The chief took the opportunity to brief the circumstances surrounding the search of Bristol Bay Apartments and the detention of Cortnee Brantley. The chief announced that the police were now engaged in a large-scale manhunt for Dontae Morris. (TPD 2010a)

The TPD chief indicated that this manhunt operation was now region-wide, with local, regional, state, and federal law enforcement jurisdictions committing resources to locating and arresting the suspect. In addition, visuals of SWAT teams, armored vehicles from the TPD, HCSO, FBI, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and ATF were displayed, along with the increasing number of mobile command vehicles crowding the once-empty car auction lot. An impressive array of law enforcement measures was prominently displayed on the news.

The TPD chief further appealed to the community for leads and information to locate Dontae Morris. She announced that the reward for information had grown to $30,000. She also announced that Morris’s photograph was up on donated billboards. The announcement prompted other large billboard companies to come forward to make the same offer. The FBI PIO then began working with the billboard companies to post the suspect’s photo throughout the southeast part of the United States. Calls were already coming in from the community with information regarding Dontae Morris and his activities.

**Press Conference: TPD HQ.** The media director was planning to hold another press conference, reaching out to the Tampa community by reinforcing the image of the fallen officers as people with families and personal stories. The media director developed an in-depth media alert announcing the press conference to be held at TPD headquarters at 2:25 PM. Included in the media alert was a package of photos and biographies of the fallen officers, so that every press outlet would have a consistent base of information from which to draw.

For personal portraits of each of the fallen officers, the media director located fellow officers who had worked side-by-side with the fallen officers. Their closest friends and squad mates were not contacted, but instead the PIO contacted officers a step-removed from the scene to ensure they could emotionally handle the task. The final selection included a field training officer, a former patrol squad member, and a female officer who had worked with or attended the academy with the lost officers. The media director then held a quick pre-briefing with the officers and asked them to focus on one or two examples of human interest that revealed Officer Kocab’s and Curtis’s character (i.e., the kinds of people they were) to the press and to residents of the Tampa region.
The media director introduced the three individuals to the media as working officers who were friends of the fallen officers, clarifying that they were not professional public speakers. The media director also laid out some ground rules for the media; no questions were to be asked about the actual crime, the suspect, the search, or the status of the potential arrest.

The goal of this news conference was to include the public in the grieving process. Painting a picture of the officers as heroes with personal lives created empathy in the community. It also fueled the public's passion that Dontae Morris be caught. As a result, community members were more tolerant of the intrusive manhunt that followed. Providing these interviews also controlled the media response. It eliminated the need for the media to go to the officers' homes and neighborhoods to interview family members and neighbors during their time of loss. Not only did it prevent journalists from approaching officers who were grieving, but it also allowed officers to focus on the manhunt. These interviews ultimately protected the department and the family members and kept the department in control of the media message about their fallen officers.

Public Message. The community responded to the news stories flooding the airwaves, calling in leads and information on possible sightings of the suspect. Initially, these tips were handled directly by the 911 call-takers. They forwarded leads to dispatchers for assignments, but, without basic assessments, the dispatchers sent patrol officers to many non-related and trivial leads. This depleted the resources of patrol in responding to normal calls for service, and calls started to back up, causing long waits for police service. TPD was quick to identify this issue and began implementing the use of E-Sponder to prevent back up of calls for police service.

Unified Command Response. HCSO crime analysts began to arrive and set up in the command post. Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) analysts arrived and set up to provide state-wide database connectivity and links to other states and national databases (FDLE 2010). The FBI, USMS, and the ATF were sending initial agents, with commitments for more resources as needed (ATF 2010; FBI 2010; USMS 2010). The FBI also committed SWAT team and support staffs (FBI 2010). Most of the larger agencies also had mobile command centers that required parking and space for set up.

3:00 PM–12:00 AM

In time for the evening news cycles, TPD released a media alert stating the reward for information on the location of the suspect had increased to a record $75,000 ($50,000 from the FBI, $5,000 from Crime Stoppers, $10,000 from the USMS, and $10,000 from the Police Defense Fund). A manhunt of unprecedented proportions was being assembled to protect the Tampa community and others from the fleeing suspect. Photos, descriptions, residences, vehicles, and Crime Stoppers' numbers were displayed and announced alongside the amount of the reward.

The sizable reward stimulated a fresh wave of leads and calls from the community. It also attracted some sellers of specific information from confidential informants who were motivated solely by money. Many called their police contacts and demanded to know if the money was real before they would assist the police in the manhunt. This development presented management challenges for the unified command and ICS operations, as the information was sensitive and, if disclosed, could cause further injury or death. The unified command and ICS structure were customized to accommodate the need to compartmentalize sensitive information and the sources. The ICS operations branch officer was included in the unified command, and, although he could not disclose sensitive information, he was able to assess assignments and operational tactics and de-conflict the plans from undercover operations and surveillances.
Later, as the final media alert went out for the day, the reward grew to $95,000 (now including an additional $10,000 each from the FDLE and the Fraternal Order of Police [FOP]). The sheer size of the reward significantly increased the number of tips—and the demand for police to investigate each one as the potential location of the armed and dangerous suspect. In addition to the community calling in tips, many confidential informants who have relationships with detectives and undercover law enforcement personnel were searching for real information on the suspect. The reward had raised the interest of sources who must be kept confidential for their personal safety. Dontae Morris reportedly had a history of violence with some neighborhood individuals. Accordingly, many people were afraid of retaliation, but the reward size was becoming a serious inducement to call the tips line.

No further evening news conferences were planned, unless there was a break in the case or an arrest.

The Bravo shift relieved the Alpha shift, and the incident command also changed, with the assistant chief of field operations handing responsibilities over to the assistant chief of administration and investigations. The tips and leads dropped off over night, so fewer police were required.

**Wednesday, June 30, 2010**

*Press Conference: Incident Command Post.* In the early morning hours, the media director focused attention on the dedication of the officers in pursuing the suspect. She featured a TPD lieutenant as a representative volunteer who, like most of the TPD
personnel, arrived at the command post and refused to go home for rest after round-the-clock duty. Protecting the community and arresting this violent suspect for the fatal shootings of the TPD officers were the driving forces keeping the officers on duty without breaks.

Community Contributions. It quickly became apparent that the amount of supplies (food and water) was dwindling at the beginning of day two of the manhunt. All the emergency water reserved for hurricanes had already been consumed, and there was no budget line for food, supplies, and support material. At the request of the chief, the TPD lieutenant and the deputy commander of the incident command post began making phone calls to community partners—including local businesses and organizations—requesting assistance in any form available (e.g., money, food, water, and ice). By that afternoon, Outback Steakhouse had set up grills at the command post, delivering meals for the officers. Their contribution continued throughout the incident. In addition, the TPD lieutenant spoke to the chief financial officer from Sykes Enterprises about the incident, and they had inquired whether assistance was needed. Ultimately, Sykes Enterprises donated $10,000 toward the purchase of any resources needed for this operation. This contribution was especially handy, as it had been raining the night before and that morning. The rain caused flooding in the command post and, without shelter, the officers on duty were drenched. The purchase of tents and canopies allowed the officers at the command post to set up areas where they could rest in between shifts and stay dry while waiting for their next assignment.

The Tampa Department of Public Works set up traffic barricades and arranged for trash sweeps at the command post at 2 PM each day. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) provided a cadre of volunteers to clean up, keep things orderly, and boost morale.

11:00 AM–3:00 PM

Press Conference: TPD HQ. At 11:00 AM, the TPD chief and mayor reported on the search progress, the numerous tips from the community, and the increasing reward being offered for information leading to the arrest of Dontae Morris. From a lectern displaying the TPD shield, the chief asserted, “This is a tragic incident, taking outstanding young officers from our community. We know who [Dontae Morris] is, and we will find him. He should be very scared. The best course is for him to call and arrange to give himself up” (TPD 2010a). The mayor added, “This is a tragedy for the TPD, the families of the fallen officers, and for our entire community. I know the TPD will not rest until the arrest is made” (ibid.).

Prior to the press conference, the media director met with the chief and mayor to inform them of the questions the media would be asking. This gave the chief time to formulate responses. The goal before every news conference was to review all possible news angles so there were no surprise questions from the media.

Public Message. The manhunt had taken on a media competition in terms of news angles, human interest, and investigative reporting. At this point, the media were aggressive but not yet restless. By the evening of June 30 and the early morning hours of July 1, there was less new information to release. An added difficulty was that the media staging area was in the same parking lot as incident command. Members of the media were contained to one area, but from that location they were able to observe and videotape the arrival of undercover officers, SWAT deployments, and large officer deployments. The police were starting to feel irritated because many of the surveillance and search-and-arrest operations were compromised by media announcements or media convoys following armored and police vehicles to security assignments.

The media also began going out on their own to search for the suspect as a means of making news. These investigative reporting activities actually hampered the police search and may have alerted the suspect to some capture plans and tactics. Police commanders complained to the media director for some kind of constraints on this freelance investigative journalism (TPD 2010b). As the complaints came in, the media director called news desks and news managers of the interfering stations and demanded that the reporters and camera crews draw back. The media complied with these individual requests but then would be equally aggressive at the next scene. They monitored all public channels of the police radio system and even responded to some locations before police.

One tactic the media employed was to identify and interview the three women who discovered the dying officers and made the 911 call. Two other women
were interviewed, provided insight from the community resident’s perspective, and described what they did to help the police.

Recounting the events of the previous day, the eyewitnesses said that around 2:00 AM they heard something like gunshots and the sound of someone running through their courtyard and climbing over the chain link fence before continuing to run away into backyards. The women decided to check out what was happening about 200 feet away, where they could see two police cars parked on their side of 50th Street:

As they approached, they saw two officers lying “side by side…like they were asleep. One officer had an arm on the other, like he was trying to catch him from falling.” The women looked closer to see if “they were breathing…they were, just barely. One was having problems.” They did not see any injuries until closer inspection. According to one woman, one officer had “some blood coming from his mouth, and the other had something coming out of his nose…but it didn’t look like blood, you know. We stood up and called 911 right away. We waited and tried to help the officers while help was coming. I think one officer might have died waiting because his breathing just stopped. It seemed to take too long for help to arrive. But when the police got here, they were running and giving aid to the officers…. Oh my God. It was just a terrible thing, and these officers did not even have their guns out. Oh my God…oh my God…. I just can’t take this. I have to leave now.” (TPD 2010a)

Unified Command Response and Public Message. All the sophisticated electronics and wide-spread connectivity for transfers of large data files that accompany modern law enforcement overwhelmed the air cards and wireless capabilities. The devices slowed and were becoming unresponsive. The analysts depended on access to large networked databases to gather information about the suspect, his associates, residences, social network, and geographic familiarity.

By the middle of the second day, it became clear that not having wireless Internet access was going to severely affect response and intelligence-gathering operations. A TPD corporal quickly noted that they were going to have to enlist high-level assistance from their local Internet provider. The corporal spoke to the senior director of corporate communications at Brighthouse Networks. The senior director of corporate communications quickly called the vice president of that region. Within an hour of the call, Brighthouse sent out five technicians and engineers to the command post and had set up newly dedicated T-1 Internet lines and unlimited wireless access.

In addition to the services provided by Brighthouse, a number of private citizens and organizations were offering supplies and assistance to the officers. These donations were consistent throughout the response.

4:00 PM

Press Conference: Incident Command Post. The TPD chief and mayor held a news conference announcing that Morris was a person of interest in other shootings (non-police involved) in the community where searches were taking place, including being named as a suspect in the murder of community resident Derek Anderson on May 18 of that year. The message of the press conference was focused on the imminent danger that the suspect Morris posed to the Tampa
community beyond the shooting and killing of the two police officers. The strategy was to shift the perception of Morris as a police resistor to a violent threat to community safety.

The goal of this message was also to build support for the ongoing, intrusive search for Morris. If the public knew he killed innocent African-American citizens as well as police, they might be more inclined to tolerate the inconvenience of the police searches and traffic delays in their neighborhoods.

The chief also highlighted the massive large-scale law enforcement response in support of this manhunt. The TPD was being assisted by more than 15 local, regional, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, all of whom were dedicated to the capture and arrest of this armed and dangerous suspect. All efforts were being made to apprehend the suspect before anyone else was injured, and while the large operation would cause some disruptions, these disruptions were for residents’ own safety.

The mayor appealed to the community to support the police and a rapid resolution to this manhunt, praised the dedication of the police, and thanked the community for its donations and overwhelming support.

**7:00 PM**

**Press Conference: Incident Command Post.** The TPD chief visited the command post and announced a historic reward amount—$100,000 (provided by the Police Defense fund, Crime Stoppers, FOP, FDLE, FBI, and USMS)—for anonymous information leading to the location and arrest of Dontae Morris. She thanked the community and private donors for support and the law enforcement community for the reward amount. The chief gave information to the media representatives that the suspect may now have attempted to alter his appearance from previous photos. Finally, the chief thanked the Tampa community for the number of helpful tips on Morris's possible location and encouraged them to continue to be on the lookout for the suspect who was armed and dangerous. If they saw him, they were to call Crime Stoppers or 911.

The media summarized operations thus far. As the intense manhunt closed the second day, the *St. Petersburg Times* described Wednesday, June 30 as a “bristling show of force, but no arrest of the man wanted in the slaying of two Tampa police officers” (Mitchell, Wilmath, and Danielson 2010). Late Wednesday, scores of officers with assault rifles, police dogs, and an armored vehicle ringed the Kenneth Court Apartments complex (ibid.). The operation lasted more than three hours and included police officers, sheriff’s deputies, FBI agents, and the ATF. The chief was quoted saying, “[The officers] are just heartbroken [...] but we’re professionals and are going to do whatever it takes to place this cop-killer in custody. However long it takes, we’re going to keep up this effort and this intensity until Dontae Morris is under arrest” (ibid.). The chief shared a comment that indicated officers and investigators believed they had been close several times but that the suspect still eluded capture. The chief said, “With the amount of pressure that we have out in the community right now, that he can stay underground this long is very surprising to me. It indicates to me that he’s had assistance on more than one level” (ibid.).

**Thursday, July 1, 2010**

**Unified Command Response.** The chief’s suspicion that Dontae Morris was receiving assistance on more than one level was confirmed when Tampa police leadership received a confidential briefing that Morris had been receiving assistance from a TPD civilian employee, Carolyn Riggins, 45, a 10-year customer service representative in the Extra Duty Office, where businesses and community members go to hire off-duty officers as extra security. Apparently Riggins was the suspect’s aunt, and her daughter was an associate of Morris’s brother who was possibly hiding Morris. Information revealed that Riggins was working against the police and “fed information to the daughter and withheld the whereabouts of people officers were looking for” (Mitchell 2010). According to records subsequently released to the media, “Riggins gave inside information to associates of Morris” that revealed investigative and tracking techniques and withheld information that “potentially would have expedited capture of the suspects and prevented fear of further violence to police officers or citizens” (ibid.).

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12. On July 7, 2010, Carolyn Riggins, a 10-year TPD civilian employee was suspended for providing inside information to associates of Dontae Morris that helped the suspect avoid arrest.
Community Contributions. A local radio station, WQYK, brought an empty trailer, which allowed officers at the command post to keep food and water cool and out of the Tampa heat and persistent rain. A number of community organizations donated coolers and ice machines as well. The donations were growing as the community mobilized to support the police during the extraordinary demands of the extended manhunt.

Approximately 11:00 AM

Press Conference: Incident Command Post. A press conference with the chief, mayor, and sheriff was held to provide the public with an update on the manhunt. The sheriff named Morris as a suspect in a murder in the county jurisdiction. The chief restated that Morris was a suspect in a Kenneth Court Apartments murder and prime suspect in at least one other murder. The chief also reinforced that all of the victims were African American.

2:00–5:00 PM

The media director released images via a media alert of what Dontae Morris would look like with an altered appearance.

7:00 PM

TPD Memorial Ceremony and Press Event. On the third evening, the media were invited to view the formal engraving of the fallen officers’ names on the TPD Honor Memorial. Many community members and families laid bouquets and flowers at the police memorial in tribute to the fallen officers. A full complement of honor guards and multiple agencies participated in this sacred ceremony. Vice President Joe Biden, who was visiting Florida, made a public statement supporting police officers and encouraged communities to come together during this tragic loss.

Due to this planned event, it was impossible to hold an evening briefing. The TPD chief and mayor spoke with the media and focused on the fallen officers. The benefit of inviting the media was that the memorial ceremony took the focus off the manhunt and put it on the department honoring its fallen officers.

Friday, July 2, 2010

By the fourth day, cooperation and enthusiasm from the media were starting to wane. The manhunt was still active, and new resources were being added, but there was no new information suitable for public release. Much of the manhunt was being driven by confidential informants, undercover officers, and investigators. This information was compartmentalized and shared only on an absolute need-to-know basis (TPD was particularly sensitive now that a TPD employee had been sharing information with the suspect).

The media director stayed at incident command with the chief. The assistant PIO was sent to the church early, at 8 AM Friday morning, to meet with the TPD funeral team and church personnel to plan media coverage of the wake. A large flatbed truck was brought in for the media area. This would contain media to one location for the events, so that their presence would be less intrusive. Arrangements were made for video cameras in the church for the funeral the following day. The media director responded to the church after 11 AM, briefing at incident command to meet with representatives of every media outlet. They walked the media’s cable run for camera location in the church, live outdoor locations, and live truck locations. Clear roles were established to ensure respect for grieving officers and family members. Arrangements for the next day were made for the live cameras inside to move to scaffolding outside after the funeral, so they could also feed live footage of the outside police ceremony. It was important for the public to see the officers honored as heroes by the law enforcement community.

11:00 AM

Press Conference: Incident Command Post. A press conference was held with the chief and mayor. No new information was presented. This press conference was driven by media questions, for which the chief and mayor were prepared and ready to answer.

3:00–4:00 PM

The media were invited to cover the honor guard at the church. They interviewed members of the honor guard, which provided the media with interviews to accompany the footage of the wake. This would
eliminate the need for the media to approach people entering the church for the wake. These interviews were designed to further protect the privacy of the grieving officers and family members.

6:00 PM

_Wake for Officers Curtis and Kocab_. Press members could make visuals and passively listen, but no sound recording was permitted. Personal reflections and testimonials included a special honor guard recalling that Officer Curtis had been a proud member of the TPD Honor Guard and had just returned from the National Police Memorial in Washington, D.C., where TPD Corporal Michael Roberts’ name was etched after having been killed on duty in August 2009, less than one year prior to the current manhunt and double homicide of police officers.

10:15 PM

_Underized Command Response_. Dontae Morris turned himself in to TPD officers at his attorney’s office (Mitchell, Thalji, George, and Danielson 2010). An announcement over radio communications was made, notifying all active manhunt personnel.

11:00 PM

_Press Conference: TPD HQ_. The TPD chief, the Tampa mayor, and other high-ranking officials held a press conference at TPD headquarters, announcing the surrender of Dontae Morris. Limited details were released. The tone of the news conference established that the community was safe, that justice would be served, and that the officers could be laid to rest with proper respect and no distraction of the manhunt.

**Saturday, July 3, 2010**

7:00 AM

_Underized Command Response_. The command post at 50th Street was deactivated.

8:00 AM

Pre-selected officers met at a media staging area to provide personal portraits of the fallen officers to the media.

9:00 AM

The chief, mayor, and sheriff met with the media in the staging area at the church. The decision was made to hold this briefing as a result of Morris’s capture. This provided the chief with the opportunity to thank supporting law enforcement agencies and the public. She also provided a few more details of Morris’s capture. After this briefing, journalists were informed that all media contact would cease to allow time for mourning. There would be no more media releases through the holiday weekend.

10:00 AM

_Funerals_. The funeral services for Officers Curtis and Kocab began. The TPD set up a separate media location to assist in its management throughout the funeral proceedings. The HCSO provided patrol officers and dispatchers to TPD headquarters to relieve on-duty personnel, so they could participate in the funeral. Law enforcement personnel previously posted at the command post also provided traffic control to allow TPD members to attend the funerals of the fallen officers.
Implementation of the Incident Command System

Communities have to respond to large-scale events and unexpected mass-casualty incidents, such as forest fires, earthquakes, plane crashes, terrorism bombings, or large-scale manhunts, that far exceed their capacity to preserve public safety. The response is supplemented by mutual aid and multiple jurisdictions. The challenge has been to manage various resources effectively and not further complicate a confusing emergency. A common system that organizes multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional efforts can help when responding to an emergency.

What is ICS?

The Incident Command System (ICS) “is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazard incident management concept [that] allows its users to adopt an integrated organizational structure to match the complexities and demands of single or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries” (FEMA 2008). ICS was originally developed in the 1970s to fix and mitigate management, coordination, and communication deficiencies in emergency incident response that were identified after massive wildfires in California.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began rethinking its approach to domestic security and emergency management on a massive scale. As a result, billions of new federal grant dollars began to flow into states and localities to address preparedness and prevention needs in the realm of homeland security and emergency management. These grants are building new capabilities and providing the opportunity for ICS to organize large-scale emergency responses. ICS is the core command and management organizational structure under the National Incident Management System (NIMS). (For more information on ICS, see Appendix C.)

Background

The Tampa region has 16 public safety jurisdictions that currently hold a voice-over Internet protocol, multi-agency (P-25 compliant), interoperable communications capability (TPD 2010b). Multi-jurisdictional mutual aid occurs regularly in the region. Tampa has recent experience in ICS and unified command structures, as it hosted Super Bowl XLIII in 2009, an event accompanied with a significant terrorist prevention requirement (ibid.). This event demanded extensive planning, capacity building, and coordinating among all levels and jurisdictions of law enforcement, as modeled under NIMS and applied with grants requiring the use of ICS. Every law enforcement agency accepting federal grants for local capability building and technology acquisition had to agree to be trained in and use ICS in managing complex operations.

Law enforcement’s NIMS training, technology acquisition, command post simulations, and full-field exercises for the Super Bowl required more than two years’ effort. During that time, law enforcement built relationships with the entire regional community. In addition, the Tampa Regional Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) made collective investments, exceeding $31 million in federal grants, to acquire interoperable radio communications systems and infrastructure. The UASI systems included the following:

- COP-Link. Organizes data to provide tactical-, strategic-, and command-level users with access to shared data in single or multiple consolidated repositories
- Site Profiler. Implements risk-management approaches for critical infrastructure protection
- E-Teams for Emergency Operations Center. Provide a common operating picture and resource management tool for emergency response
- E-Sponder. Manages incidents and tracks leads electronically
- Avalex. Airborne system provides street maps, electronic markers, tracking systems, and infrared TV/video recordings
- Voice-Over IP. Provides interoperable radio communications

13. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) was issued on March 1, 2004 and mandated that any state or locality that received such funding from DHS/FEMA must use NIMS to respond to emergencies.

14. These systems were employed throughout the Tampa manhunt to great effect.
The interoperable radio system is a collection of voice-over programmable technologies with “open architecture” for the entire Tampa Bay UASI. This region-wide capacity building required local, regional, state, and federal law enforcement to provide common operating policies, exercise together, and develop a strong sense of mutual respect and appreciation for integrated emergency support under NIMS. This investment in technology, communications, and training in ICS implementation provided the foundation from which TPD could build a unified command and ICS structure to manage the developing situation of an open-ended manhunt.

Summary of Lessons Learned

For the purposes of this report, CNA Analysis & Solutions defined lessons learned as knowledge and experience, whether positive or negative, derived from actual incidents, such as the manhunt analyzed in this report. The documentation and organization of the lessons learned follow the analysis of the ICS structure TPD implemented during the incident. (To examine how TPD implemented ICS, see Figure 1 on page 2.) The ICS branches TPD utilized are as follows:

- Command
- Operations
- Planning
- Logistics and Finance/Administration
- Intelligence and Investigations

The ICS structure is further broken down by function area. CNA developed these function areas as a means to organize the lessons learned based on the primary activity conducted within the ICS structure. Table 1 on page 25 provides each function area description. The lessons learned are not listed by priority but rather are organized according to TPD’s ICS branches.
Table 1. ICS branches and function area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICS Branch</th>
<th>Function Area</th>
<th>Function Area Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Command post management</td>
<td>Command post management includes establishing a unified command, managing overall command during a response, and maintaining relationships with external partners and agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On-site command and control</td>
<td>On-site command and control includes the ability for personnel to maintain control at the scene or incident command post location. This function includes activities like establishing a perimeter and communications systems. In addition, this function also includes maintaining situational awareness among the responders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>The public information officer (PIO) plays a large role, working with the chief to develop a strategy for the release of information to manage the media, so as to protect the investigation and grieving process and build community support for the agency and its actions. Throughout this incident, the role of the PIO included not only keeping the public informed but also involving the community in the search for the suspect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Law enforcement operations</td>
<td>Law enforcement operations include all aspects of the operational response in an incident. In this case, it primarily included the use of tactical teams like SWAT and the Rapid Offender Control (ROC) squad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Funeral planning</td>
<td>Funeral planning included the logistical planning for the two officers who had been shot and killed. It is important to note that in this case (and most cases like this) parallel planning occurs simultaneously with the search of the suspect.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leads tracking</td>
<td>Leads tracking throughout this incident was a primary function. Because the identity of the suspect was established early in the response, the case did not revolve around trying to identify the suspect; instead, it focused on where the suspect was located.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics and Finance/Administration</td>
<td>Resource management</td>
<td>Resource management includes the logistics and distribution of the resources brought forth by partnering agencies and community organizations. These resources included personnel, portable bathrooms and showers, and trash pickup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donations management</td>
<td>Donations management handles donations received by non-law enforcement partners and community businesses and groups, including money, food, and resources such as tents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Investigations**</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence and investigations were implemented as separate ICS branches throughout this incident. This was done to ensure that any intelligence information gathered was available only to those authorized. The officers for these branches made sure to include themselves in all command briefs, which allowed de-confliction of information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* It is important to plan media logistics and clearly communicate to media management, so as to ensure that the media act with respect during a funeral.

** TPD’s intelligence and investigations branches (grouped together in this table) were not extensively reviewed and analyzed in this report due to the pending capital trial.
**ICS: Command**

The ICS command branch is the main purview of incident/unified command and includes oversight of the public information message via the public information officer (PIO) and oversight of the interagency coordination process via the liaison officers of the supporting departments and outside agencies.

**Command Post Management**

**Lesson Learned:**

TPD responded and implemented the initial stages of ICS within minutes of their arrival to the crime scene.

**Discussion.** The officers, supervisors, and commanders that initially responded to the scene automatically established command to manage the crime scene, the suspect, the search, and the location of witnesses, as would be expected in any police incident crime scene response (TPD 2010b). The first responding officers assumed the initial incident command roles by setting up an initial perimeter, reviewing the videotape in the police cruiser to identify the suspects, beginning the canine search for the suspects, and collecting evidence (ibid.). ICS is inherently a first-on-scene system whereby the first responder has charge of the scene until the incident has been resolved or until a superior officer arrives, is fully briefed, and takes command. In the Tampa incident, the responding lieutenant remained as the de facto incident commander until the chief arrived on scene (ibid.). After the chief arrived, however, the lieutenant maintained leadership of the immediate operations. Once the TPD assistant chief arrived, the chief was then quickly superseded and relinquished incident command (ibid.).

The first-arriving officer took initiative and implemented ICS rather than waiting for a superior officer to arrive, actions that were essential in generating a regional response and beginning the search for the suspect.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies conduct training and exercises focusing on the initial, seamless implementation of ICS. Even for small-scale incidents, basic ICS should be implemented. Doing so will ensure that the responding agencies will know what ICS procedures to follow when responding to a similar incident and how to integrate another jurisdiction’s overall operations.

**Lesson Learned:**

The quick arrival of HCSO leadership at the crime scene allowed a seamless transition into a unified command.

**Discussion.** Because the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office’s (HCSO) assets were intimately involved with the initial search (both canine and air support units), and because HCSO deployed its mobile command post to the incident scene, it was natural for the incident to transition to a unified command between TPD and HCSO.

Once it became clear that the suspect would not be apprehended in the initial canine search and in following and investigating the natural initial leads (e.g., his residence and the residence of his family members), it was necessary for the unified command to expand the initial compact structure of the incident command into a larger structure that would allow the integration of other law enforcement personnel; assets; and analytical, surveillance, and tactical capabilities.

Years prior, the HCSO sheriff and TPD chief had agreed to combine their policies in operations, arrests, use of force, and crime scene management (HCSO 2010). These common policies aided in the integration of law enforcement into blended, effective teams. A critical incident and emergency response is not the time to be making introductions. The lesson learned is that trust-relationships need to be established through carefully planned joint exercises and training in common procedures. When law enforcement agencies are under the stress of a real-world emergency, previous investment in exercises provides a basis to implement ICS as a natural structure.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies conduct training and exercises that focus on the implementation of unified command. Doing so will ensure that the responding agencies will know the procedures that should be followed to ensure a seamless transition to a unified command.
Implementation of the Incident Command System

Lesson Learned:
The ICS structure employed for this incident was both adaptable and responsive to the changing needs of the incident.

Discussion. The ICS structure employed consisted of a unified command with a staff that included the PIO, the liaison officers from participating support agencies, and a general staff grouped into six sections—planning (which was divided in two: funeral services and leads tracking), operations (SWAT/ROC), investigations, intelligence, and logistics and finance/administration.

After the first day, the planning section for funeral services and honor memorials for Officers Curtis and Kocab transitioned into its own incident command at the church where the services took place and where HCSO provided another mobile command center (TPD 2010b). The manhunt command post, across the street from where the officers were shot, focused solely on the apprehension of the suspect and, to a lesser extent, his associates. For a visual of the ICS structure TPD implemented, see Figure 1 on page 2.

By employing such an organizational structure, the unified command allowed the efficient integration of investigatory, analytical, surveillance, and tactical operations assets from other assisting agencies. Because liaison officers from these agencies were also present at incident command with the unified command and general staff, optimal decisions could be made for the appropriate use of external assets. For a list of contributing law enforcement agencies according to role and the types of assets they employed in the manhunt, see Appendix D.

Recommendation. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies review ICS and examine the ways in which it can be used in a variety of incidents. Doing so will allow agencies to better understand the flexibility of ICS and its components.

Lesson Learned:
Pre-existing relationships with local and federal agencies facilitated their quick response and efficient integration into the ICS structure.

Discussion. A number of the interviewees noted that the most important aspect behind the success of the response to this incident was the well-established relationships between TPD, local, state, and federal law enforcement departments and agencies (TPD 2010b). This incident allowed responding agencies to further cement the relationships they have built through long-standing mutual efforts of support, aid, and common training initiatives. In the few cases where TPD may not have worked with particular departments and agencies before, they were quickly able to establish relationships and use the additional support. For example, TPD had not previously worked with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) in a real-world incident or exercise (ibid.). However, TPD and ATF personnel had spoken to each other throughout the course of normal day-to-day operations, allowing both entities to work together quickly and respond when the need arose (ibid.). ATF ultimately provided support to the HCSO tactical operational efforts of the response (ATF 2010). As noted by interviewees, establishing new relationships should not be happening during an incident (TPD 2010b).

Recommendation. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies and their partners continue to cement these relationships and engage in continual activities such as training and exercises. In addition, CNA recommends conducting joint operations and joint planning among jurisdictions to build multi-agency and regional cooperation.

Lesson Learned:
The Critical Incident Stress Management unit provided vital mental health services to the officers in need.

Discussion. The stress, turmoil, and grief of having a fellow police officer killed in the line of duty can often be detrimental to incident response. These natural reactions, especially from those who are close to the fallen officers, will require support systems immediately and throughout the course of recovery. The ability of a police department to provide the needed support systems while not depleting operations is essential to ensuring that their officers are physically, psychologically, and emotionally cared for.

During this incident, TPD was able to provide their officers with access to the Critical Incident Stress
Management (CISM) unit, which is available region-wide and staffed by volunteer, multi-jurisdiction public safety personnel who are specifically trained in mental health (TPD 2010b). TPD mandates debriefing for those employees (e.g., officers and dispatchers) directly involved. The TPD chief attended the debriefing with squad members and those first on the scene (ibid.). The CISM unit arrived at the hospital and was able to provide support to the officers who needed their services. In addition to the CISM unit, TPD provided chaplains to the officers who desired additional support (ibid.). Also important to note is that CISM assisted with the funeral preparations as well (ibid.). In this case, it was especially important for TPD to be cognizant of all needs during the incident.

**Recommendation.** Having support systems activated and ready for use will assist in recovery from the incident. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies employ these support systems in similar incidents.

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**Lesson Learned:**

TPD quickly determined who should report to the hospital, facilitating continuity of leadership during the subsequent response.

**Discussion.** It is often difficult for police chiefs and assistant chiefs to determine who is going to respond to the scene and who is going to respond to the hospital when one of their officers has been shot in the line of duty. The ability of the chief to assign his or her assistant chiefs quickly to a responding location allows successful continuity in the response. In the case of this incident, when notified, both assistant chiefs called the chief (TPD 2010b). The chief quickly assigned one of her assistant chiefs to the scene to lead the multi-agency search for the suspect and the other to the hospital to console fellow members of the department and the families of the fallen (ibid.). If the chief had not made these assignments quickly, one end of the response likely would have struggled in the attempt to carry on without the required leadership.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies implement these procedures during similar incidents and consider making this procedure policy, if it’s not already included in their plans. It is also imperative that the chief communicates his or her actions to the assistant chiefs so that everyone has real-time information on status and actions.

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**Lesson Learned:**

TPD kept command leadership informed by providing incident information in periodic situational briefs.

**Discussion.** Situational briefs play an important part in keeping the command-level personnel aware of all the activities occurring simultaneously throughout the response. These briefs provide leadership with essential information, such as updates on leads tracked, background information, and resources logged. This information is essential in helping leadership determine what their next steps in the response will be. The duration and scale of this incident reinforced the need for a unified command. Situational briefs between outgoing and incoming shift commanders were important for the continuity of operations and occurred before and after every 12-hour shift (TPD 2010b). In addition, a number of situational briefs (about every eight hours or so) were conducted to keep branch officers and fellow supervisors aware of how the response was progressing. Interviewees noted the importance in recording and documenting these situational briefs for future events (ibid.). The TPD chief e-mailed operational briefs daily to keep the entire department aware of the developments. Keeping everyone informed will eliminate potential communication issues among decision makers and will ensure that all aspects of the response are addressed (ibid.).

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies conduct situational briefs when there is a shift in command and, in future real-world incidents and exercises, document these situational briefs so that individuals not present during a brief can gain awareness. CNA also recommends that law enforcement agencies keep a record of how a response progresses in case past events are brought into question or for use as a learning tool in the future. Keeping all employees briefed daily is important for the health of the organization.
Lesson Learned:

The command of the incident naturally migrated into a unified command structure between TPD and HCSO, which previous joint training and exercises aided.

Discussion. In an incident where multiple departments and agencies are involved, establishing a unified command is essential to maintain control of the response. Command of this incident naturally migrated into a unified command structure between TPD and HCSO. A total of 22 agencies provided support and played an important role in the response to the incident (TPD 2010b). The ICS structure is required training, providing a familiar organization into which multiple agencies could transition. (For a list of the agencies that provided support throughout the incident, see Appendix B.)

The major agencies throughout the incident were TPD and HCSO. This was partially due to the fact that, although the scene of the crime occurred within TPD jurisdictional lines, it was close to the Hillsborough county line. Moreover, both departments have a longstanding working relationship; in addition to training with each other during the Gasparilla Parade and Super Bowl XLIII, these two departments respond to incidents as partners on many day-to-day operations. Previous joint training allowed them to use preparation for pre-planned events for future unplanned events (TPD 2010b).

Because of training and previously cemented relationships, TPD officers found themselves taking command of the incident from the HCSO’s mobile command unit. HCSO’s mobile command unit was the first to arrive at the command post (TPD 2010b). TPD used HCSO’s unit as a command post and later used their own unit to stage investigatory resources, like managing the leads coming in from tips.

Recommendation. The ability for TPD and HCSO to move swiftly to a unified command was critical in this incident. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies build upon relationships with neighboring agencies and departments by continuing to conduct joint training, exercises, planning sessions, and meetings specifically focused on the implementation and use of unified command under ICS.

Lesson Learned:

Balancing the search and investigation operations with the ongoing, day-to-day police operations was difficult because all officers wished to be part of the manhunt operations.

Discussion. Being able to conduct the search for a suspect and maintain day-to-day operations is often difficult for chiefs and assistant chiefs to accomplish. Balancing both aspects is vital for maintaining continuity of operations, but this balance was often difficult to gain during this incident, especially because a number of officers were emotionally affected by the loss of their comrades (TPD 2010b). Adding to this difficulty, a rapid influx of officers came to the scene and hospital within hours of the incident from their off-duty or neighboring departments to provide assistance. Command staff must be able to determine where additional aids are needed and where their resources can be best utilized.

In this particular incident, a number of officers who assigned themselves to the scene recognized the need for assistance within the command post. For example, one officer arrived at the command post with her K-9 ready to conduct a search on-site (TPD 2010b). After about an hour or two, it became apparent that there was a need for someone to take on the logistical management of the command post. She decided to take on this role and recruited other officers to assist her (ibid.). Quick decisions like this by supervisory-level officers assisted in meeting this balance.

On the other end of this response is the need to maintain normal day-to-day calls for police service. Most of the officers on duty can have a personal attachment and want either to be at the scene or out searching for the suspect. The reality is, however, that supervisors and chiefs need officers to attend to their normal day-to-day duties; yet supervisors and chiefs need to keep these officers informed about the progress of the incident so that they, too, feel involved.

A single agency can redirect its resources to surge for one shift, but sustaining the surge into several days can exhaust the agency’s reserve. Accordingly, balancing calls for service with special operations requires an infusion of additional resources in mutual aid modes. ICS is necessary if the community is to be protected.
Recommendation. CNA recommends that in similar incidents law enforcement agencies consider balancing both aspects of response. CNA also suggests law enforcement agencies follow similar actions when conducting exercise operations, because managing those officers attending the exercise and those conducting normal operations can often be difficult.

Lesson Learned: The first 12 hours were the most taxing and dynamic, making it essential to stabilize ICS and establish and maintain an operational tempo.

Discussion. In an incident where the duration is unknown, it is important to establish and stabilize an operational tempo as quickly as possible. In the incident that occurred at TPD, everyone suspected, based on experience, that the suspect would be arrested within an hour or two; in reality, the incident dragged on for 96 hours. Many personnel stayed on scene for 18–24 hours, becoming fatigued (TPD 2010b). During the initial four hours, without a planning branch, little attention was devoted to sustaining the operational rhythm and implementing a formal ICS (ibid.). Once TPD realized that the incident was going to last longer than previously thought, establishing a sustainable operational tempo became the first priority (ibid.). Doing so allowed these agencies to set up its ICS and organize response assets more quickly.

Experience reveals that demobilizing ICS after 1–2 hours is easier than building it in after an incident has reached full operational mode. A number of interviewees noted the importance of the first 12 hours in response to an incident and how this time period can directly impact the continued response in a long, drawn-out incident (TPD 2010b). Instituting a day and a night shift allowed incident command staff to organize personnel and guarantee that their staff members were not over-worked. This, however, proved difficult at times. Officers were often emotionally invested and reluctant to leave the search to return home. Resources like the mobile bedrooms and bathrooms, which Polk Fire Department and HCSO provided, respectively, were essential and gave the officers who would not or could not return home a place to rest and regain energy (POLK 2010; HCSO 2010).

Recommendation. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies focus more organizational efforts on getting ICS up and running smoothly within the first couple of hours, even if the event or incident is not expected to last past one or two hours.

On-Site Command and Control

Lesson Learned: The recently purchased UASI 800-MHz radio communications system provided critical interoperable communications among all agencies present throughout the incident.

Discussion. Until 2009, law enforcement agencies such as TPD and other departments within the region operated on multiple frequency bands and disparate systems for radio communications, making interoperable communications between responding agencies difficult.15 TPD, in particular, operated on a conventional ultra high frequency (UHF) radio system that was not compatible with either the Hillsborough or Pinellas County 800-MHz communication systems (TPD 2010b). The inability to communicate with neighboring jurisdictions during a critical incident can greatly hinder response to a multi-jurisdictional emergency.

In 2007, the City of Tampa solicited a bid for an 800-MHz communication system to replace their UHF system. Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) funds were granted, and TPD was able to begin transitioning to the new communications systems in 2009. After this transition, TPD had direct interoperability with all agencies operating on 800-MHz through the conventional mutual aid channels and access to multiple talk-groups on the Hillsborough County trunked system (Tampa Region UASI Administrator 2010; see also Appendix F).

The manhunt was the first real-world emergency in which TPD utilized the full capability of this system since its purchase (TPD 2010b). This system was not completely operational in 2009, and, therefore, TPD was unable to test the systems during Super Bowl XLIII. Although TPD was able to communicate during the manhunt with HCSO and other neighboring law enforcement agencies directly, there were a couple

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15. The Tampa region jointly planned to build interoperable communications with UASI grants. This joint law enforcement planning laid the foundation for ICS and unified command.
entities that they initially had trouble communicating with, including federal agencies, the Lakeland Police Department, and Polk County Sheriff’s Office (LPD 2010; POLK 2010).

TPD was able to provide each of these entities with one of their radios or with a liaison who had direct communication with TPD. In total, TPD lent out 12 radios, six to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and six to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) (TPD 2010b). This allowed most, if not all, agencies to have a basic means to communicate with each other throughout the manhunt. In addition to handing over radios to federal, state, and local partners, TPD kept a cache of backup batteries and battery chargers at the command post (ibid.). This allowed the response personnel to have working radios at all times and proved essential to maintaining communications throughout the extended response duration.

After the incident was resolved, TPD discovered that they had forgotten and not used a regional cache of radios that was available. TPD noted that this additional cache of radios would be utilized in future events and incidents. (TPD 2010b)

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies jointly plan to build regional inter-operability communication to facilitate large-scale ICS. In addition, CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies conduct full inventories of all of the communications resources available.

**Lesson Learned:**

TPD quickly established a perimeter and conducted search operations.

**Discussion.** After rendering aid to the injured, setting up a suspect containment perimeter is perhaps one of the most important initial actions first responders on the scene can do. Within minutes of the incident, an initial perimeter was established (TPD 2010b). TPD worked with state agencies to establish traffic closures and with the media to announce these closures on the news. Upon the incident commander’s arrival, a larger, more-secure perimeter was established; a more-defined perimeter in all directions surrounding the scene was quickly established (ibid.).

Within minutes of the relay of the incident via communication channels, a number of officers assigned themselves to the scene and were prepared to assist in the search. Command staff posted officers around the perimeter and established vehicle and foot-patrol teams to search the perimeter. (TPD 2010b)

In addition, TPD quickly brought K-9 search teams onto the scene in hopes that one of the K-9s would pick up the suspect’s scent and lead them to his location (TPD 2010b). Providing support to these K-9 teams were HCSO and TPD helicopters, powered with Avalex systems (HCSO 2010). The Avalex systems, like the 800-MHz radio systems, were purchased using USAI funds and allowed officers in the air to assist and provide backup to the K-9 teams on the ground and transmit the video to the command post, providing situational awareness. It is important to note that it was still night out when the incident began, and these systems were essential in getting a complete picture by reading heat signatures of the search area, ensuring the safety of the officers on the ground.

In addition to providing TPD with helicopter support, HCSO also assisted by providing detailed maps of the perimeter area from their command post (HCSO 2010). These maps divided the area into detailed grids, which allowed the K-9 search teams to conduct more systematic searches within the established perimeter. HCSO also brought in patrol units to help relieve TPD officers on traffic control (ibid.).

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies employ these tactics and ensure that suspect identification photos or detailed descriptions are provided to perimeter checkpoints to facilitate quick vehicle checks. Agencies can also conduct additional training and exercises where these methods of perimeter management, search, and containment are tested.

**Lesson Learned:**

Officers were not always aware of the operations being undertaken; as a result, downward and horizontal situational awareness among all responders needs to be improved.

**Discussion.** Although situational awareness among ICS commanders and branch officers was consistent, the same cannot be said for downward and horizontal
situational awareness to the first responders. Interviewees noted a number of reasons for lack of shared situational awareness; for example, there was increased concern over the possibility of information leaking into the community and making the suspect aware of police operations (TPD 2010b). This was due to the fact that officers communicated via public radio channels, which allowed the media to listen in.

Due to these concerns, many police personnel were unintentionally left out of the loop of information sharing. In some instances, the shift commanders of street operations were not briefed by their supervisors and therefore were unable to pass along operational updates to their officers on the street; patrol officers often reported seeing convoys of SWAT moving through their districts without any knowledge of the target areas (TPD 2010b).

Although there was concern over keeping information close on the status of the search for the suspect, a number of interviewees noted that this lack of downward and horizontal communication could have hindered the response. In addition, TPD underutilized a number of units. Although there were additional resources available throughout the response, the lack of communication on the status of operational missions often caused the missions to be under resourced. (TPD 2010b)

Recommendation. Although the concerns of officers at the command post are legitimate, TPD and all law enforcement agencies alike should consider additional means of communicating updates and situational briefs to the entire responding police force. One way TPD and other law enforcement agencies can ensure this occurs is to have shift commanders and command branch officers arrange alternate locations to brief personnel, like TPD headquarters. Other means would be to relay updates via phone or radio. CNA recommends structuring briefs to include all levels of command, from the incident commander and branch officers to the officers on the street (undercover and deep-cover), which is critical in maintaining situational awareness among responders.

Media

Lesson Learned:
The TPD PIO’s strategy of humanizing the officers killed and making the community aware of the suspect’s past criminal history helped gain community support in the search for the suspect.

Discussion. The media were a means of reaching across the Tampa community. A number of interviewees noted that having and distributing a good message to the public was important in creating a sense of community and common cause (TPD 2010b). TPD followed up the initial press release and gave the public general information with a more in-depth and detailed press release given by the chief (ibid.). This press release initially developed this sense of community and focused on the actions that the suspect had taken.

These press releases were coordinated with the PIO, chief, and, at times, the mayor. The TPD PIO helped guide the strategy behind each press release (TPD PIO 2010). Initially, a number of press releases were conducted, each with additional information provided, as the response went on; the press releases focused on the on-going efforts and increased determination of the police department to catch the suspect. These press releases also continued to build on the sense of community and common cause. TPD, in particular, accomplished this by showing the community that not only had the suspect shot and killed police officers but that he was also wanted for shooting and killing fellow community members (ibid.). This strategy allowed the community and officers to join in the common cause of capturing the suspect.

Recommendation. Although this aspect of the response was well-executed, CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies continue to train and conduct exercises for participants in its public information system strategy. In addition, CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies include a media strategy within their plans and procedures.
Lesson Learned:

Locating the media too close to the command post can often compromise the integrity of sensitive operational information.

Discussion. Almost all interviewees agreed that the location of the media were too close to the command post, which was located in a vacant auto auction parking lot; the media were located just outside this area, and press release was located just inside this location (TPD 2010b). This proximity often caused concern regarding the integrity of the response operations and situational briefs. In particular, interviewees noted that TPD could have placed the command post in a location that was more secure and that the media should not have been allowed to be so close (ibid.).

The concern over what the media were seeing and hearing caused issues in command staff communication. For example, law enforcement officers communicated with each other via radio on public channels (TPD 2010b). This allowed the media to monitor and sometimes respond to a scene prior to SWAT. The PIO had to call the media, demanding they leave the area due to safety concerns and interfering with the investigation (TPD PIO 2010). Because of this concern, command staff did not always communicate situational briefs outside of the mobile command post (TPD 2010b). As a result, not all who should have been updated in the situational briefs were, as updates were not always relayed down to shift commanders and officers on patrol.

The public message is facilitated by the media, and sensitivity needs to be given to what they need to access. Planning for a joint information center (JIC), separate from the command post, could engage media constructively before a critical incident. The media became limited partners in informing the public.

Recommendation. CNA recommends that police leadership design a strategy to separate the location of official police department briefings from media director briefings. In addition, because media can listen to police radio communications, it may be productive to establish a police pool camera at active scenes to satisfy the media's need to follow law enforcement officers to scenes while simultaneously protecting the investigation.

ICS: Operations

In general, the operations branch of ICS includes all tactical activities in the pursuit of incident objectives. A principle of unified command is that all information is shared openly; this principle applies to natural and man-made disasters. Police work, on the other hand, often involves significant risks to public and personal safety, or it is required to keep some investigative techniques and process highly compartmentalized. For example, in investigatory or intelligence work, it is not possible to fully disclose tactical operations in a law enforcement context. Therefore, for this incident, the operations section was solely responsible for the coordination and execution of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and hostage rescue team (HRT) tactical operations, while other undercover tactical operations remained under the close hold of the intelligence and investigations sections. To avoid conflicts and duplicate actions that might compromise operations or officer safety, the intelligence and investigations commanders were part of unified command and served only to assess and de-conflict leads and deployments.

Law Enforcement Operations

Lesson Learned:

The SWAT teams blended quickly and conducted successful, highly coordinated operations, building on previous joint training.

Discussion. Oftentimes, utilizing SWAT members from different agencies and departments can create confusion and a lack of cohesion. This was not the case for Tampa's incident. Federal and local teams from a number of different agencies and departments worked exceptionally well together (TPD 2010b). TPD strategically blended the SWAT teams to create optimal effectiveness and efficiency by breaking them into two 12-hour shifts. TPD integrated TPD SWAT members with SWAT personnel from outside jurisdictions to maintain sustainability, area knowledge, and objectivity/emotional detachment (TPD 2010b). Although SWAT teams have minor differences in procedures, they all have the same operational tactics when it comes down to basics (ibid.). This enables SWAT teams in other jurisdictions to adapt...
TPD’s procedures quickly. One method to achieving this quick integration was the use of plain language. Avoiding the use of specific terminology and nine or ten codes ensured that everyone understood what was being communicated. This also ensured the safety of all SWAT team members.

TPD blended the SWAT teams into the following groups (TPD 2010d):

▪ Polk County and Lakeland County SWAT Teams
▪ TPD and TTPD SWAT Teams
▪ HCSO and ATF SWAT Teams
▪ Florida Fish and Game and FBI/TPD SWAT Teams

In addition to pairing the SWAT teams strategically, extensive training and exercises with the involved entities assisted in successful implementation. Training and exercises occur several times a year, creating opportunities for all members of SWAT to get to know each other and their differing procedures and to develop a level of professional confidence in training together. (TPD 2010b)

Recommendation. Although the blending of SWAT teams proved a success, TPD should stress additional training and maintenance of relationships with surrounding jurisdictions and state and federal agencies. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies build and maintain its relationships and communications with all local SWAT teams. CNA also recommends that law enforcement agencies and neighboring jurisdictions conduct joint training and joint planning at least once a year.

Lesson Learned:

Electronically documenting SWAT team deployments made tracking the location of and gaps in tactical resources easier.

Discussion. A couple of different methods are used to track SWAT team deployments and were used throughout the duration of the incident. Not all methods were equally successful. Initially, command staff used whiteboards to document the deployment and location of SWAT team assignments (TPD 2010b). Although this provided a quick method of tracking where all SWAT team members were located at a given time and allowed everyone in the command post to gain awareness, fellow personnel often found themselves leaning up against the whiteboards and unintentionally erasing information posted (ibid.). This often caused confusion and a need to communicate with the SWAT team to get their status and location. Because this quickly became an issue, command SWAT team members developed an Excel spreadsheet as a means to electronically track SWAT team deployments and location, which eliminated the possibility of information begin erased by careless actions (ibid.). It also created a record of SWAT activities. (For an example of this Excel spreadsheet, see Appendix E.)

In addition, TPD eventually posted the spreadsheet onto E-Sponder, the department’s source for up-to-date information on leads (TPD 2010b). Specifically, E-Sponder (2008) is “a software solution that enables multiple first response entities to share critical information when collaborating in the preparation, response, resolution, and review processes associated with daily activities, events, and incidents.” The upload to E-Sponder allowed anyone with access to view the status and location of the SWAT teams. This essentially served as a formalized means of tactical management.

Recommendation. CNA recommends that TPD and all law enforcement agencies formalize this tracking procedure and upload and maintain any additional tracking methods to a common data-sharing system like E-Sponder.

ICS: Planning

In general, the planning section of an ICS structure is responsible for planning, collecting, and disseminating all information related to the successful completion of incident objectives and for updating objectives and incident action plans, as appropriate. As the initial events of this incident unfolded, two different objectives needed to be accomplished:

1. Proper honoring and burial of the slain officers
2. Use of public intelligence (tips) to track down the suspect systematically

Both of these functions fall broadly under the planning function of ICS and thus are included below.
Funeral Planning

Lesson Learned:

The use of a separate location for the media during the funeral provided both the families and colleagues of the fallen officers with privacy and respect while satisfying the needs of the media at the same time.

Discussion. Although TPD could not completely restrict the actions of the media during the manhunt operation, providing a separate location from which they could report proved beneficial during the funeral, serving as a means to keep the media out of the way and to ensure privacy for the family and friends of the fallen officers (TPD 2010b). Doing this allowed those who attended the service a time to mourn and ensured they did not have to deal with the media getting too close to the funeral for questions. This level of planning was critical to establishing the desired level of privacy.

Recommendation. CNA recommends that TPD strongly consider the use of a mobile joint information center to provide separation from the media in future incidents.

Lesson Learned:

TPD needed to support simultaneously the manhunt investigation and the families’ funeral-planning activities while publicly honoring the fallen officers.

Discussion. A concern for some TPD officers was the possibility of having to manage the diversion of resources, as the number of personnel out searching for the suspect would decrease while the funeral was being held (TPD 2010b). In this incident, the suspect turned himself in the night before the funeral, allowing the officers who had been searching for the suspect to attend the funeral.

Some interviewees noted that it would have been difficult assigning personnel to stay at the command post or out in the field and continue ongoing search tactics. The interviewees also cited how difficult it would be to make the decision of who could or could not attend the funeral. They even contemplated the possibility of conducting the funeral at a later date. However, interviewees noted that, although holding the funeral at a later date would allow the search for the suspect to continue unaffected, this would place undue burden on the families. Interviewees felt that attempting to achieve the balance of dealing with both aspects would be difficult. (TPD 2010b)

Prior to the funeral and the arrest of the suspect, command staff agreed that HCSO and other fellow neighboring police departments would step in and relieve most of the TPD personnel at the command post during the funeral (TPD 2010b). As the incident was resolved, HCSO was still able to assist TPD in the break down and deactivation of the command post so that TPD officers could attend the funeral (HCSO 2010).

Recommendation. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies review current plans, procedures, and mutual aid agreements regarding funeral planning and staffing. CNA also recommends that law enforcement agencies consider establishing a funeral-planning branch early in an incident and use volunteers and cadets for such planning.

Leads Tracking

Lesson Learned:

E-Sponder could have been implemented earlier to ensure the timely tracking and sharing of all information pertaining to the incident.

Discussion. Although TPD did not utilize E-Sponder from the beginning of the incident, it proved useful as the number of tips increased and the search for the suspect grew more imperative. Initially, the TPD communications center recorded the tips pertaining to the search on a whiteboard and then verbally relayed that information to personnel at the scene and later to the command post staff, who would then relay the information to the tactical teams (TPD 2010b). As the number of tips grew and the search for the suspect dragged on past the first day, it became clear that TPD had to use a different method of tracking and disseminating leads to patrol officers and the SWAT teams (ibid.).

16. E-Sponder (2008) “is highly customizable and can be easily expanded to fulfill specific event/incident management needs that may exceed the capacity of an organization’s daily tools.”
As this became apparent, TPD decided to use E-Sponder as a method to track the tips coming in. E-Sponder allowed personnel with access to document the actions taken on the tips, as well as the ability to go back and search the tips, reference the actions taken, and determine whether a tip was still open or resolved. A number of interviewees noted that, although E-Sponder proved useful, being able to activate such a system within the first hour of a similar incident would be nearly impossible without a pre-designed system (TPD 2010b). This is partially due to the fact that a number of other initial set-up actions and management methods are also occurring within that first hour. Interviewees noted that TPD would likely use a laptop or standalone system initially to track leads (ibid.). This would ensure that TPD tracks and records all leads prior to the use of E-Sponder.

At the end of the search for the suspect, TPD documented and tracked more than 400 tips on E-Sponder (TPD 2010b). It should be noted that 12 hours of initial leads were not captured in the E-Sponder database because they were called into dispatch rather than documented on E-Sponder.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that TPD continue to use E-Sponder, or a similar system, in future incidents. CNA also recommends that TPD continue to explore additional ways in which E-Sponder can be utilized in an emergency, such as tracking resources and personnel. Having this system up and running as soon as possible after an incident is essential for maintaining records and managing resources. In addition, CNA recommends that other law enforcement agencies examine ways in which systems like E-Sponder can assist in day-to-day operations, not just during extended police operations.

### ICS: Logistics and Finance

In a normal, pre-planned incident, separate logistics and finance/administration sections are generally employed to account for resources and facilities and for incident costs, respectively. Initially, in this incident, the unified command decided that there was no need to separate these functions, especially because the TPD Special Support Division oversees both in its normal day-to-day TPD activities. However, as the incident evolved, it became apparent that a dedicated logistics and finance/administration operation was required. Both logistics and financial/administration lessons learned will be addressed in this section.

### Resource Management

**Lesson Learned:**

Because this event was of unknown duration and not pre-planned, TPD did not use distinct logistics and finance/administration branches.

**Discussion.** All of these activities were combined into a single ICS branch that tracked assets and administratively accounted for personnel. After it became clear that outside help would be needed to provide for the logistical needs of the personnel on scene, the logistics and finance/administration branch used existing relationships and community ties to encourage the donation of food and drinks for personnel and to raise money to purchase logistical items that were drastically needed, such as tents, tarps, chairs, and coolers (TPD 2010b). Items originally reserved for hurricane response (such as the water bottles used the first day) were depleted, so, with a limited budget for incidents of extended duration, donations became essential to the response (ibid.). In addition, the second day brought rain, and resources like the tents and tarps were important for ensuring the officers had a dry place to eat and rest. Because most of the officers working on-scene were either assigned as part of their normal duties or were volunteering their hours, there was much less of an administrative need for these items as there normally is for planned public safety incidents (ibid.).

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies consider the alternate ways in which ICS can be implemented to best suit their needs in similar incidents. CNA also recommends that plans and procedures be established (if they’re not already in place) to manage logistically and financially incidents of long duration, particularly with regard to the sustainment of resources.
Lesson Learned:

Responding law enforcement agencies were quick to offer additional resources.

Discussion. Within the first couple of hours of the incident, a number of local, state, and federal personnel were responding to the scene or contacting the chief or assistant chiefs with requests to assist. Local agencies like HCSO, Lakeland City, and Polk County responded to the command post with staff, mobile command posts, and sleeping trailers (TPD 2010b). In addition, state agencies like FDLE provided assistance, forensics teams, and analysts (FDLE 2010). On the federal side, agencies like the FBI, ATF, and U.S. Marshals Service were at the command post within hours, ready to provide assistance and technical investigation support in any way possible (TPD 2010b). ATF in particular was holding training on the east coast when the incident occurred; within hours of hearing of the news in Tampa, they quickly self-assigned to the incident and provided much needed assistance (ATF 2010).

The support of these agencies provided TPD with much-needed assistance, particularly for tactical officers, squad officers, SWAT vehicles, and mobile command post vehicles and suspect tracking. These resources proved essential as the incident continued for several days. The chiefs made sure that any agency offering assistance was not turned away; rather it was reserved in case the incident dragged on longer than expected (TPD 2010b). Receiving additional support allowed TPD the option of relieving current resources. This was especially important in the third and fourth days, when TPD realized that it had to consider how to best continue the manhunt. TPD began to list alternative locations for their command posts and considered how to carry on staffing levels if the incident continued for another week. Luckily, as TPD began putting their plans onto paper, the suspect turned himself in and the manhunt came to an end.

In addition, FDLE had a robust surveillance capability to survey potential hideouts and associates of the suspect (FDLE 2010). The FBI volunteered to investigate financial leads and to look at cyber tracking the suspect, along with the tactical assets that it provided, and also coordinated with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to pursue potential federal charges (U.S. Attorney’s Office 2010; FBI 2010). Altogether, the use of these assets allowed a more robust search for the suspect and allowed TPD and HCSO to balance more acutely the needs of the investigation with the overall public safety needs of the community.

Recommendation. CNA recommends that the forward resource-planning actions taken in this incident be considered in future incidents. In addition, CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies consider methods to manage and organize incoming assistance and gain a greater understanding of the resources and capabilities federal and state partners can offer in a time of crisis.

Lesson Learned:

The ICS’s forward planning for tactical assets, technical support, and personnel in an incident of extended duration is important to ensure that the level of effort can be sustained throughout the operational response.

Discussion. As stated earlier, a large amount of resources and personnel became available throughout the incident. However, the unorganized donations and volunteers needed to be managed, sequenced, and matched to meet and anticipate operational demands. TPD interviewees noted a lack of documentation of personnel at the command post during each shift throughout the incident; there was no roster of operational census, so personnel were unevenly used, with some overscheduled and others waiting for assignments (TPD 2010b).

Documentation was also lacking in tracking resources. The great number of resources made it difficult to track what TPD had at any given time or what was still needed; for example, although TPD was able to provide an 800-MHz radio to the arriving outside agencies, TPD officers did not realize until after the incident that they had a stored cache of radios ready for immediate use, which they could have utilized but had overlooked (TPD 2010b). The management of resources would have proved even more difficult if the incident had gone on for another week (ibid.). Resources need to be managed to ensure that command staff distribute them evenly over time and employ fresh resources, when required.
**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies develop real-time resource-management tools and incorporate this tracking mechanism into E-Sponder or a similar system that can be readily deployed. A system of advanced check-in and credentialing could sequence and phase in resources as required and ensure adequate reserves are available.

**Donations Management**

The lessons learned in this function area are more closely tied to community-based police partnerships and as such can be found in the following chapter, Community Policing.

**ICS: Intelligence and Investigations**

**Lesson Learned:**

TPD effectively adapted the intelligence and investigations branches into its ICS structure to meet the need for separate but unified information sharing.

**Discussion.** Under more advanced implementation of ICS, especially in incidents with a heavy law enforcement presence, intelligence and investigations is an essential ICS branch during a large-scale criminal or terrorist incident involving sensitive information—information that, if inappropriately disclosed, could prevent the capture and arrest of dangerous individuals and jeopardize police and officer safety. Unlike a large fire or natural disaster, a criminal could use information to evade arrest and engage in more crimes against the community. As ICS is flexible in its implementation, the intelligence and investigations branch can be placed under the command, planning, or operations branch or under its entirely own section, depending upon the nature of the intelligence and investigations being gathered.

The ICS structure that TPD used during the response had the intelligence and investigations branch broken into two different entities, each with its own branch officers. (For a look at the TPD ICS structure, see **Figure 1 on page 2**.) The position of these branch officers within the command post ensured the de-confliction of any information received on the suspect (TPD 2010b). They also acted as liaisons to undercover officers in the field. Although these branch officers were in the command post, the activities undertaken within each branch were often kept on a need-to-know basis (ibid.). The use of this method ensured that only those with appropriate clearance were aware of sensitive and compartmentalized intelligence and of investigative activities taking place throughout the response.

Although there was an extensive use of these ICS branches throughout the response, the case is currently under trial, and the release of information on the activities employed by these branches has been sequestered by the state’s attorney, pending the capital trial.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies take advantage of the flexibility of the ICS structure. Adapting the ICS structure to meet an incident’s specific needs allows police departments and agencies to incorporate all aspects of ICS effectively without the concern that sensitive information will be released or hinder the successful completion of a task.
Community Policing

“We have also been shown through countless examples what an unshakeable and supportive ally we have in our community.”

— Chief Castor (McElroy et al. 2010)

Community policing is a philosophy promoting the systematic partnership of law enforcement operations with community members and organizations (COPS Office 2010). Community policing is an important part to any police operation, both in searching for a suspect and in reducing crime. Community engagement and mobilization can result in the early surrender of a suspect to authorities and can help prevent additional risk to public safety.

Background

Before 2003, Tampa had one of the highest crime rates in the country for a city of its size (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010). Mayor Iorio, elected into office in April of 2003, took on the initiative of reducing crime in Tampa by bringing on a new police chief with a specific directive to reduce crime (ibid.). In turn, the Tampa Police Department (TPD) was reorganized with a strict crime reduction mission in mind. In order to do this, TPD decided to establish and work on its relationship with the community and further develop mutual trust, organizational transparency, constant communication, and teamwork. Examples include the use of city cell phones, which a majority of TPD officers carry with them on a daily basis (ibid.). These city cell phones allow officers to provide direct and immediate contact with the citizens in their area of responsibility.

Another example of improved communication with the community is a search warrant directive (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010). In the past, officers would go into a neighborhood and execute a search warrant, arrest suspects, make seizures, and then leave, often leaving the surrounding community confused and unaware of what was happening. Currently, supervisors are directed to go to all surrounding residences when executing these services and explain their actions in detail (e.g., identify who was arrested and what contraband was seized), making the community aware of the specific law enforcement actions TPD is taking to keep their neighborhood safe (ibid.). This hard work has resulted in a 61 percent reduction in crime since 2003 (ibid.).

In this incident in particular, TPD was able to maintain situational awareness and mutual trust with the community by the chief’s consistent reminders to the officers to put their emotions aside and act professionally during the manhunt (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010). The chief made sure to keep the TPD officers informed by providing them with daily briefs via e-mail, the goal of which was not only to keep the officers situationally aware of the progress of the manhunt but also to prevent their frustrations from building and potentially turning into negative dealings within and outside the department (ibid.). Managing these emotions was particularly important for the chief and the safety of the officers and for maintaining trust with the community. In addition to keeping the officers informed, the TPD chief ensured a consistent public message was given to the public (ibid.). This message made the public aware of the suspect’s past criminal history, showing him as a threat not only to police officers but also to the community.

After the incident was resolved and the suspect turned himself in, the chief noted in an interview with CNA that she utilized all aspects of the media, including TV news, print, and radio to provide an overview and to thank the community. The chief participated in a live African-American radio show as well as a civic meeting in an African-American neighborhood where she advised the public that if there were any complaints on how the officers handled the search for the suspect, she would personally address them. In addition, she made sure to provide her cell phone number, so that anyone with a complaint could
contact her directly. The TPD chief repeatedly reassured the community that her officers were trained to put their emotions aside and to operate in a professional manner. (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010)

All of these efforts on TPD’s part played a large role in keeping the public aware of the operations that the police were undertaking as part of the manhunt. This, as well as maintaining communications with the public and the officers throughout the incident, ensured expectations were met and emotions were managed.

Summary of Lessons Learned

Lesson Learned:

Extensive donations were made throughout the response, arising from members of the public and from non-governmental and private-sector organizations.

Discussion. In addition to the support provided by neighboring jurisdictions, significant donations were made by the state, a number of federal agencies, the public, and many private-sector entities (see Table 2). The public primarily made donations directly to the command post. These donations consisted of food and cases of water that Tampa citizens dropped off. The number of public donations could be attributed partly to the fact that the command post was located in a vacant parking lot on a busy thoroughfare, easily visible to the public, and partly to the constant media coverage on police efforts (TPD 2010b).

A Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) deputy was assigned at the command post gate to quickly accept the donations being dropped off (HCSO 2010). At times, there were so many contributions that the deputy could not record the donors. The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) set up traffic cones to provide a separate lane for donation drop-offs (TPD 2010b).

In addition to the donations from the public, a number of donations were made by private-sector entities that had community partnerships with TPD or who saw a need to support and assist the officers in their search in any way they could. For example, WQYK, a Tampa radio station, donated the use of a cold trailer, allowing TPD to store food and water donations adequately (TPD 2010b). In addition, Brighthouse Networks provided high-speed Internet connections and T-1 high-speed wireless throughout the command post within the first days of the search (Brighthouse 2010). This ensured that the officers at the command post were able to search for and share information without worry of connectivity issues. Moreover, Outback Steakhouse and Carrabba’s Italian Grill, as well as a number of other restaurants, set up on-site to provide meals for the officers on duty (TPD 2010b).

Private-sector entities also made monetary donations. These donations allowed TPD to purchase much-needed logistical items for the command post, such as ice chests, canopies, and tents. For instance, Sykes Enterprises assisted TPD by donating $10,000 toward the purchase of any items needed for the incident (TPD 2010b).

The TPD chief ordered that all unconsumed food and beverages be delivered to Tampa homeless shelters (TPD 2010b). Off-duty officers and citizen volunteers helped to pack up, transport, and deliver food donations to the shelters, ensuring that no donations were wasted.

Table 2. Community organizations that contributed during the incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brighthouse Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrabba’s Italian Grill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crime Stoppers</td>
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<td>Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)</td>
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<td>Fraternal Order of Police (FOP)</td>
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<td>Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outback Steakhouse</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sykes Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tropicana</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Marshals Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>WQYK 99.5 Radio Station</td>
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* This table does not include all organizations that made community contributions.

Recommendation. CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies develop problem-solving partnerships throughout their communities to build a mutual-trust relationship. Agencies with community policing strategies should strengthen and maintain relationships with community organizations. This community-building will allow agencies to list sources
of possible support in future incidents. In addition, CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies specify in their plans and procedures how they will handle and document extensive donations.

**Lesson Learned:**

**Managing donations and volunteers in an incident of extended duration is important to ensure the sustainability of these operations.**

** Discussion.** Managing all of the donations was often difficult because the duration of the incident was unknown and because there was a lack of procedure on how to deal with donations and volunteers (TPD 2010b). This challenge goes hand-in-hand with the difficulty that the command staff faced in determining how to best manage resources and personnel with an unknown timeframe.

In this incident, managing donations was particularly difficult because of the limited space and limited means to store food items. Interviewees made sure to note that the public made considerably more donations than TPD had expected (TPD 2010b). TPD ultimately left the decision on how to handle the extensive amount of donations to the branch officer at the command post and assigned HCSO deputies to the entrance gate of the command post (HCSO 2010; TPD 2010b).

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies develop plans and procedures for how to process donations and integrate volunteers effectively in similar incidents. If these plans are already developed, law enforcement agencies should modify its volunteer- and donation-management plans used in large-scale emergencies to include incidents of smaller scale.

**Lesson Learned:**

**Community mobilization was reinforced through transparency in media releases.**

** Discussion.** Keeping the public informed of the police operations, the mission, and the reason for the manhunt operations was extremely important to TPD. Doing so developed awareness of the scope of the operation for both the public and for the suspect. TPD gave press releases regularly throughout the duration of the incident, which kept the press informed and initially out of the way of police operations (TPD 2010b).

Within hours of the incident, the chief was able to convey to the public exactly what the police were doing to catch the suspect (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010). She conveyed this partially through her tone, not necessarily through the divulgence of exact details. The chief was able to set a tone of sympathy for the fallen heroes and give a sense of strength and calm to a public that might otherwise have felt panic (ibid.). A strong message clearly established leadership and provided the community with a sense of confidence that leaders were in control of a dangerous situation (ibid.). This initially eliminated the public’s need for details of all police action.

As the manhunt continued, the public message slowly evolved to establish Morris as a community threat and, therefore, reinforced a tolerant attitude toward the police searches (TPD PIO 2010). These updates occurred every day. When TPD was able, additional information about the suspect and the incident was given to the public throughout the duration of the response. In addition to the press briefings, Florida Outdoor Advertising Association posted billboards with the suspect’s mug shot, and flyers were used in an effort to keep the incident—and subsequent search for the suspect—fresh in the public’s mind (TPD 2010b).

A number of interviewees also noted that having and distributing a good message to the public was important in creating a sense of community and common cause (TPD 2010b). Shortly after the incident began, TPD followed up the initial press release with a more in-depth and detailed press briefing given by the chief (ibid.). This news conference initially developed the sense of community and focused on the actions that the suspect had taken.

These press releases were coordinated with the PIO, the chief, and the mayor. The TPD PIO helped guide the strategy behind each press release (TPD PIO 2010). As the response went on, the press releases focused on the on-going efforts and increased determination of the police department to catch the suspect. These press releases continued to build on the sense
of common cause by showing the community that the suspect not only had shot and killed police officers but also was wanted for shooting and killing fellow community members (ibid.). The strategy of emphasizing the suspect’s continual threat allowed the community and the officers to join in a partnership to capture the suspect, or at least limit the suspect’s mobility and support.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that media messages be strategically planned to develop community support for the police mission and to encourage cooperation with police actions and area closures. The message to the community should reflect the philosophy of police-community partnerships and have as its goal the mobilization of the community.

**Lesson Learned:**

Tampa community leaders shared responsibility with the police and contributed to the outcome of arresting the suspect without any additional loss of life.

**Discussion.** In a number of instances, individuals close to the suspect came forward and made public and private pleas to the suspect to turn himself in (Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010). This was strategically cultivated by the chief. The chief was in touch with the suspect’s family, pastor, and community activists, so they would feel involved and invested in police actions to capture the suspect (ibid.). Tampa community leaders shared the responsibility with the police to arrest the suspect quickly. The suspect’s family pastor and mother both appeared in the media in a community setting, pleading with the suspect to stop the violence and turn himself in (Poltilove, Shaw, Altman, and Morelli 2010; TPD 2010b; Tampa Police Chief Castor 2010).

In addition, a local “activist” stated that the officers’ efforts to locate the suspect and search the Kenneth Court Apartments were professional. The “activist” specifically stated that the police and SWAT team were “not very aggressive at all, not hostile” (Mitchell, Wilmath, and Danielson 2010).

The pleas of those close to the suspect, as well as local community activists, express the community’s desire to bring the incident to a close and to capture the suspect.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies take into consideration the value of community leader participation in their search for a suspect. Community leaders, especially those who have a close relationship with the suspect, can give reasons for a successful and safe arrest. In addition, involving community leaders who have close relationships with their respective communities can assist police in their investigative efforts.

**Lesson Learned:**

Both TPD’s relationship with the community and the community’s constant vigilance ultimately led to the successful arrest of the suspect.

**Discussion.** Once TPD reached out to the public with a strategically developed message, positive responses from the community began pouring in. The community called in more than 400 tips over the course of four days (TPD 2010b). Many convenience stores and drycleaners posted photos of the suspect with the tip line number. Although the tips may not have been case-breakers, they reflected the vigilance of community members and their willingness to participate in the effort to catch the suspect. The community partnership with the police clearly communicated to the suspect that the perimeter was tightening around him and that his best course of action was to turn himself in.

Ultimately, it was TPD’s relationship with the community that led to the gathering of critical information on the whereabouts of the suspect. The intelligence gathered from the community was consistent and perhaps led the suspect to believe that there was no way out. As a result, those close to the suspect convinced him that it was in his best interest to turn himself in to police.

**Recommendation.** CNA recommends that law enforcement agencies invest in communities as a resource in supporting their efforts during future large-scale operations. CNA also recommends that law enforcement agencies proactively make their citizens aware of police operations within their neighborhoods, such as when search warrants or evidence is seized. This will increase the level of trust the community has with the police and further their cooperation during incidents where their assistance is needed.
Conclusion

Tampa’s incident serves as a real-world example of an unplanned, large-scale operation involving more than 22 federal, state, and local public safety agencies; countless volunteers; and a number of community partnerships. This report provides lessons learned for other law enforcement agencies to apply to their own policies and procedures for similar large-scale scenarios. Their documentation of the manhunt allows other law enforcement agencies to apply the lessons learned to strengthen current operational policies and procedures in similar, large-scale events.

To manage the complexities of the incident, the Tampa Police Department (TPD) quickly implemented the Incident Command System (ICS) and tailored it to their needs. TPD separated the intelligence and investigations branch, forming two branches for the incident, instead of combining it under the planning branch of ICS. This decision aided the security of the intelligence gathered while preserving the ability to de-conflict information within the command post. In addition, Tampa created a funeral-planning branch to separate it from the manhunt operations.

TPD also strengthened existing relationships with neighboring law enforcement agencies, enabling them to utilize a unified command and implement ICS effectively. Building these relationships prior to this incident (through joint training, planning, exercises, and involvement in other real-world incidents) allowed the agencies to assist each other without hindrance. These agencies are often described as working as one organization.

In addition, TPD’s media strategy of humanizing the fallen police officers, stressing the common threat the suspect posed, and keeping the public informed about the law enforcement operations allowed the police department to garner community support, which contributed to the apprehension of the suspect without further violence and loss of life.

TPD also effectively leveraged relationships developed through community policing. The assistance of small businesses and citizens became essential to the successful end to the manhunt.

The timely documentation of these lessons learned is important, especially in the aftermath of such a complex and emotion-triggering event. In light of recent incidents involving shootings of police officers, such reviews can help to improve the policies and practices that guide law enforcement operations and officer safety.

ATF. (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. October 1.

Brighthouse Networks. 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. September 30.


FBI. 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. October 1.


FDLE (Florida Department of Law Enforcement) 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. September 30.

HCSO (Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office) 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. September 29.

LPD (Lakeland Police Department) 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. October 1.


PCSO (Polk County Sheriff’s Office) 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. October 1.


Tampa Region UASI Administrator. 2010. “Tampa Region Interoperable Communications: A UASI Investment.” Tampa, Florida: Tampa Urban Area Security Initiative Reg. 4. See also Appendix F.


——. 2010b. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. September 27–October 1.


TPDPIO (Tampa Police Department Public Information Officer) 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. October 28.

U.S. Attorney’s Office. 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. October 1.

USMS (U.S. Marshals Service) 2010. Interviewed by CNA Analysis & Solutions. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. October 1.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISM</td>
<td>Critical Incident Stress Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPS Office</td>
<td>Office of Community Oriented Policing Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>cardiopulmonary resuscitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMV</td>
<td>Department of Motor Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOA</td>
<td>dead on arrival</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOB</td>
<td>date of birth</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>Emergency Management Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLE</td>
<td>Florida Department of Law Enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDOT</td>
<td>Florida Department of Transportation</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FIN</td>
<td>Florida Interoperability Network</td>
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<td>FOP</td>
<td>Fraternal Order of Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCSO</td>
<td>Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>HRT</td>
<td>Hostage Rescue Team</td>
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<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>IAP</td>
<td>incident action plan</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>joint information center</td>
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<td>LPD</td>
<td>Lakeland Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHz</td>
<td>megahertz</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>public information officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSIC</td>
<td>Public Safety Interoperable Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDSTF</td>
<td>Regional Domestic Security Taskforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Rapid Offender Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHSGP</td>
<td>State Homeland Security Grant Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>special weapons and tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGH</td>
<td>Tampa General Hospital</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPD</td>
<td>Tampa Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTPD</td>
<td>Temple Terrace Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>UASI</td>
<td>Urban Areas Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultra high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMS</td>
<td>U.S. Marshals Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSS</td>
<td>U.S. Secret Service</td>
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Appendix A: Departments and Agencies Interviewed

CNA conducted more than 36 interviews with a number of different departments and agencies in an effort to gather as much information as possible on the implementation of ICS throughout the incident. These departments and agencies included:

Brighthouse Networks
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Tampa Office
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO)
Lakeland Police Department (LPD)
Polk County Sheriff’s Office (PSCO)
Tampa Police Department (TPD)
U.S. Attorney’s Office
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)
U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

Appendix B: Departments, Agencies, and Organizations Involved

Brighthouse Networks
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
Carrabba’s Italian Grill
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Florida Department of Public Works
Florida Department of Transportation
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
Florida Highway Patrol
Fraternal Order of Police
Hernando County Sheriff’s Office
Hillsborough County Fire Rescue
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office
Hillsborough County State Attorney’s Office
Lakeland Police Department
Mothers Against Drunk Driving
Outback Steakhouse
Pasco County Sheriff’s Office
Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office
Pinellas Park Police Department
Polk County Sheriff’s Office
St. Petersburg Police Department
Tampa Fire Rescue
Tampa International Airport Police
Tampa Police Department
Tarpon Springs Police Department
Temple Terrace Police Department
Transportation Security Administration
U.S. Marshals Service
WQYK 99.5 Radio Station
Appendix C: ICS, as Defined by NIMS

What is ICS?

The following key features of the Incident Command System (ICS) are summarized from the National Incident Management System (DHS 2008).

ICS is a widely applicable management system designed to enable effective, efficient incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. ICS is a fundamental form of management established in a standard format, with the purpose of enabling incident managers to identify the key concerns associated with the incident—often under urgent conditions—without sacrificing attention to any component of the command system.

ICS is used to organize on-scene operations for a broad spectrum of emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and manmade. The field response level is where emergency management/response personnel, under the command of an appropriate authority, carry out tactical decisions and activities in direct response to an incident or threat. Resources from the federal, state, tribal, or local levels, when appropriately deployed, become part of the field ICS as prescribed by the local authority.

As a system, ICS is extremely useful; not only does it provide an organizational structure for incident management, but it also guides the process for planning, building, and adapting that structure. Using ICS for every incident or planned event helps hone and maintain skills needed for the large-scale incidents.

ICS is used by all levels of government—federal, state, tribal, and local—as well as by many NGOs and the private sector. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. The Intelligence/Investigations branch is an optional sixth functional area that is activated on a case-by-case basis.

Although the National Incident Management System (NIMS) identifies 14 management characteristics that are crucial to the success of ICS, many of these are related more to resource utilization or communications than strictly to management and coordination of incident response.

The key concepts of ICS are:

1. **Establishment and transfer of command.**
   The command function must be clearly established from the beginning of incident operations. The agency with primary jurisdictional authority over the incident designates the individual at the scene responsible for establishing command. When command is transferred, the process must include a briefing that captures all essential information for continuing safe and effective operations.

2. **Chain of command and unity of command.**
   Chain of command refers to the orderly line of authority within the ranks of the incident management organization. Unity of command means that all individuals have a designated supervisor to whom they report at the scene of the incident. These principles clarify reporting relationships and eliminate the confusion caused by multiple, conflicting directives. Incident managers at all levels must be able to direct the actions of all personnel under their supervision.

3. **Management by objectives.**
   Management by objectives is communicated throughout the entire ICS organization and includes:
   - establishing incident objectives;
   - developing strategies based on incident objectives;
   - developing and issuing assignments, plans, procedures, and protocols;
   - establishing specific, measurable tactics or tasks for various incident management functional activities and directing efforts to accomplish them in support of defined strategies;
   - documenting results to measure performance and facilitate corrective actions.
4. **Modular organization.**

The ICS organizational structure develops in a modular fashion based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of the hazard environment created by the incident. When needed, separate functional elements can be established, each of which may be further subdivided to enhance internal organizational management and external coordination. Responsibility for the establishment and expansion of the ICS modular organization ultimately rests with incident command, which bases the ICS organization on the requirements of the situation. As incident complexity increases, the organization expands from the top down as functional responsibilities are delegated. Concurrently with structural expansion, the number of management and supervisory positions expands to address the requirements of the incident adequately.

5. **Manageable span of control.**

Span of control is key to effective and efficient incident management. Supervisors must be able to adequately supervise and control their subordinates, as well as communicate with and manage all resources under their supervision. The type of incident, nature of the task, hazards and safety factors, and distances between personnel and resources all influence span-of-control considerations. It should be noted that this feature of NIMS/ICS is not as rigid as it is sometimes understood to be. While the doctrine and training materials for ICS do indeed emphasize that the span of control of any individual with incident management supervisory responsibility should range from three to seven subordinates, with five being optimal, these materials also state that during a large-scale law enforcement operation, eight to ten subordinates may be optimal. It follows logically then that the span of control mustn’t be any exact ratio, but—especially in complex law enforcement operations—must be whatever ratio the incident commander and section chiefs are comfortable with, so long as the other management concepts of ICS are met.

6. **Common terminology.**

From an organizational standpoint, a common glossary of position titles, resources, and facilities leads to a reduction in confusion and better understanding and coordination amongst different agencies. However, it is important to emphasize that the use of common language is equally if not more important in the areas of interagency communication (e.g., no code words, especially over radio communications) and tactical operations.

Aside from these management concepts, there are also two crucial aspects to coordinating any incident: incident action plans and integrated communications. Incident action plans (IAPs) ensure that all personnel, no matter their specific agency, are working toward the same goals set for an operational period. Centralized, coordinated incident action planning should guide all response activities. An IAP provides a concise, coherent means of capturing and communicating the overall incident priorities, objectives, strategies, and tactics in the context of both operational and support activities. Every incident must have an action plan. However, not all incidents require written plans. The need for written plans and attachments is based on the requirements of the incident and the decision of the incident commander or unified command. Most initial response operations are not captured with a formal IAP. However, if an incident is likely to extend beyond one operational period, become more complex, or involve multiple jurisdictions and/or agencies, preparing a written IAP will become increasingly important to maintain effective, efficient, and safe operations.

Integrated communications are essential if all personnel from all participating agencies are to be on the same page operationally, tactically, or logistically. Incident communications are facilitated through the development and use of a common communications plan and interoperable communications processes and architectures. ICS Form 205 is available to assist in developing a common communications plan. This integrated approach links the operational and support units of the various agencies involved and is necessary to maintain communications connectivity and discipline and to enable common situational awareness and interaction. Preparedness planning
should address the equipment, systems, and protocols necessary to achieve integrated voice and data communications.

**Incident Command**

For a given incident, there are two general types of incident command under ICS: single incident command and unified command.

Single incident command is appropriate for most events when an incident occurs within a single jurisdiction and when there are no agency or department overlaps in responsibility for dealing with the event.

Unified command is appropriate when an incident is multi-jurisdictional or requires the response of multiple agencies or organizations. Under unified command, “a collective approach is used to develop strategies to achieve incident objectives, [to improve] information flow and coordination…between all jurisdictions and agencies involved in the incident…[and to optimize] the combined efforts of all agencies…as they perform their respective assignments under one IAP.”

**Command Staff**

Typically, in ICS there are three major staff positions that answer directly to the incident/unified command:

1. The **public information officer** (PIO) serves as the conduit of information to internal and external stakeholders, including the media.

2. The **safety officer** is in charge of overseeing and monitoring safety conditions and helps to ensure the safety and well-being of all responders and personnel on scene at the incident.

3. **Liaison officers** are the interface between supporting agencies and the incident/unified command and help to ensure that supporting agencies’ policies and resources are represented in the decision-making processes that are underway.

**General Staff**

As shown in Figure C-1, the general staff consists of the various section chiefs. Under the normal ICS-100 incident management course, there are four main sections: Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. Under ICS-200, the number of sections can be expanded to include an Intelligence/Investigations section.

The sections have the following roles:

- **Operations** – direct management of all incident-related tactical activities
- **Planning** – collecting and disseminating of all incident-related situational information, responsibility for communicating situational awareness to all personnel, and developing IAPs as appropriate
- **Logistics** – overseeing and providing all resources, services, facilities, and support needed by incident personnel to accomplish the mission
- **Finance/Administration** – tracking incident-related costs, personnel time, vendor contracts; administering compensation and work-related claims; and maintaining an overall cost analysis for the incident
- **Intelligence/Investigations** – producing information that leads to the detection, apprehension, and/or prosecution of criminal activities and/or their perpetrators

It should be noted that no one section is required in ICS, and there is no maximum number of sections allowed; any or all of these sections and general staff are created and staffed by an affirmative decision of the incident/unified command. The needs of the specific incident at hand dictate the organizational structure employed.
Figure C-1. General organizational structure of an incident response under ICS
## Appendix D: List of Departments and Agencies According to Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments and Agencies</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives</td>
<td>Tactical Operations; Logistics; Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigations</td>
<td>Tactical Operations; Logistics; Investigation; Analysis; Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Department of Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Logistics; Investigation; Analysis; Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission</td>
<td>Tactical Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Highway Patrol</td>
<td>Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hernando County Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillsborough County Fire Rescue</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>Command; Tactical Operations; Logistics; Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hillsborough County State Attorney’s Office</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lakeland Police Department</td>
<td>Tactical Operations; Logistics</td>
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<td>Pasco County Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>Support</td>
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<td>Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office</td>
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<td>Pinellas Park Police Department</td>
<td>Support</td>
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<td>Polk County Sheriff’s Office</td>
<td>Tactical Operations; Logistics</td>
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<td>St. Petersburg Police Department</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa Fire Rescue</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tampa International Airport Police</td>
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<td>Tarpon Springs Police Department</td>
<td>Support</td>
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<td>Tactical Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
<td>Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Marshals Service</td>
<td>Investigation; Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Secret Service</td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix E: Deployment Templates

These templates were used by TPD to track the blended SWAT teams deployed. After discovering that tracking the teams on a whiteboard was inefficient, they decided to produce these templates to ensure that the locations of the SWAT teams were always known. These Microsoft Excel spreadsheets were then uploaded to E-Sponder, which provided the law enforcement agencies with the ability to share status information with those who have authorized use.

If such a system is not already utilized, these templates may prove beneficial to other law enforcement agencies.

Figure E-1. Complete SWAT team roster using Microsoft Excel
Figure E-2. Department-specific tactical team roster

Figure E-3. Date-specific deployments
Appendix F: Tampa Region Interoperable Communications: A UASI Investment

by Tampa Region UASI Administrator

Prior to 2009, law enforcement agencies throughout the region operated in multiple frequency bands and disparate system types for radio communications, making interoperability between responding agencies difficult.

As part of the Regional Domestic Security Taskforce (RDSTF) Interoperable Communications committee efforts, in conjunction with an Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) assessment in 2005, interoperable communications projects were made the number one priority for Homeland Security funding received through the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), and Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC). The assessment recommended that agencies migrate or replace existing technology with standards-based P25 technology in 700/800 MHz to establish a common operating platform.

Tampa Police Department (TPD) had operated on a conventional UHF radio system that was not compatible with either of the Hillsborough or Pinellas County 800-MHz countywide systems. In 2007, the City of Tampa solicited a bid for an 800-MHz communications system to replace their antiquated ultra high frequency (UHF) system. After multiple levels of review, it was recommended that TPD purchase P25 700/800-MHz Harris (formerly MA/Com) radios and operate on the Hillsborough County 800-MHz system. These recommendations were made based on the daily interaction with the Hillsborough County sheriff and on the fact that they would be compatible with the Pinellas and Polk County systems as they migrated to P25 technology. TPD used $7,932,612 in UASI grant funds and TPD funding to complete the migration of its field equipment and dispatch operations to 800-MHz technology. After TPD transitioned in 2009, it had direct interoperability with all agencies operating on 800-MHz through the conventional mutual aid channels and access to multiple talk-groups on the Hillsborough County trunked system.

Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Polk Counties are also using UASI and PSIC grant funds, in addition to county funding, to assist in expediting the migration of their systems to P25 technology. Hillsborough County has been allocated $12,748,373 and is in the process of transitioning their system to P25 technology, and they are currently in phase three of a five-phase project. The first phase of the Hillsborough County project directly benefited TPD. Pinellas County has been allocated $13,655,755 for the P25 migration of their existing countywide system, which will be fully transitioned to P25 technology in 2014. TPD currently has access to interoperability talk-groups on both the 700-MHz overlay, funded through the PSIC grant, and 800-MHz talk-groups on the P25 system, funded through the UASI grant. Polk County received $7,125,575 to assist in their recent P25 system migration, which can go online in late-August and can now talk to TPD through interoperability talk-groups.

Other local, state, and federal agencies throughout the region that do not have the ability to communicate on 800-MHz frequencies can be connected to the county-city networks through the Florida Interoperability Network (FIN), which is a statewide system funded through the SHSGP. Interoperability between agencies can be achieved in a variety of methods, has been used in many multi-jurisdictional operations throughout Tampa Bay since 2009, and is a direct result of regional leadership and grant funding.
Good morning, [Ma’am/Sir]:

As requested, here is a brief description of the purpose and need of your donation to the [X] Police Department.

These funds will be used for [e.g., food and supplies], as needed, to assist in the [police activity, e.g., search and capture of a suspect involved in a double police homicide and any funeral assistance necessary for Officer Jeffrey Kocob and Officer David Curtis]. Some supplies purchased will be used for future police operations (e.g., chairs, tables, and tents). Your donation can be sent to [X] Police Department, Attn: [Point of contact name and address]. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact [Police Department’s direct point of contact] at [phone number].

I have also attached a copy of our Federal Identification Number as requested.

Thank you in advance for your help.

[Point of Contact Name]
[Dept.]
[Position]
[Office phone number]
[Fax number]
[E-mail address]
About the COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources. The community policing philosophy promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime. In its simplest form, community policing is about building relationships and solving problems.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy cutting-edge crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test innovative policing strategies. The COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders and all levels of law enforcement.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $16 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing. More than 500,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.

The COPS Office has produced more than 1,000 information products—and distributed more than 2 million publications—including Problem Oriented Policing Guides, Grant Owner’s Manuals, fact sheets, best practices, and curricula. And in 2010, the COPS Office participated in 45 law enforcement and public-safety conferences in 25 states in order to maximize the exposure and distribution of these knowledge products. More than 500 of those products, along with other products covering a wide area of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—are currently available, at no cost, through its online Resource Information Center at www.cops.usdoj.gov. More than 2 million copies have been downloaded in FY2010 alone. The easy to navigate and up to date website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.
On June 29, 2010, at 2:15 AM, the Tampa Police Department suffered a tragic loss when two officers were shot and killed during a traffic stop. The suspect fled on foot. During the ensuing 96-hour manhunt, the Tamp Police Department established a multi-agency unified command using the Incident Command System (ICS) to plan, coordinate, and manage the complex response that involved 22 law enforcement agencies and more than 1,000 personnel, including volunteers and donations from the community.

Presented in this after-action report, the analyses and lessons learned from the Tampa Bay manhunt can be of significant use to all local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies that need to be able to coordinate an extended, multi-jurisdictional law enforcement response within their communities. Although ICS is approached at times with hesitation, Tampa’s incident response demonstrates the flexibility of ICS and its potential for successful implementation across all aspects of law enforcement operations. In addition, the report shows how relations built before a crisis can impact local community acceptance of extraordinary police presence or measures for extended periods.